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Each of the six chapters in this volume was first presented as a
public lecture as part of the Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar Series for
the academic year 2000–2001.  This series is sponsored jointly by the
Department of Economics at Western Michigan University and the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.  The series was titled
“The Economics of Work and Family” and included research from six
prominent economists specializing in family- and employment-related
economic studies.  The chapters tackle five broad subjects: child care,
parents’ time allocation, childbearing decisions, the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act (FMLA), and the relationship between family structure
and labor market outcomes.
Each of the authors is a nationally known and widely published
expert.  However, rather than attempting to present highly technical
research evidence, the intent of this volume is to be accessible to read-
ers from a wide variety of backgrounds, including policymakers, social
scientists, and college students.  In fact, the collection of lectures
would serve as a useful companion piece in a course on economics of
gender.
Perhaps the most significant problem workers face when attempt-
ing to mesh their work lives with their family lives is what to do with
young children during parents’ work hours.  Broadly stated, the child
care problems are availability, affordability, and quality.  What are the
magnitude and scope of these problems, and what might be govern-
ment’s role in alleviating these concerns?  The first two chapters in this
volume address these topics.
The first chapter, by Professor David M. Blau of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is titled “Federal Child Care Policy: An
Evaluation and Proposal for Reform.” Blau, a leader in framing the
child care debate in the language and logic of economics, begins by
describing the current role of the federal government in subsidizing
child care and early education.  Next he outlines the sources of market
failure in the child care market, and based on this outline he delineates
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the goals that federal child care policy should address.  Finally, cen-
tered on these ideal goals, he presents his vision for federal child care
policies and illustrates their costs.
As Blau describes, the job of regulating child care falls to the
states.  At present, the federal government intervenes in the child care
market by providing financial support through a number of targeted
child care subsidies.  After describing the various federal child care
subsidy programs, Blau analyzes two broad reasons for federal govern-
ment involvement in the child care market.  First, government inter-
vention might be necessary to help low-income workers achieve self-
sufficiency because quality child care is expensive and unaffordable
for many lower- or even moderate-income families.  Second, the gov-
ernment might play a role in rectifying some of the imperfections in the
child care market; for example, parents often do not possess complete
information about the overall importance of quality child care nor
about the actual quality of care their own children receive.  Blau
explains that the numerous justifications for intervention can be
reduced to two oft-conflicting goals: encouraging parents’ employment
and enhancing child development.
Blau concludes that the primary goal of child care policy ought to
be to strive (within obvious cost constraints) to enhance child develop-
ment.  Using this policy goal, he describes in detail a totally revamped
federal child care policy that provides significant child subsidies to
parents, who will then be responsible for making their own employ-
ment and child care decisions.  His proposal offers incentives for pur-
chasing quality care, but they are not contingent on parental
employment.  Finally, in his conclusion, Blau hopes to influence the
child care debate with a clearly devised policy that recognizes trade-
offs between different goals and takes a stand behind a single goal—
improving child development.
The second chapter, also on the topic of child care, is written by
Professor Emerita Barbara R. Bergmann, retired from both American
University and the University of Maryland.  Bergmann exploits her
many years of commitment to the integration of sound economic
thought with responsible social policy in her more expansive interpre-
tation of government’s role in child care.  This chapter, titled “Think-
ing about Child Care Policy,” focuses on the importance of affordable,
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quality child care to lower-income families and their ability to achieve
economic self-sufficiency.
Contrasted with Blau’s chapter, Bergmann’s piece, while filled
with data and computations, is more of an advocacy statement concern-
ing the impact of child care costs on families’ standards of living.  She
summarizes the costs of care and its affordability for families of differ-
ent income levels.  Next, based on these analyses, she develops a work-
able definition of “affordable” child care and outlines its important
characteristics.  Finally, she projects the costs of three new child care
policy plans, with increasing subsidy eligibility for more families.  The
plans range from targeting the most disadvantaged families to provid-
ing universal coverage.  She argues that while these plans are expen-
sive, they are cost-effective and crucial if we as a nation wish to
ameliorate the effects of child poverty and encourage self-sufficiency
(with an accompanying improvement in quality of life) for disadvan-
taged families.
Professor Cordelia W. Reimers of Hunter College and the Gradu-
ate School of the City University of New York is the author of the third
chapter, titled “Parents’ Work Time and the Family: Thirty Years of
Change.”  This chapter summarizes the evolution over time in the way
that parents divide their time between home activities and paid work.
Reimers explains that the enormous changes in work behavior, family
incomes, family structure, and fertility rates throughout the last three
decades of the twentieth century have worked both to increase and
decrease parental time available for their children.  This chapter exam-
ines the demographic trends in detail and reports the net impact of
these trends on parental time devoted to their children.
Reimers details the following five demographic trends: changing
family structure (in particular, the rise in single-parent households),
increases in parents’ combined work time (arising from increased
maternal employment and work hours), the surprising stability in
median family income, the widening distribution of family income,
and declining fertility rates.  Reimers uses national survey data for var-
ious years spanning the period 1960–1999 from the Current Population
Survey, a survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.  She includes
in her discussion a comparison across race and ethnicity and explains
the net outcomes for children arising from these broad trends.  She
exploits the availability (albeit limited) of data concerning explicit time
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use by parents.  One surprising finding is that mothers’ time spent in
child care has declined by only 10 percent, with the bigger loss seen in
mothers’ free time.  Additionally, as an increasing number of mothers
assume more responsibilities outside the home, fathers have been slow
to pick up the slack at home, although their time in unpaid home work
has increased somewhat.  Finally, Reimers discusses the implications
of mothers’ market work for their power within the household and the
potential consequences of this enhanced power for child well-being.
In her conclusions, Reimers describes several possible policy
responses to the rising concerns about the family “time crunch,” with a
focus on employer responses to the work and family conflict.  These
include enhanced “flex-time,” voluntary shift work, increased possibil-
ities of home-based work, expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
and finally, precisely the policies discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 that
would affect the affordability and quality of child care.
What are the links between women’s childbearing behavior and
their employment outcomes?  Professor Susan L. Averett of Lafayette
College examines this topic in her chapter, titled “Fertility, Public Pol-
icy, and Mothers in the Labor Force.”  Averett focuses first on fertility
(childbearing).  She explains in nontechnical terms the way that econo-
mists model fertility decisions.  Then she outlines the relationship
between public policy and fertility behavior, with a focus on taxes,
welfare policy, Medicaid, and maternity leave.  Next Averett turns to a
discussion of the employment behavior surrounding childbirth for
mothers holding professional jobs, and finally to an examination of the
family pay gap: a comparison of the earnings differential between
working mothers and women without children who work.  In her con-
clusion, Averett restates the fundamental premise of her chapter:
despite having no explicit policies designed to affect fertility rates, it is
clear that past and existing policies in the United States have had some
impact on decision making regarding fertility choice.  She concludes
that “it is of increasing importance to examine the delicate balance
between work and family that many women must maintain,” for
women all along the income/education spectrum.
Chapter 5, “How Family Structure Affects Labor Market Out-
comes,” is also related to the topic of fertility and labor force participa-
tion.  The author, Professor Joyce P. Jacobsen of Wesleyan University,
is a prominent researcher of gender issues.  Her book, The Economics
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of Gender, now in its second edition, has become a standard reference
work in this area.  Her chapter summarizes trends in family structure
and labor market outcomes, and the reasons the two may and may not
be related.
Jacobsen begins this discussion by presenting the definition of a
family and the meaning of family structure, and the range of labor mar-
ket outcomes to be examined.  Then she presents descriptive evidence
about these two concepts and develops the reasoning economists use to
explain why there may or may not be a relationship between the two.
Finally, she reviews some of the extensive research that has been con-
ducted in this area and considers whether these findings contain any
policy relevance.  As Jacobsen explains, the mere presence of linkages
between family structure and labor market outcomes does not lead nec-
essarily to the conclusion that there is a “problem” for policy initiatives
to remedy.  The clearest grounds for intervention exist in the realm of
labor market outcomes that can be tied to “accidents of birth.”  That is,
none of us is responsible for which family we are born into, and to the
extent that birth family circumstance negatively affects future work
possibilities, there might be grounds for policy intervention.
Potentially one of the most important policy advances in recent
history was the passage of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) in 1993.  This landmark legislation mandates 12 weeks of
unpaid, job-protected leave each year for eligible workers for care-giv-
ing and medical reasons.  The FMLA legislation includes as an explicit
goal the promotion of economic security for all families.  Dr. Katherin
Ross Phillips of the Urban Institute has studied this legislation in depth
and reports on her findings as well as the broader literature in Chapter
6, “Working for All Families? Family Leave Policies in the United
States.”  She summarizes the existing evidence concerning the utiliza-
tion of FMLA leaves and analyzes its impact on family economic secu-
rity.  
Phillips begins her discussion by describing the FMLA and
explaining its connections to various state and employer leave policies.
Then she discusses the importance of access, or eligibility, to this leave
coverage, and the linkages between access and family income level.
Unfortunately, as is common with other family-related policies, the
less that families are likely to have to rely on a federal mandate, the
more likely they are to be covered by the FMLA mandate.  That is,
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higher-income families are more likely to have a family member
employed in an FMLA-eligible job. 
After Phillips discusses access to FMLA leave, she moves on to
the discussion of actual take-up of such leave.  Because the mandated
leave is unpaid, many families simply cannot afford to take it.  She
describes the types of workers and family members who report having
taken such leave and finds that the majority of workers taking FMLA
leave report reasons other than childbirth for their leaves.  This merely
confirms the argument made by the legislation’s early proponents that
it was truly family policy, not women’s policy.  Phillips concludes her
chapter by describing several policy solutions to the access and take-up
problems that she has outlined.
The work/family topics covered in this volume are timely given the
passage of family-related legislation such as the FMLA in 1993, as
well as the 1996 federal reform of welfare that pushed millions of
unskilled single mothers into the workforce.  As we as a nation attempt
to recover from the current recession and from the lingering economic
effects of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, consideration of the
factors that facilitate or hinder families’ economic security must not be
lost.  
Finally, I want to use this volume to publicly mourn the untimely
death last year of  well-known economist and policy researcher Profes-
sor Leslie A. Whittington of Georgetown University.  She devoted her
academic career to studies intended to enhance our understanding of
the linkages and conflict between work and family.  She, along with
her husband and two young daughters, was killed in the September 11
terrorist attacks.  Any dialogue and informed policy debate that stems




Federal Child Care Policy
An Evaluation and Proposal 
for Reform
David M. Blau
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
INTRODUCTION
Child care in the United States is a problem.  This is the message of
many newspaper and magazine articles, conferences, and reports by
think tanks and government agencies.  Depending on whom you ask,
the child care problem endangers the well-being of children, causes
financial hardship and stress for families, makes it nearly impossible
for low-income families to work their way off welfare, causes substan-
tial productivity losses to employers, and prevents many mothers from
maintaining productive careers in the labor force.  The federal govern-
ment plays a major role in the U.S. child care market, providing subsi-
dies worth almost $20 billion.1 Are these subsidies well spent? Do they
help accomplish the goals of federal child care policy? What are the
goals of federal child care policy, and how do these goals relate to the
nature of the child care problem in the United States? This chapter
addresses these questions from an economics perspective.  The goal of
the chapter is to reach some conclusions about whether child care pol-
icy is sensible, and if not, how it could be improved.  
An economics perspective on this issue is helpful because it
focuses attention on the rationale for government intervention in the
child care market.  The two main arguments that have been made in
support of government intervention in child care are based on attaining
economic self-sufficiency and correcting child care market imperfec-
tions that result from imperfect information and externalities.  If we
believe that the child care market is inefficient as a result of some kind
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of market failure, we can then examine whether government policy is
directed appropriately at the cause of the market failure.  The key is to
identify the source of the market failure.  Child care costs as a barrier to
economic independence for low-income people suggests a different
approach to child care policy than market failure related to the quality
of child care.  The crucial issue in evaluating whether child care policy
is sensible is determining which, if either, of these problems are impor-
tant in practice in the child care market.  This chapter discusses and
evaluates the evidence on child care costs as a barrier to economic
independence and the evidence on market failure in child care.
The second section of the chapter describes the main features of
current federal child care subsidy policy.  The next section then dis-
cusses in more detail the possible sources of market failure and evalu-
ates the available evidence on them.  In the fourth section, I propose a
set of principles that I believe should guide child care policy.  These
principles are based in part on the evidence regarding the importance
of alternative sources of child care market failure, but they are also
based on my own views about what the goals of child care policy
should be.  This is inevitably subjective, and I try to be clear about the
views I have on the topic.  The fifth section evaluates existing child
care policy in light of the guiding principles and finds that there is
much room for improvement.  Next I propose a new set of child care
policies that are more consistent with the principles that I believe
should guide child care policy.  I discuss the rationale for the new pro-
posal and present some illustrative calculations of its cost.  The final
section contains a summary and conclusions.
U.S. CHILD CARE SUBSIDY POLICY
Child care subsidies help parents pay their expenses for nonparen-
tal child care and preschool, and help child care providers pay the cost
of providing such care.  Some of the subsidy programs are restricted to
employment-related child care expenses, while others have no employ-
ment requirement.  The goals and structure of employment-related
child care subsidy programs are quite different from those of early edu-
cation preschool programs.  Society faces a trade-off in child care pol-
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icy between the goals of improving child well-being and increasing the
net return from employment for parents of young children.  Thus it is
important to interpret child care subsidies broadly and include in the
discussion all programs that help defray expenses for the regular care
of young children by adults other than their parents.  A subsidy for
work-related child care expenses may affect the quality of child care
purchased, whether or not this is a goal of the subsidy program, and a
subsidy for an early education program intended to improve child
development affects the work incentives of the parents, whether by
design or not.
The goals and main provisions of the major U.S. child care and
early education subsidy programs are summarized in Table 1.2 The first
two programs listed are tax subsidies.  The exclusion from taxable
income of employer-provided dependent care expenses (EEPDCE) is a
fringe benefit offered by some firms to their employees in one of two
forms.  First, if the firm provides child care benefits to its employees in
the form of subsidized on-site or near-site facilities or direct reimburse-
ment of employee expenses, such benefits are treated as a form of non-
taxable compensation, such as health insurance.  Only 4 percent of
employees in private establishments had such benefits in 1995–1996
(U.S. Department of Labor 1998).  Second, if the firm provides its
employees with the option of a flexible spending or reimbursement
account (“cafeteria plan”) that can be used for child care expenses, the
employee contribution to such an account is treated as nontaxable com-
pensation.  Twenty percent of private sector workers in 1995–1996
worked for a company that had established a reimbursement account to
cover child care expenses.
The Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) allows taxpayers with an
adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than $10,000 to receive a tax
credit of 30 percent for child care expenses of up to $4,800 per year for
two or more children ($2,400 for one child).  The subsidy rate declines
by one percentage point for each $2,000 increase in AGI, reaching 20
percent for AGI of $28,000.  The subsidy rate remains constant for an
AGI above $28,000.  This subsidy is means-tested in the sense that the
value of the subsidy declines as income increases.  More importantly,
however, the credit is not refundable, so the amount of credit available
to low-income families is relatively small.  A nonrefundable credit is
limited to the amount of income tax liability; many low-income fami-
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a Earlier provisions of the Social Security Act provided federal matching funds to the states for social services.
b Less than 2% of the funds in the food program go to adult care centers.
c Beginning in 2003, the maximum credit rate will be 35% for AGI # 15K and the limit on expenses will be $3,000 for one child and $6,000 for
two or more children.
SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means (1998) and U.S. Department of Education (1996).
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lies have no federal income tax liability and therefore cannot receive
any tax credit.  Data from the Internal Revenue Service indicate that
27.4 percent of the total amount of tax credit claimed in 1999 went to
families with an AGI of less than $30,000, but almost all of this
amount was claimed by families with an AGI between $15,000 and
$30,000; only 0.8 percent of the total was claimed by families with an
AGI less than $15,000 (Internal Revenue Service 2001, Table 3.3).
In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act (PRWORA) consolidated four existing employment-
related child care subsidy programs for low-income families into a sin-
gle child care block grant program called the Child Care and Develop-
ment Fund (CCDF).3 The main goal of the consolidated program is to
facilitate the transition of families from welfare to work and to help
low-income parents maintain employment.  States can use CCDF funds
to assist families with income up to 85 percent of state median income
(SMI) but are free to use a lower income-eligibility criterion.  Parents
must be employed, in training, or in school, although some exceptions
are permitted.  In general, priority for CCDF funds is supposed to be
given to families with very low incomes and with children who have
special needs.  The CCDF also requires that part of the funds be used to
assist working poor families who are not currently, recently, or likely
future welfare recipients.  As part of the general increase in flexibility
provided by PRWORA, states are permitted to transfer up to 30 percent
of their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)4 block
grant funds to the CCDF to be used for child care, and states can also
use TANF funds directly for child care services without transferring
the funds to CCDF.  States must offer “certificates” (formerly called
vouchers) that allow families to purchase care from any provider that
meets state regulations and licensing standards or is legally exempt
from licensing, including relatives and baby-sitters.
The states have substantial flexibility in designing their CCDF pro-
grams, including the income eligibility limit, co-payments by families,
and reimbursement rates to providers.  Only nine  states set income eli-
gibility at the maximum allowed by law, 85 percent of SMI.  Seven
states set the income eligibility limit at less than 50 percent of SMI.
States are permitted to waive fees (co-payments) for families with
income below the poverty line, and there is substantial variation among
states in use of this provision.  Fees are determined in many different
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ways, including flat rates, percent of cost, percent of income, and com-
binations of these.  States are required to have sliding scale fee struc-
tures, with fees that rise with family income.  The amount of the
subsidy is supposed to be based on a recent market survey, with the
subsidy set to cover the fee charged by the provider at the 75th percen-
tile of the market rate distribution.  In practice, many states use out-of-
date market surveys or set the subsidy below the 75th percentile
(Adams, Schulman, and Ebb 1998, p. 23).
The other main means-tested subsidy program with an employ-
ment focus is the Title XX Social Services Block Grant (TXX).  This
program subsidizes a wide variety of social services and gives states
flexibility in how the funds are allocated across the various eligible ser-
vices.  On average, about 15 percent of TXX funds have been spent on
child care in recent years.  Child care funded by Title XX must meet
applicable state standards, and it is often provided through “slots” in
centers and family day care homes purchased through grants and con-
tracts with state or local agencies.  States choose the income eligibility
limit.
The last three programs listed in Table 1, Head Start, the Child
Care and Adult Food Program (CCFP), and Title I-A of the Elementary
and Secondary Schools Act, are intended to improve child well-being,
and these programs therefore have no employment or training require-
ment for the parents.  Head Start provides part-day preschool, along
with health, nutrition, and social services, to children from families in
poverty.  The goal of the program is to improve the social competence,
learning skills, health, and nutrition of children.  Head Start programs
must meet a set of federal standards that are more stringent and child-
development-oriented than most state regulations.  The CCFP provides
subsidies for meals meeting federal nutrition requirements served in
licensed day care centers and family day care homes serving low-
income children.  Subsidy rates depend on family income of the chil-
dren served, with a maximum income of 185 percent of the poverty
level.  The goal of Title I-A is to provide services for educationally dis-
advantaged children who are at risk of failing to meet student perfor-
mance standards.  Most Title I-A funds go to schools serving K-12
students, but state and local education agencies may use such funds to
serve preschool aged children as well, in school-based or community-
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based programs.  Title I-A programs must meet the Head Start stan-
dards.
Table 2 summarizes federal and state expenditures on child care
subsidies in recent years, and the numbers of children served by the
subsidy programs.  Assuming that fiscal year (FY) 1999 CCFP expen-
ditures are the same as in FY1997 (in real terms), and that FY1999 real
CCDF expenditures are the same as in FY1998, a rough figure for total
federal and state expenditure on child care subsidies in FY1999 is $18
billion.  A meaningful total for the number of children cannot be com-
puted.  Head Start and the CCDF are the two biggest programs in terms
of expenditures, at $5.5 billion each.  Head Start is the best-funded pro-
gram per child served, with annual expenditures of $5,759 per child
versus $3,400 per child in the CCDF.  The only subsidy programs that
are open-ended entitlements are the EEPDCE and DCTC tax subsidies
(in terms of number of children served, not expenditures per child).
The other programs are capped entitlements, with no obligation to
serve all eligible families.  It is estimated that the CCDF serves only 15
percent of eligible children (Administration for Children and Families
1999).  Head Start is estimated to serve 34 percent of 3- to 5-year-old
children in poverty.5 No figures are available on the percentage of eli-
gible children served for the other programs.
WHY SUBSIDIZE CHILD CARE?
The two main arguments that have been used in support of govern-
ment subsidies to child care are based on attaining economic self-suffi-
ciency and correcting child care market imperfections.6
Self-Sufficiency
Child care subsidies might help low-income families be economi-
cally self-sufficient, which in this context means employed and not
enrolled in cash-assistance welfare programs.  Self-sufficiency might
be considered desirable because it may increase future self-sufficiency
by inculcating a work ethic and generating human capital through on-
the-job training and experience, and it may therefore save the govern-
16Table 2 Federal and State Expenditures and Children Served by Major Federal Child Care Subsidy Programs
DCTCa EEPDCEb HSc TXX-CC CCFP CCDF Title I-Ao
Federal and state expenditures (billions of constant 1999 dollars)
2000 2.200 0.984 5.056 0.222d 1.624g — —
1999 — 0.995 4.658 0.285e — 9.132j 2.015
1998 2.649 0.910 4.443 — — 6.540j —
1997 2.464 0.862 4.132 0.384f 1.582h 4.535j —
1996 2.663 0.823 4.223 0.374f 1.678h — —
1995 2.518 0.792 3.862 0.453f 1.603h 3.4k —
Children served (millions)
2000 — — 0.858 — — — —
1999 — — 0.826 — — 1.760l —
1998 6.120 — 0.822 — 2.6i 1.531l —
1997 5.796 — 0.794 — 2.2l 1.248m
1996 6.003 — 0.752 — 2.4l —
1995 5.964 — 0.751 — 2.3l 1.445n
NOTE: See Table 1 for definitions of the program acronyms.  Current dollar expenditures were converted to constant 1999 dollars using
consumer price index values of 1.093, 1.062, 1.038, and 1.022, 1.0, and 0.96 for 1995 through 2000, respectively.  Blank cells indicate
that data are not available.  This table is from Blau 2001a, Table 8.2.
a Committee on Ways and Means 2000, 816. The figure for 2000 is estimated (600). The 1998 figures are preliminary. Figures in the
lower panel are number of returns filed claiming the credit, not the number of children. The figures are for calendar years, not fiscal
years.
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b Office of Management and Budget 1996, Table 5-1. These figures are for the calendar year. The method used to compute them is
unclear, and in budget statements for subsequent years they are different. They are also different in Joint Committee on Taxation (1999).
These are probably the least reliable figures in the table.
c Head Start Fact Sheet 2001.
d Thirteen percent of $1.775 billion, multiplied by 0.96 to convert to 1999 dollars (Committee on Ways and Means 2000, 600).
e Estimated at 15 percent of $1.9 billion for TXX from Committee on Ways and Means (2000, 634).
f Committee on Ways and Means 1998, 714, 720: 14.8 percent of total TXX funding of $2,800 billion, $2.381 billion, and $2,500 billion
for fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997.
g Committee on Ways and Means 2000, 600.
h Committee on Ways and Means 1998, 679, 687.
i U.S. Department of Agriculture 2001.
j I computed these figures by summing all federal and state expenditures on the CCDF, either directly or through transfers to TANF,
using data from the annual TANF reports to Congress (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, various years) and reports from
the Child Care Bureau (various years). The latter source provides allocations to the CCDF for fiscal years 200 and 2001, but there are
not data available on transfers from TANF for these years. Transfers to TANF constituted about half of CCDF spending in fiscal year
1999.
k U.S. General Accounting Office 1998, 4; total funding for the four programs later consolidated into the CCDF: AFDC-CC, TCC,
ARCC, CCDBG.
l Administration for Children and Families 2000a.
mAdministration for Children and Families 1998, 1.
n Sum of AFDC-CC, TCC, ARCC, and CCDBG Administration for Children and Families 1995.
o U.S. General Accounting Office 1999, 6: Department of Education programs: Title I-A, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
Even Start, Twenty-First Century Learning Centers. U.S. General Accounting Office (2000b) gives different figures, and an estimate of
341,000 preschool children served by Title I-A and Even Start.
18 Blau
ment money in the long run (Robins 1991, p. 15).  These arguments
explain why many child care subsidies are conditioned on employment
or other work-related activities such as education and training.  Child
care and other subsidies paid to employed low-income parents may
cost the government more today than would cash assistance through
TANF.  But if the dynamic links suggested above are important, then
these employment-related subsidies could result in increased future
wages and hours worked and lower lifetime subsidies than the alterna-
tive of cash assistance both today and in the future.  Note that this argu-
ment has nothing to do with the effects of child care on children, and
there are few restrictions on the type and quality of child care that can
be purchased with employment-related subsidies such as the CCDF
and DCTC.
There is surprisingly little known about wage growth of low-
skilled workers, but a recent paper by Gladden and Taber (2000) pro-
vides some useful evidence.  Using panel data from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth, they analyze wage growth of individuals
with no more than a high school education over the first ten years after
completing schooling.  They find that wage growth rates as a function
of labor market experience are very similar for different skill groups, as
defined by education (high school graduate or high school dropout).
The fact that the lower-skilled groups have wage growth rates similar
to the higher-skilled groups suggests that low-skilled workers do gain
higher wages by being employed.  But the actual wage growth rates
with experience are modest for all skill groups, and do not seem high
enough to lift low-skilled workers out of poverty.  For example, high
school dropouts averaged 4.4 percent wage growth per year of actual
work experience over the first 10 years of work.  Thus, if a high school
dropout began working at the minimum wage of $5.15, after 10 years
of work experience her wage rate would have increased to $8.00.  This
is not negligible but is also not enough to significantly reduce depen-
dence on welfare.  Gladden and Taber conclude from their results that
“. . . low-skilled workers will not have huge wage gains from work
experience” (p. 189).
Middle- and upper-income families are generally not at risk of
going on welfare, so why should the government provide subsidies for
the employment-related child care expenses of such families through
the DCTC and EEPDCE tax programs? There is no apparent economic
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rationale for such subsidies.  They appear to be purely a redistribution
of the federal tax burden from taxpayers who use paid child care to
those who do not, in much the same way that the mortgage interest
deduction redistributes the tax burden away from homeowners and
toward nonhomeowners.  In the absence of any economic rationale for
middle-class child care subsidies, the most likely explanation for the
existence of such subsidies is that they are politically popular.
Market Imperfections
The other main argument in favor of government child care subsi-
dies is the existence of imperfections in the child care market.  The
imperfections that are often cited are imperfect information available
to parents about the quality of child care, and positive external benefits
to society generated by high-quality child care.  Walker (1991) spells
out these points in detail; the discussion here follows his arguments
closely (see also Council of Economic Advisers 1997; Magenheim
1995; and Robins 1991).  Imperfect information in the child care mar-
ket exists because consumers are not perfectly informed about the
identity of all potential suppliers, and because the quality of care
offered by any particular supplier is not fully known.  A potential rem-
edy for the first problem is government subsidies to Resource and
Referral (R&R) agencies to maintain comprehensive and accurate lists
of suppliers.  This may not solve the problem in practice because of
very high turnover and unwillingness to reveal their identity among
informal child care providers.  The second information problem is
caused by the fact that consumers know less about product quality than
does the provider, and monitoring the provider is  costly to the con-
sumer.  This can lead to moral hazard (hidden action) and/or adverse
selection.  Moral hazard is a plausible outcome in day care centers (for
example, changing diapers just before pick-up time).  Adverse selec-
tion of providers is plausible in the more informal family day care sec-
tor: family day care is a very low-wage occupation, so women with
high wage offers in other occupations are less likely to choose to be
care providers.  If the outside wage offer is positively correlated with
the quality of care provided, then women who choose day care would
offer lower-quality care than would the potential caregivers who
choose other occupations.
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Is there evidence that child care consumers are not well informed?
Walker (1991) reports that 60–80 percent of child care arrangements
made by low-income parents are located through referrals from friends
and relatives or from direct acquaintance with the provider.  This sug-
gests that consumers may not be well informed about a wide range of
potential providers, but it does not prove that a suboptimal amount of
information is used by consumers.  Using data from the “Cost, Quality,
and Outcomes” study Helburn (1995) and Cryer and Burchinal (1995)
report a direct comparison of parent ratings of various aspects of their
child’s day care center classroom with trained observer ratings of the
same aspects.  The results show that parents give higher average rat-
ings on every item than do trained observers, by about one standard
deviation on average for preschool age classrooms and by about two
standard deviations on average for infant/toddler rooms.  The instru-
ment containing these items, The Early Childhood Environment Rating
Scale (Harms and Clifford 1980), is of demonstrated reliability when
administered by trained observers, so this suggests that parents are not
well informed about the quality of their child care arrangements.  Son-
enstein (1991) reports that low-income mothers express greater satis-
faction with their child care arrangements when they believe it is
convenient, reliable, and low cost than when they believe it is high
quality.
The evidence suggests that there may be an information problem in
the child care market, but it does not rule out other possibilities.  For
example, parents could be aware of the developmental benefits of high-
quality child care but place low value on those benefits compared with
other things they can buy.  Parents might feel that their own influence
on the development of their children can make up for the effects of
low-quality child care, or that the developmental outcomes measured
by standard assessments are less important than, say, religious values,
respect for authority, and other intangible attributes of child care.
Child care subsidies targeted at high-quality providers could
induce parents to use higher-quality care by reducing the relative price
of such care.  This would not necessarily remedy the information prob-
lem, but it would deal with a consequence of that problem, namely a
level of child care quality that is suboptimal from the perspective of
society.  Head Start and Title I tend to provide subsidies for high-qual-
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ity child care for low-income children, while other subsidies generally
place few restrictions on quality.7
The externality argument is a standard one that closely parallels the
reasoning applied to education.  High-quality child care leads to
improved intellectual and social development, which in turn increases
school-readiness and completion.  This reduces the cost to society of
problems associated with low education: crime, drugs, teenage preg-
nancies, and so forth.  If parents are not fully aware of these benefits, or
if they account for only the private rather than the social benefits of
high-quality child care, then they may choose child care with less than
socially optimal quality.  This argument could rationalize subsidies tar-
geted to high-quality providers, such as Head Start, and could rational-
ize similar programs for middle- and upper-income children.  
Evidence on the effect of child care quality on child development
is of two main types.  The first is from randomized assignment studies
that have evaluated the impact of high-quality preschool programs for
disadvantaged children.  A comprehensive review of early childhood
interventions by Karoly et al. (1998) concludes that such programs can
provide significant benefits to participating children and can reduce
future expenditures on welfare, criminal justice, and related items.
This evidence is compelling, but it is based mainly on very intensive
and costly programs that are of higher quality than even Head Start.  It
is unclear whether child care of moderately high quality provides posi-
tive but proportionately smaller developmental benefits, or whether
there exists a threshold of quality below which benefits are negligible.
The second type of evidence is from observational studies of children
placed by their parents in child care arrangements of varying quality.
Such studies have generally not followed the children long enough to
determine whether any observed developmental gains are long-lasting
and whether there are subsequent effects on school outcomes.  Hence,
there is very little evidence about externalities in the child care market.
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WHAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD GUIDE CHILD CARE POLICY?
The following principles are based both on my reading of the evi-
dence and on the goals that I believe a child care policy should attempt
to achieve.  The latter are obviously based on my opinion.
Child care policy should be neutral with respect to employment.
There are no compelling economic or moral reasons for society to
encourage employment of both parents in a two-parent middle-class
family.  Although many parents may feel that two incomes are neces-
sary for a reasonable standard of living, there is no reason why society
should provide them with a subsidy to defray the child care costs asso-
ciated with achieving the desired standard of living.  There is a more
compelling case for society to encourage single parents to achieve eco-
nomic independence through employment, but a child care subsidy is
at best an indirect and at worst an ineffective approach to accomplish-
ing this goal.  A wage subsidy such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) or a job skills training program are more direct approaches to
dealing with the underlying source of welfare dependence, low skills
and the resulting low wages.  Instead of subsidizing employment of
parents, government should, if anything, subsidize the costs of raising
children, without favoring market child care costs over the foregone
earnings cost of a parent who stays home to care for a child.
Child care policy should provide information to parents about the
benefits of high-quality child care and about how to discern the quality
of care.  In my view, quality is the crux of the child care problem.  If
parents lack information about the benefits of high-quality child care or
do not know how to recognize it, then children suffer as a result.  The
evidence on these points is not overwhelming, but it is persuasive
enough that I would prefer the government take action rather than risk
harm to children.  If effective and low-cost policies to provide informa-
tion can be designed, then this would be a good approach because it
directly addresses the source of the inefficiency.  
Child care policy should provide incentives for parents to choose
high-quality care.  These policies would be worthwhile, because as
noted above some parents who are fully informed about the benefits of
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high-quality child care may nevertheless fail to choose it.  Financial
incentives can be a potential remedy for this problem.
Child care policy should give providers an incentive to offer high-
quality care.  If consumers are given incentives to choose high-quality
child care, providers will have an incentive to offer such care.  This is
the essential feature of a competitive market: firms can prosper only by
offering the services for which consumers are willing to pay.  Never-
theless, it is possible that the child care market may not be able to
respond to a large increase in the demand for high-quality care without
a substantial increase in the price of such care.  Many high-quality day
care centers and preschools are nonprofit establishments that rely on
donated space and volunteer labor.  They may be unable to expand
their capacity enough to absorb large numbers of additional children.
For-profit providers will have an incentive to increase quality in
response to consumer demand, but they may lack the knowledge and
resources to upgrade quality rapidly.  Hence, a government policy to
help defray the cost of improving quality may be worthwhile.
Child care policy should be progressive: benefits should be larger
for children in low-income families.  Children in low-income families
are at greater risk of developmental delays and the problems that result
from such delays.  It makes sense that the benefits of high-quality child
care are thus larger for these children, and there is some evidence to
support this presumption (Currie 2001).  Equity considerations also
favor a progressive child care policy.  This is, of course, purely a per-
sonal judgment, not a logical consequence of economic analysis, but it
is a compelling judgment to me.  
Child care policy should be based on incentives, not regulations.
Regulating an industry with a few large firms, such as long-distance
telecommunications, is difficult enough.  Regulating an industry such
as child care with hundreds of thousands of providers is likely to be
either very costly or ineffective.  Given the relatively small enforce-
ment budgets of most states (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000a),
it is not surprising that state child care regulations appear to have rela-
tively little impact on the child care market (Blau 2001a, Chapter 8).  I
would not discourage the states from regulation, but I would not base
federal child care policy on regulation.  Financial incentives are more
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flexible than regulations and if designed well can be self-enforcing
rather than requiring a monitoring bureaucracy.  
Child care policy should be based on the presumption that well-
informed parents will make good choices about the care of their chil-
dren.  Government can provide the best available information to influ-
ence parental decision making, and it can provide incentives to make
good choices for children.  But government should not limit the free-
dom of parents to arrange care for their children as they see fit, subject
to caveats about neglect and abuse.  Not all parents will want to take
advantage of subsidized high-quality child care in preschools and fam-
ily day care homes.  Some will prefer care by a relative or close friend,
some will prefer care in a church-based setting that emphasizes reli-
gion, and some will prefer a baby-sitter in the child’s home.  These
choices may not be optimal from a child development perspective, but
society should not be in the business of coercing parents to raise chil-
dren in a particular way.  As long as safety and general well-being are
assured, parents should be the decision makers.  Government policy
should inform parents of the benefits of high-quality child care and
encourage its use, but it should not require it.
WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT 
CHILD CARE POLICY?
The majority of child care subsidy dollars are independent of the
quality of care under current child care policy.  Most of the child care
subsidies provided under the CCDF are in the form of certificates
(vouchers) that can be used for any legal child care arrangement.  The
DCTC and the EEPDCE are also unrestricted subsidies that are not tied
to the quality of care.  The CCFP does not impose any quality stan-
dards beyond existing state regulations.  Head Start and Title I-A are
the only major subsidy programs that require high quality.  The latter
two programs account for only 43 percent of all child care subsidies
according to the information in Table 2.
The reason for this is clear: most child care subsidies are intended
to defray work-related child care expenses.  In fact, Head Start and
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Title I-A are typically not even thought of as child care subsidies, but
rather as early education programs for disadvantaged children.  They
are not designed to facilitate parental employment and are therefore
generally not classified as child care programs.  But setting aside
labels, employment-related and child development–related programs
share two common features: they subsidize care of a child by someone
other than the parent, which reduces the cost to the parent of being
employed, whether by design or not.  And they affect child develop-
ment through the quality of the care provided, again whether or not this
was intended.  Because they have the explicit goal of facilitating
employment, “child care” subsidies emphasize care that is convenient
for employment, i.e., full-day care, and are neutral with respect to qual-
ity.  “Early education” programs emphasize quality rather than facili-
tating employment, and as a result are often part-day.  Conceptually
they are the same kinds of programs, located at different points on the
two-dimensional continuum of quality and employment facilitation.
Viewed in this way, the problem with federal child care policy is clear,
at least to me: more than half of subsidy dollars require employment
but not quality.
The goal of employment-related child care subsidies targeted at
low-income families is to help families achieve and maintain economic
self-sufficiency as an alternative to dependence on welfare.  If child
care subsidies make employment more attractive, and if skills improve
through on-the-job training and experience gained by being employed,
then child care subsidies would indirectly address the problem of low
skills, which is the source of the welfare dependency problem.  In this
case, child care subsidies would help families escape poverty and wel-
fare dependence in the long run.  But as noted above, the typical low-
wage job does not provide fast enough wage growth to lift the worker
out of poverty.  In this case, the child care subsidy must be continued
indefinitely in order to make employment attractive, and the goal of
economic independence is not achieved.  One form of dependence on
government assistance, a cash benefit, is simply replaced by another
form, a child care subsidy.  A policy that deals with the direct cause of
welfare dependence—low skills—would be more appropriate.  There
is no evidence that child care subsidies will increase economic self-suf-
ficiency, defined as nonparticipation in means-tested government pro-
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grams. Employment-related child care subsidies for middle-class
families are even harder to rationalize.
 The new welfare system created by the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 imposes employ-
ment requirements and time limits on receipt of cash benefits.  In the
context of this system, child care subsidies might appear to be quite
sensible.  If welfare recipients are forced to accept employment at low
wages, child care subsidies can help make employment more finan-
cially rewarding than cash assistance.  But other policies, such as the
EITC, can accomplish this as well, without the unintended conse-
quences caused by employment-related child care subsidies such as
low-quality child care.  There is no logical connection between requir-
ing employment and providing child care subsidies: if employment is
to be required and if employment at typical jobs available to low-
skilled individuals provides less net income than cash assistance, then a
wage subsidy such as the EITC is a more direct remedy that does not
induce distortions in child care incentives.  
I question the wisdom of a welfare system that requires employ-
ment for mothers of young children, given the absence of evidence that
this will lead to long-run economic independence, defined as not being
dependent on any means-tested transfer, not just cash assistance.  If
child care subsidies and other employment-conditioned subsidies such
as the EITC are necessary to make employment more financially
rewarding than cash assistance, and if employment at low-skill jobs
fails to lead to improved skills and wages, then why require employ-
ment? However, the main point I want to make here does not depend
on the nature of the welfare system.  The point is that employment-con-
ditioned child care subsidies cannot be justified by the claim that the
child care market is inefficient.  The child care market may very well
be inefficient, but not for reasons associated with employment.
It may be argued that equity considerations can justify intervention
in the child care market.  The poor have less money to spend on child
care than others and are therefore likely to end up with lower-quality
care in the absence of government intervention.  This argument is not
specific to child care: the poor are likely to end up with lower quality
medical care, education, food, shelter, and other things that might
affect child development.  The problem is that the poor do not have
enough money, not that they do not have enough money to afford high-
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quality child care.  The government could, of course, provide subsidies
to the poor for all of the goods and services deemed essential to healthy
child development, and this is in fact the basis of most government pol-
icy toward the poor (Medicaid, food stamps, housing subsidies, and so
forth).  It would be simpler to transfer cash to the poor instead of subsi-
dizing many different goods and services, but many people worry that
the poor cannot be trusted to spend the cash on items deemed essential
for the well-being of their children.
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
There are four elements to my proposal.8 I describe these in general
terms and then discuss the cost of the proposal based on a specific set
of numbers for benefit levels, including savings from eliminating some
existing programs.  The goals of the proposal are to increase consumer
knowledge about the benefits of high-quality child care, encourage
consumers to use high-quality child care, encourage providers to offer
high-quality care, and provide increased flexibility to parents of young
children in making choices about employment.  The proposal is tai-
lored specifically to accomplish these goals, but I cannot offer any reli-
able evidence about how effective the program would be.  Below, I
present some illustrative calculations of take-up and cost based on my
best guesses.
Provide a means-tested child allowance.  Each family would
receive an allowance from the federal government for up to two chil-
dren, from birth through age 17.  The allowance could take the form of
a refundable tax credit, requiring that a family must file a tax return to
claim the allowance.  Refundability means that a family with no tax lia-
bility is eligible for the credit, so it is of value to low-income families.
The value of the allowance should decline as the level of family
income rises, and it should be phased out entirely for high-income fam-
ilies.  There would be no restrictions on use of the allowance, since it
would be in the form of cash.  It could be used to pay for child care,
food, housing, medical care, or other items that directly benefit chil-
dren, but it could just as easily be used for other purposes.  It could be
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used to subsidize non-employment by one of the parents, so that the
parent can stay home to care for the child.  It could also be used to pay
for child care should parents choose to be employed.  The principle
behind a cash allowance is that parents care about the well-being of
their children and are in the best position to decide how to allocate
additional resources to improve child well-being.  This feature of my
proposal is very similar to Walker’s (1996) proposed child allowance.
I suggest that the allowance should be limited to two children per fam-
ily in order to avoid providing strong pronatalist incentives.  
Subsidize the cost of accreditation to child care providers.  Organi-
zations such as the National Association for the Education of Young
Children (NAEYC) charge a fee to day care centers and preschools that
seek to become accredited as high-quality providers.  Organizations
such as the NAEYC should be subsidized to provide accreditation ser-
vices to child care providers at low or zero cost to the providers.  A sys-
tem with two levels of accreditation seems sensible to me, so that
centers that are unable to qualify for the highest level of accreditation
could nevertheless be certified as providing care of good quality by
meeting an intermediate set of standards.  In the system I have in mind,
each provider would be either 1) unaccredited, meaning that it is not
certified as offering high-quality care, though it presumably meets state
regulatory standards; 2) accredited as offering care of good quality; or
3) accredited as offering care of excellent quality.  Participation by pro-
viders would be voluntary; a provider that does not wish to become
accredited is not required to do so.  A similar system for family day
care homes is feasible as well.  However, baby-sitters and relatives
would not be included in such a rating system.  As discussed below,
providers will have an incentive to offer high-quality child care and to
be accredited as such.
Inform all new parents of the benefits of high-quality child care,
how to recognize high-quality care, and how to find it.  The simplest
way to accomplish this would be to give a booklet and video with such
information to mothers when they are in the hospital to give birth.  The
booklet and video should describe and illustrate in vivid terms what a
high-quality child care arrangement looks and feels like, and contrast it
with a low-quality arrangement.  The consequences for child develop-
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ment of high- and low-quality care should be described, without mak-
ing claims that cannot be supported by scientific evidence.  The
booklet and video should describe the accreditation system and should
emphasize that accreditation is certified by independent agencies.
They should also contain information on how to contact local resource
and referral agencies and other sources of information about the local
child care market.  
Provide a means-tested child care voucher with a value that
depends on the quality of the child care provider at which it is
redeemed.  The voucher would be worth more if it is used at an accred-
ited provider.  For example, a low-income family might receive a sub-
sidy of 30 percent of the average cost of unaccredited child care, 60
percent of the average cost of “good quality” care, and 100 percent of
the average cost of “excellent quality” care.  This gives families an
incentive to seek care of high quality, and it gives providers an incen-
tive to offer high-quality care in order to attract consumers.  The value
of the voucher would be smaller for higher-income families, and it
would be phased out entirely at high-income levels.  The voucher
would be of no value if the family does not purchase child care or pays
a relative or baby-sitter for child care.  This is a disadvantage, but it is
unavoidable if the system is to contain incentives for the use of high
quality care.  Parents who do not use the voucher still receive benefits
from the child allowance part of the system.  The voucher does not
require employment, so it would encourage use of high-quality care by
non-employed mothers to enhance child development.
This proposed system is consistent with all of the principles
described in the previous section.  All of the elements of the system are
neutral with respect to employment, consistent with freedom of parental
choice, and rely on incentives rather than regulations.  The child allow-
ance and voucher make the system progressive, providing greater ben-
efits for low-income families.  The voucher and technical assistance
subsidies provide incentives for improving quality of care demanded
and supplied.  The information booklet provides parents with the infor-
mation needed to help them make well-informed decisions.
This proposed system would replace the entire current federal child
care subsidy system.  Employment-related child care subsidies, includ-
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ing the DCTC, EEPDCE, the CCDF, and TXX-CC, would be elimi-
nated.  Head Start and Title I-A programs could be integrated into the
new system.  These programs would be evaluated and accredited (or
not) by the same standards as other programs and would be eligible for
vouchers accordingly.  Funding for these programs would be integrated
into the new subsidy system.  Head Start and Title I-A establishments
could choose to maintain their special status as being designated
mainly for children from low-income families, or they could choose to
accept other children as well.  The system would also replace all cur-
rent tax deductions and credits for children, including the exemption
for children and the child tax credit.  The proposed child allowance
serves the same purpose as these programs, so they would be redun-
dant.  Finally, the proposed new system would also replace Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  TANF provides cash assis-
tance to low income families with children, and the child allowance
portion of my proposal does the same; however, my proposal does not
replicate the employment requirements and time limits of TANF.  This
is a deliberate choice: though the child allowance benefit that I propose
is means-tested, the child allowance is not welfare and is phased out at
a relatively high level of income.  Other policies could be used to
encourage employment of low-income parents if this is considered
desirable.
Because the proposed system is neutral with respect to employ-
ment, it would not replace programs that are explicitly intended to
encourage employment, such as the EITC, job training, and education
programs.  If society considers it desirable for low-income single
mothers to be employed rather than receive cash assistance, the
voucher part of the child care system I propose provides considerable
resources that such mothers could use for child care.  On the other
hand, the child allowance is likely to have a negative effect on employ-
ment, since this benefit would be available regardless of employment
status.  So, unlike the current child care system, the proposed new sys-
tem does not encourage employment, and if such encouragement is
desired it would have to come from another source.
The cost of the proposed new child care policy depends on a num-
ber of factors that are difficult to quantify, so the estimates I present
here are no more than illustrative.  I try to justify the specific numbers
used in the calculations, but there is a large amount of unavoidable
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arbitrariness.  Hence these estimates are no more than educated guesses
and should not be treated as reliable.  I propose a child allowance of
$5,000 per child aged 0–17 per year for families below the poverty
line; $3,500 per child aged 0–17 for families with income between one
and two times the poverty line; $2,000 per child aged 0–17 for families
with income between two and four times the poverty line; and no
allowance for families with income over four times the poverty line.
The allowance would be provided for, at most, two children per family.
Table 3 displays the average family income of each of these four
income groups in 1999, and the numbers of children by age in each
income group.  The figures in the last three rows of the table show the
number of eligible children, accounting for the maximum of two per
family.  
Table 4 shows illustrative cost calculations, based on the data in
Table 3 and the figures assumed for the value of the voucher.  The first
two rows of Table 4 show the annual cost of the child allowance,
assuming that all eligible children receive it.  This cost is $131.608 bil-
lion.
The base amount of the proposed child care voucher is $6,000 for
one preschool-aged child in a low-income family that redeems the
voucher at a day care center accredited as providing high-quality care.
This figure is an estimate of the cost of providing day care in a high-
quality center.  I used the “Cost, Quality, and Outcomes” data (Helburn
1995) to compute the average cost of care per child in day care centers
with an Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale score of good or
better (5–7 on a scale of 1–7).  This was approximately $5,000 in
1993.9 After adjusting for inflation, this amounts to $5,765 in 1999.  I
add an extra $235 per child to account for the higher real salary that
will be needed to attract substantial numbers of well-qualified provid-
ers into the field.  The $6,000 figure I use here can be compared to the
$6,000 estimate of the cost of high-quality care used by Barnett (1993),
which is equivalent to $6,918 after adjusting for inflation, and to the
$5,417 cost per child of Head Start in 1998.10 The value of the voucher
is adjusted down by one-third for good quality care and by two-thirds
for child care that is unaccredited.  The value of the voucher is reduced
by one-sixth for families between one and two times the poverty line
and by one-half for families between two and four times the poverty
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Table 3 Number of Children and Average Income, by Income/Needs 
Category
I/N < 1.0 1.0 #I/N<2.0 2.0 #I/N<4.0 4.0 # I/N
Average family income $7,911 $23,800 $46,516 $108,350
All children
Number of children 
< 6 4.688 4.854 7.085 5.539
6–12 5.499 6.146 9.554 7.337
13–17 2.932 3.565 6.511 5.965
Maximum of 2 children 
aged 0–12 per family
Number of children 
< 6 4.402 4.683 6.911 5.443
6–12 3.829 4.808 8.169 6.596
Maximum of 2 children aged
0–17 per family
Number of children 
0–17 9.919 11.938 20.115 17.759
NOTE: I/N is Income/Needs, total family income divided by the poverty standard for
the size and structure of the family.  Numbers of children are in millions.  The figures
under “Maximum of 2 children aged 0–12 per family” were computed as follows: if
there were at least two children < 6, then number of children < 6 was set to two and
number of children 6–12 was set to zero.  If there was one child < 6 and at least one
child 6–12, then the number < 6 and the number 6–12 were both set to one.  If there
were no children < 6 and at least two children 6–12, then the number of children 6–12
was set to two.
SOURCE: Tabulations from the March 1999 Current Population Survey.
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Table  4 Illustrative Cost Calculations for a Proposed New 
Child Care System
Family income needs ratio Total cost 
($, billions)0.0–1.0 1.01–2.0 2.01–4.0 4.01+
Allowance per child 0–17 ($) 5,000 3,500 2,000 0.0
Cost of the child allowance, 
maximum of two children per 
family ($, billions)
49.595 41.783 40.230 0.0 131.608
Child care voucher per child <6 ($)
  High quality 6,000 5,000 3,000 0.0
  Good quality 4,000 3,333 2,667 0.0
  Other 2,000 1,667 1,333 0.0
Child care voucher per child 
6–12 ($)
  High quality 2,000 1,667 1,000 0.0
  Good quality 1,333 1,111 850 0.0
  Other 667 556 440 0.0
Estimated number of voucher users 
(max. 2 per family) with children 
aged 0–5 (millions)
  High quality 2.861 3.044 4.492
  Good quality 0.660 0.702 1.037
  Other 0.440 0.468 0.691
Estimated number of voucher users 
(max. 2 per family) with children 
aged 6–12 (millions)
  High quality 2.489 3.125 5.310
  Good quality 0.574 0.721 1.225
  Other 0.383 0.481 0.817
Total cost of vouchers ($, billions) 26.685 24.617 23.873 0.0 75.176
Technical assistance 0.075
Information booklet and video 0.035






Family income needs ratio Total cost 
($, billions)0.0–1.0 1.01–2.0 2.01–4.0 4.01+
Savings from eliminating 
($, billions):
   TANF 30.4 30.4
   Child care subsidies 21.0
   Tax exemption for dependent 
children
0 6.008 17.800 14.500 38.3
Child tax credit 21.6
Total savings 111.3
Net total cost of the child care 
system
95.594
NOTE: Assumes that 65% of eligible children will be in high quality child care, 15%
in good quality care, 10% in other care, and 10% not in child care (and therefore not
using the voucher).  The cost calculations for technical assistance and information
distribution are described in the text.  TANF cost is computed from Administration
for Children and Families (2000b) and includes state and federal cost.  Child care sub-
sidies are from Table 2, assuming items that are not available for 1999 are the same in
1999 as in the most recent year for which they are available.  Savings from eliminat-
ing the tax exemption for children uses the deduction from income of $2750 per child,
and assumes that families in poverty pay no income tax, families between one and
two times the poverty line are in the 15% tax bracket, and other families are in the
28% bracket.  Child tax credit figure is from Committee on Ways and Means (1998,
p. 840).
line.  It is reduced by two-thirds for children aged 6–12.  Table 4 illus-
trates these adjustments.
  The most speculative part of the calculation is estimating the take-
up rate of the voucher.  I have no sound basis for doing this, so my esti-
mates are completely arbitrary.  I assume that within each income
group 65 percent of eligible children will use high-quality care, 15 per-
cent will use good-quality care, 10 percent will use unaccredited care,
and 10 percent will use no child care and therefore will not redeem the
voucher.  The value of the voucher to low-income families is quite high
compared with existing subsidies (except for Head Start), so it seems
sensible to assume that it will have a high take-up rate.  For the other
eligible income groups, I assume that the lower value of the voucher is
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compensated by higher income, and that the information dissemination
part of the program convinces families to use high-quality care in large
numbers.  This is plausible because the value of the voucher is much
higher than current child care subsidies available to families in the low-
to middle-income range.  Table 4 shows the implied cost of the vouch-
ers: $75.176 billion.  The costs of the other two parts of the system are
minuscule compared with the cost of the allowance and the voucher.
These are shown in Table 2 and amount to $110 million.11
The total cost of the proposed new system is $206.894 billion per
year.  However, as shown in Table 4, eliminating programs that would
be redundant with the new system saves almost $111.3 billion per year.
After accounting for savings due to eliminating TANF, child care sub-
sidies, the tax exemption for dependent children, and the child tax
credit, the net annual cost of the new system is $95.594 billion.  This is
obviously a very large sum and may not be politically feasible.  Read-
ers who have trouble swallowing a cost this large can use the informa-
tion in Table 3 to compute the cost of child allowance and voucher
subsidies of smaller magnitudes or with lower assumed take-up rates.
The proposed system is highly progressive, but it does provide substan-
tial benefits up to an income level of four times the poverty line, which
is about $64,000 on average in 1999.  Hence benefits are spread quite
far up the income distribution, and about 75 percent of all children
would be eligible for subsidies, based on the figures in Table 3.
Assuming that the additional taxes needed to finance the cost of the
system are raised in proportion to the current distribution of the income
tax burden by income group, the system would be highly progressive.
Other possibilities for reducing the net cost of the system would be to
eliminate some other means-tested programs for families with children,
such as food stamps and subsidized housing.  I do not pursue this possi-
bility here because I want to keep the focus on programs that are spe-
cifically child oriented.  
The main losers under the proposed system are high-income fami-
lies, who will lose the tax exemption, child care tax credit, and exclu-
sion of employer-provided dependent care expenses with nothing
gained in return.  (See Blau 2001a, Chapter 10, for details.)  In my
judgment, these families can afford this loss with little hardship and
would still be able to purchase child care of high quality.  I have no
objection in principle to providing benefits to all families regardless of
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income, but a universal system is far more expensive than a means-
tested system, particularly if the value of the voucher and child allow-
ance is not reduced at higher income.
There are many practical issues that would arise if such a system
were to be implemented.  Here I briefly discuss only three of these
issues.  First, how does the voucher get delivered to eligible families?
The voucher is means-tested, but three-quarters of all children would
be eligible, so it seems unlikely that stigma associated with use of a
voucher would be a significant deterrent to its use.  Nevertheless,
because the child care subsidy is not universal, the voucher must some-
how be delivered to eligible families, and there could be significant
time costs to a family of securing a voucher.  One possibility that could
help avoid this is for the voucher to be delivered to families by the
Internal Revenue Service, based on the tax return for the previous cal-
endar year, and on an estimate by the family of changes in income and
eligibility for the subsequent year.  After filing a tax return for calendar
year t – 1 in, say, March of year t, the family receives from the IRS in
April a child care voucher for year t with a value based on calendar
year t – 1 income, the age distribution of children anticipated in year t,
and any adjustments to expected calendar year t income and age distri-
bution of children noted by the family on the tax return.  If income for
year t turns out to be different than anticipated, the value of the voucher
for the following year can be adjusted accordingly.  The voucher is
redeemed by the family at the chosen provider, and the provider returns
it to a designated government office for compensation.  This may
require the provider and/or consumer to extend credit temporarily.
A second practical issue is the possibility of a shortage of high-
quality child care during the transition to the new system.  If tens of
millions of families receive substantial new child care subsidies tar-
geted for use in high-quality child care, the child care market may not
be able to respond quickly with large increases in capacity.  One way to
make the transition smooth is to delay the distribution of vouchers until
about a year after the new system becomes law, in order to give centers
and family day care homes time to expand and upgrade quality.  Any
shortages that are caused by implementation of the new system are
likely to be transitory, since providers will have strong incentives to
expand capacity and upgrade quality in order to attract consumers with
vouchers.
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A final issue that should be discussed is the relationship between
the proposed new system and state and local child care policy.  The
current child care subsidy system gives states some flexibility in how
they use federal CCDF and TXX-CC subsidies, both of which are dis-
bursed as block grants.  States can choose the income eligibility crite-
rion, the sliding-scale fee, and other features of their CCDF-funded
programs, within limits.  There is much less flexibility in the Head
Start and Title I-A programs, since these must meet the uniform federal
Head Start standards and income eligibility guidelines.  States would
lose some flexibility in the new system, because both the income eligi-
bility and quality guidelines would be uniform federal standards.  In
fact, state bureaucracies that administer federally funded child care
subsidies would no longer be needed, since all subsidies would be dis-
bursed through the federal income tax system.  However, many states
have their own child care subsidy programs funded entirely by state
funds.  The proposed new system would not interfere with these pro-
grams.  These programs vary widely, ranging from state child care tax
credits and mini-CCDF-style programs, to teacher training initiatives
and quality-improvement subsidies.12 States would be free to fund
whatever child care programs they like, or to discontinue such pro-
grams if they are found to be no longer necessary as a result of the
expanded federal system.  
CONCLUSION
Child care is a problem in the United States because the quality of
care is low on average.  Current child care policy does relatively little
to address the problem because most child care subsidies are designed
to encourage employment rather than enhance child development.  The
tension between these alternative goals ensures that debate and discus-
sion of child care policy issues will continue for the foreseeable future.
There is not a consensus on the goals of child care policy or on the
means to achieve those goals.  This is due in part to conflicting views
on the proper role of the government in a domain that was mainly left
to families as recently as a generation ago.  My proposal is squarely on
the side of enhancing child development, and this will no doubt be con-
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troversial.  The proposal is quite costly, though it is possible to reduce
the cost as much as desired by providing less generous subsidies.  In
exchange for the substantial cost of the proposal, one would hope for
large benefits.  I believe that there would be large benefits in the form
of enhanced child development, leading to improved school perfor-
mance, a more productive labor force, and fewer social problems such
as crime and welfare dependence.  But I cannot provide any compel-
ling quantitative evidence to support this belief.  In any case, most
readers would probably like or dislike the proposal based on their val-
ues and beliefs rather than on evidence about its benefits and costs,
even if reliable evidence were available.  This is not offered as an
excuse for the absence of evidence, but in recognition that there are
limits to the ability of economic analysis to influence decision making.
Notes
Thanks to Jean Kimmel for comments.  Comments welcome at david_blau@unc.edu.
1. The federal government does not have the authority to regulate child care; this is
the responsibility of states.  Child care regulations are an important part of the
overall structure of government child care policy, but they are not discussed here
because they are not part of federal child care policy.  See Blau (2001b) and Blau
(2001a, Chapter 8) for analysis of child care regulations.
2. Some smaller programs omitted from the table are listed in U.S. General Account-
ing Office (1994) and Robins (1991).  A number of states have their own tax cred-
its for child care, but they generally provide small benefits.
3. The programs were Aid to Families with Dependent Children—Child Care, Tran-
sitional Child Care, At-Risk Child Care, and the Child Care Block Grant.  See
Blau (in press) for details.
4. TANF is the cash assistance welfare program created by PRWORA in 1996 to
replace AFDC.
5. Head Start served 822,316 children in FY1998, compared to an estimated 4.775
million children under age six in poverty in calendar year 1998 (Current Popula-
tion Report P60-207, Table 2).  However, 96 percent of children in Head Start are
aged 3–5.  Assuming that half the children under age six are aged 3–5 yields 34.4
percent as the percentage of 3- to 5-year-old children in poverty who are served
by Head Start.
6. It is sometimes argued that shortages of child care of certain types in specific
locations are important enough to justify government intervention.  I do not
believe this is a significant enough issue to warrant systematic government inter-
vention.  See Blau (2001a) for discussion of shortages in the child care market.
Another argument for government child care subsidies is based on distributional
considerations related both to cross-sectional equity at a given time and to the
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long-run benefits to children of high-quality child care.  Bergmann (1996, p. 131)
argues that high-quality child care can be thought of as a “merit good, something
that in our ethical judgment everybody should have, whether or not they are will-
ing or able to buy it.”  In its pure form this argument is based solely on the moral
grounds that it is unethical to deprive any child of the optimum conditions for
development if society has the resources to provide such conditions.
7. Regulations can deal with information problems to some extent, by ensuring that
all providers offer care of some minimum quality.  This is discussed in Blau
(2001a, Chapter 8).
8. Other proposals for reform of child care policy include Barnett (1993), Bergmann
(1996), Gormley (1995), Helburn and Bergmann (2002), Kagan and Cohen
(1996), Robins (1990), Walker (1996), and Zigler and Finn-Stevenson (1999).
Gomby et al. (1996), Hayes, Palmer, and Zaslow (1990, Chapter 10), and Kahn
and Kamerman (1987) also offer some suggestions for reform.  See Blau (in
press) for discussion of these proposals.  I have borrowed liberally from these
authors.
9. The cost figure includes the imputed value of donated space and volunteer labor.
10. Head Start Fact Sheet: http://www3.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/hsb/research/
99_hsfs.htm.
11. The cost of accreditation is assumed to be $1,000, which is the maximum fee
charged by the NAEYC for the accreditation process (http://www.naeye.org/
accreditation/default.asp).  This is incurred every three years.  In 2000 there were
an estimated 106,000 licensed day care centers (The Children’s Foundation
2000).  I arbitrarily assume that there will be 150,000 day care centers in the new
system, 50,000 of which would incur the accreditation cost per year, at $50 mil-
lion.  I arbitrarily add another $25 million per year for accreditation of family day
care homes.  I do not provide any direct subsidies for centers to improve their
quality in order to satisfy the accreditation standards.  I assume that centers will
find it worthwhile to improve quality because of the large increase in demand for
high-quality care prompted by the vouchers.  Finally, the cost of producing and
distributing the informational booklet and video are estimated at $10 per child,
with an estimated 3.5 million children born per year.
12. See http://cpmcnet.columbia.edu/dept/nccp/main5.html and http://
www.gao.gov.news.items/he0011.pdf for information about state child care initia-
tives.
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Two revolutions in the latter half of the twentieth century have
changed the way our society finances and arranges for the care and
rearing of young children.  One  is women’s entry into the labor mar-
ket; almost two-thirds of mothers with children under six are now in
the paid workforce.  The second revolution, which resulted from the
same economic and social developments as the first, is the increase in
the number of single-parent families; they now constitute about one-
quarter of the families with children under 6, and they tend to have
much lower incomes than other types of families (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2000).  These two revolutions make the traditional
model of providing and financing child care—an at-home wife sup-
ported by a bread-winning husband—no longer useful for the care of
most children.
We have yet to face up to the implications and requirements of
those enormously important changes.  The paychecks of mothers—
both married and single—are now an important source of support for
millions of families.  In a growing number of cases they are an indis-
pensable source of support.  Yet the high cost of child care makes
severe inroads on those paychecks and therefore on the standard of liv-
ing of families.  Child care costs can take away 25 percent or more of
the incomes of low-wage families.1 And millions of children are not
getting the quality of care that would do justice to their needs for
safety, nurture, and development.
The kind of care children receive, as well as the cost of that care
and its effect on a family’s standard of living, are issues that deserve—
and are beginning to receive—national attention.  The high cost of
child care is one of the major causes of low living standards, lack of
self-support, and social pathology in families with children.  Obvi-
ously, that is, or should be, a matter of public concern.  The low quality
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of care that many young children receive should also be of public con-
cern, as it affects the kind of adult population we will have in the
future—it affects the psychological security, the social maturity, and
the economic productivity of the future citizens of this country.
Equally important, the kind of care a child receives affects the quality
of his or her life right now in regard to feelings of happiness, security,
and self-worth.  The care children receive can also affect parents’ abil-
ity to get to work reliably, and to feel secure that while at work their
children are well cared for.  This in turn affects worker productivity,
labor turnover, and thus employers’ costs of production. 
If there is general agreement that child care in the United States is a
serious problem, there is little agreement on what to do about it.  Con-
servatives say mothers (with the exception of single mothers, perhaps)
should stay home with their children.  They regard the movement of
mothers out of the home and into jobs as a terrible mistake, and believe
that the lack of full-time care by mothers has produced cohorts of unsu-
pervised, unhappy children, many of whom are without morals, are
poorly socialized, and are prone to crime.  A Republican leader in the
U.S. House of Representatives, commenting on a massacre perpetrated
by high school students, mentioned day care as a major cause.2 Liber-
tarians would rely totally on the free market to evolve a supply of care
that would be appropriate to the country’s needs in terms of quality and
cost, and would favor withdrawing what government subsidies and
regulations are now in place.  Some people argue that government and
employer help to families with children discriminates against the child-
less.  Others present the contrary argument, that parents are aiding
society by raising children and deserve society’s help in doing so.
Many advocates of that help look to community action, such as corpo-
rations, charities, and foundations, to mobilize the resources to
improve the quality and availability of child care in each locality.
There are others who hope that state and local governments will
increasingly contribute to help parents with child care, and will address
part of  the problem through the increased provision of free pre-kinder-
gartens.  Finally, there are those, myself included, who believe that
only a large, active, and expensive federal program, providing both
finance and a national framework for quality improvement, will serve
the nation’s purposes adequately.
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The welfare reform of 1996, whatever else it accomplished, forced
a recognition of the fact that working mothers were here to stay, and
that many of them needed and deserved help in obtaining care of
decent quality for their children.  It was accompanied by a considerable
increase in federal and state funds devoted to paying for child care, but
computed on any rational basis, the expansion has by no means been
sufficient to fill the need.  Current appropriations still cover only a
small proportion of those eligible to receive help under present rules, to
say nothing of those who are not now eligible but arguably should be.  
COSTS AND PRICES 
Full-time care for a child under five is a “big-ticket item.” We can
estimate that parents working full time paid an average of $7,777 per
child for licensed care in a center in the year 2000.  Those who used
family day care, most of which is unlicensed and unregulated, paid an
average of $6,413.3 Some families had a relative who provided child
care at no charge, but about one-third of relatives (other than fathers)
charged for care.  Even a middle-income family with two preschool-
aged children in licensed care has a large financial burden.
The high price of child care is a crucial aspect of the “affordabil-
ity” problem.  For a large number of families, paying these prices
means parting with a painfully large portion of their incomes.  For
some parents, the price of child care keeps them from working.  Other
parents put their children into affordable but low-quality care that is so
poor, it may even bring harm.  Still other parents use so much of their
income for child care that they are unable to buy the basic goods and
services they need to live decently. 
Is the price of child care too high? The only prices that economists
would characterize as  too high occur in situations where competition
is absent or weak, and where the price-setter can take advantage of the
customers’ lack of alternative sellers to raise prices far above costs.
The child care industry is marked by vigorous competition and relative
ease of entry for new competitors, so we do not see prices unreason-
ably elevated above costs.  In the for-profit part of the industry, reve-
nues are close to costs and the margin of profit is low.  The nonprofits
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receive some help from government programs and private sources, but
they, as well as the for-profit centers, depend heavily on fees to cover
their costs.  We can conclude that it would be impossible to reduce fees
significantly by reducing profits or surpluses.
Could costs be reduced? Labor costs are 70 percent of the total cost
of child care centers (Cost, Quality, and Child Outcomes Study Team
1995) and an even larger share of the cost of other modes of care.
Child care inevitably takes a lot of labor time; providers cannot hope
for the steady evolution of labor-saving machinery, which raises pro-
ductivity and cuts cost through time in most other modern industries.
(The only labor-saving machinery available for this industry is televi-
sion, and its extensive use degrades the quality of care.) If child care
providers try to economize on labor by giving care givers larger groups
of children to supervise, quality will suffer.  This is not to say that
every child care center is optimally managed;  undoubtedly some pro-
viders could achieve cost-savings through better management.  How-
ever, the opportunities for lowering costs appear minor compared with
the forces making for higher costs per child.
Prices for child care have been on an upward trend.  Between 1990
and 2000, while the overall consumer price index was rising by 29 per-
cent, fees child care centers and nursery schools charged were rising by
56 percent.4 We can expect this upward trend in child care prices, rela-
tive to prices charged for other goods and services, to continue.  As
most other industries experience rising labor productivity over time,
we can expect a resumption of the economy-wide upward trend in real
wages which, until relatively recently, has been a long-run feature of
Western economies.  Rising wages will have an especially heavy
impact on costs and prices in a labor-intensive industry such as child
care.  Upward changes in the legal minimum wage will also raise costs
in child care relative to costs in other industries.  Moreover, a success-
ful campaign to improve child care quality would accentuate the rise in
costs because it would require better trained and better paid workers. 
Thus, when we talk about making child care affordable, we are not
talking about reducing costs.  On the contrary, costs are rising, and we
can expect them to continue to rise over time, relative to the costs of
most other goods and services.  Whatever the inflation rate we have in
the general level of prices, the rise in child care costs and prices is
likely to exceed it by a considerable amount.  So reducing child care
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costs is not something we can realistically hope to achieve through any
sort of government policy.  The only way to make child care affordable
to families with children is to transfer the burden of some or all of
those unavoidably high costs from parents to some other set of persons.
CHILD CARE AFFORDABILITY FOR FAMILIES 
MOST IN NEED
We now take a closer look at the question of affordability.  The
question is what amount constitutes affordable child care, and how
much of the cost of child care should be born by public subsidies, given
a family’s size and financial circumstances.  Obviously, reasonable
people would differ on such a question.  Nevertheless, by looking at
particular cases it is possible to zero in on an idea of affordability
which, if not meeting everybody’s exact standard, would be considered
reasonable by most people. 
It makes sense to start our discussion of affordability with the sim-
plest and most obvious case, that of a single mother, working full time
at a minimum wage job.  We will assume she has two children, ages
one and three.  She may never have been on welfare, or perhaps
recently  moved off.  In the former case, she is likely getting no help at
all in paying for child care from any current government program.  The
case of the low-wage single mother is not one that politicians find the
most compelling.  People like her don’t vote in large numbers, and sin-
gle mothers who need help are not popular with large segments of the
American public.  Arguably, her plight is likely to have been the result
of unwise behavior: having children out of wedlock or having them
within wedlock in a marriage headed for breakup.  Nevertheless, hers
is a good case to start with because her need is so stark, obvious, and
understandable.  And whatever her history, she is now working and
thus “playing by the rules.”
Obviously, a low-wage, single mother needs someone to care for
her children while she works.  Some people assume that the typical sin-
gle mother has a relative who is willing to provide quality care for her
children for free (Kaus 1992), but that is not the reality (Presser 1989).
Currently about half of working single mothers do get free care, mostly
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from relatives,5 although some of those arrangements are far from
ideal.  But the other half—those who must pay—is our main concern.
What is affordable child care for a family headed by a low-wage
single woman? One obvious way to think about the family’s ability to
pay for child care is to see how much money the family takes in during
a year, and how much it would cost to buy the goods and services
(other than child care) that would provide a poverty-line standard of
living.  Out of her income the mother needs to pay taxes, buy adequate
food, pay for housing, and see that other necessities such as transporta-
tion to work, clothing, and toiletries are paid for.  We have left medical
expenses out of the list because she is eligible for Medicaid.  After
accounting for these minimal necessities, we can see how much money
is left over to cover the cost of providing care for the family’s children.
If the amount remaining is insufficient to buy care of an acceptable
quality, then keeping this family at a poverty-line standard of living
would require some form of government help to make child care
affordable. 
The financial situation of the family of our working single mother
in the year 2000 is summarized in Table 1.  The first panel of the table
gives information on the amount of money the mother will have to live
on.  Working at the minimum wage of $5.15 for 40 hours a week, 52
weeks a year, would bring in $10,712 per year.  To see how much
money she will have available to spend—her disposable income—we
subtract from her wage income the taxes the family owes and add in
any benefits she will be entitled to.  This family’s income is too low to
owe any federal or state income taxes, but it does pay Social Security
taxes of $819.  Offsetting this subtraction are several government ben-
efits which families with an earned income this low are entitled to
receive: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) of $3,888 and food
stamp benefits of $1,955.  After these subtractions and additions, we
arrive at a disposable income of $15,736.
The second panel of the table gives two alternative assessments of
what a minimally decent standard of living would cost this family.  The
first is the official U.S. poverty line figure of $13,898.  The poverty
line is specified as the cost of a thrifty food budget multiplied by three.
It is revalued yearly, to take account of price changes.  The official
poverty measure was set up in the early 1960s, when most families
with children had a stay-at-home mother.  Child care needs were thus
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not allowed for, and it is reasonable to characterize the official poverty-
line income as representing one estimate of the cost of a minimal bud-
get, exclusive of child care costs.
The second assessment shown in the panel is based on the work of
a committee of experts assembled by the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS) in the early 1990s.  By then, it was obvious that child care
costs needed to be taken into account.  The NAS experts concluded that
there should be a new official poverty line based on a detailed family
budget, rather than on the “food cost times three” calculation that has
been used to calculate what is now the official poverty line.6 The
detailed budget provides a more realistic accounting for minimal needs
Table 1 Financial Situation of a Single Mother with Two 
Preschool Children in a Full-Time, Minimum-Wage Job, 2000
Ability to spend
Pre-tax wagesa $10,712
Federal and state income taxes 0
Earned income tax credit 3,888
Social security taxes –819
Food stampsb 1,955
Disposable income 15,736
Minimum budget, excluding child care
Official poverty line $13,898
Required expenditure for food, clothing, 
shelter, transportation, and servicesc 15,587
Cost of child cared 
Center care for two children, ages 1 and 3 $13,460
For family day care 12,826
a Assumes work of 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year at the 1998 minimum wage
of $5.15.
b The family may be eligible to receive additional food stamps equal to 30 percent of
expenditures on child care, up to a maximum of stamps worth $1,350 in a year.  Food
stamp benefits may also be increased for those paying relatively high rents.
c According to the National Academy of Sciences budget (exclusive of child care and
health insurance).
d Derived from census data.
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for food, clothing, shelter, transportation, services, and taxes, better
consideration of health care needs, and of the child care needs of
employed parents.7 One version of the NAS’s minimal basic budget for
a family of this composition, exclusive of taxes and health insurance
and exclusive of child care costs, would come to $15,587 for the year
2000.  The disposable income provided by the minimum wage and
other benefits that a parent earning the minimum wage receives is just
about par with the amount the NAS decided this three-person family
needs to spend in order to have a poverty-line package of goods and
services.  To be precise, our sample mother would have $149 remain-
ing after following the NAS budget. 
The third panel in Table 1 gives two alternative amounts for the
cost of care.  The first is the average cost of full-time center care for
two children, ages one and three, a total of $13,460.8  The second alter-
native is the average cost of family child care, much of which is unreg-
ulated or unlicensed.
It is obvious that this mother can bear little of the burden of paying
for child care.  Her disposable income will virtually be exhausted in
purchasing the goods and services needed for a poverty-line standard
of living, whichever of the two poverty lines one adopts.  What she has
left over would finance only a fraction of the cost of caring for one
child; it would certainly not cover the cost for the care of two, regard-
less of the form of care.  If the family is required to divert anything but
a small portion of its disposable income to pay for child care, it will be
forced below a poverty-line standard of living.  It seems reasonable,
then, to say that the only affordable price this family can pay for child
care is close to zero.
What is the rationale for government action to make child care
affordable for this family? Action is clearly needed if our society wants
to adhere to the principle that when people work and thus “play by the
rules” in this richest of all countries, they should have a standard of
living that meets some basic minimum and their children should have
care of a decent quality.  Of course, not everyone is willing to sub-
scribe to the proposition that such a family ought to be helped with
child care costs.  Some argue that people whose income doesn’t allow
them to support children decently and pay for good quality care out of
their own resources simply shouldn’t have children.  In this view, if
they do have children, it is best if they (and the children) suffer the con-
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sequences; government help to them would merely encourage irre-
sponsible behavior and dependency in themselves and others. 
When considering both sides of this argument, it is important to
remember that we are talking about a mother who works full time all
year round at an unskilled job, perhaps cleaning offices or hotel rooms,
who has nobody with whom to share family chores, and who is raising
children who will be future citizens, future earners, and future taxpay-
ers.  Many of the nation’s children live in families with characteristics
similar to these.  The question at hand is whether we as a nation want
to insure that such children and their parents do not have a standard of
life lower than the poverty line.
AFFORDABLE CHILD CARE FOR FAMILIES ABOVE 
THE LOWEST-EARNING BRACKET
We now go on to consider the situation of families with more than
minimum-wage earnings who have no government help with child care
costs.  The single mother we have been using as an example would
need a wage rate almost three times the minimum wage in order to live
above the poverty-line level and pay the average price of care for her
children without government assistance.  Referring again to Table 1,
we can see that she would have to spend $13,898 in order to buy the
goods and services providing a standard of living at the official poverty
level, and she would have to pay an additional $13,460 for child care.
To be able to spend those sums she would need a disposable income in
the year 2000 of $27,358.9 To have a disposable income that large she
would need to earn a wage of $29,655 because she would have to pay
federal and state income taxes.  (The figures quoted here are based on
the state tax rates in Colorado.)10 Only about 21 percent of single moth-
ers earn that much; the median wage earned by single mothers who are
employed was under $19,000 in that year.11 
In Table 2, the results of this kind of calculation is shown for single
parents and for couples with differing numbers and ages of children.
We assume that preschoolers need full-time care and any school-age
children need after-school and summer care.  The table shows, for
example, that a couple with four children would need almost $44,000
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Table 2 Estimates of the Wage Income Required to Maintain a Poverty-
Line Standard of Living and Pay for Child Care in a Center, for 
Families of Various Sizes and Compositions, 2000
Family type and income characteristics
Number of 







age Single Married Single Married Single Married
0 1 11,889 13,885 13,712 15,708 11,787 12,965
1 0 11,889 13,885 18,642 20,638 18,661 21,276
0 2 13,898 17,493 17,544 21,139 13,644 18,928
1 1 13,898 17,493 22,474 26,069 22,308 27,347
2 0 13,898 17,493 27,358 30,953 29,655 34,035
1 2 17,554 20,586 27,953 30,985 29,988 33,552
2 1 17,554 20,586 32,837 35,869 36,194 39,340
2 2 20,271 23,049 37,377 40,155 40,970 43,788
SOURCE: Computed by the author based on tax and benefit rates.  The state tax for-
mula used is that of Colorado.  The care of children under 5 is assumed to cost the
average amount indicated by the census survey of 1993.  One child under 5 is
assumed to be one year old.  A second child under 5 is assumed to be three years old.
The poverty lines for 2000 are based on those for 1999 updated by price changes
through July 2000.
in wages to live at a poverty-line standard and afford center care for
those under school age and after-school care for those in school.  That
means that a couple with four children who didn’t have an income that
large would have to choose between center care of average quality for
their children and living at a standard below the poverty line.  The table
thus demonstrates in a simple way an important truth: parents with sub-
stantial middle-class incomes need help paying for child care if they
are to have a standard of living that even comes up to that permitted by
a poverty line income.  As we shall see, there is a sensible argument for
extending help with child care costs to families with wage incomes
considerably above those indicated in Table 2. 
Thinking about Child Care Policy 53
A WORKABLE DEFINITION OF AFFORDABLE 
CHILD CARE 
The argument so far has demonstrated a simple proposition: if
working families with children are to have living standards that at least
come up to the poverty line, we need to provide child care subsidies to
families with incomes considerably above the poverty line.  There are
three important characteristics to a program that provides affordable
care. 
First, families with incomes at or below the poverty line should
pay little or nothing for child care.  Families with incomes above the
poverty line should be required to spend on child care only some frac-
tion of the amount by which their income exceeds the poverty line.
That would guarantee that working families with children would not
have to endure a below-the-poverty-line standard of living because of
child care costs.  We believe this to be the core of any reasonable defi-
nition of affordability.  Second, the subsidy paid out of government
funds, together with the co-payment required of the parents, should be
enough to buy care of a respectable quality.  Finally, if the subsidies for
child care are phased out for the higher-income groups, they should be
phased out gradually.  If a family’s income rises, the subsidy to which
it is entitled should not as a result decrease by even more, leaving the
family worse off.12
Table 3 shows four variants of a subsidy plan that would have the
characteristics we have laid out, as applied to a couple with one three-
year-old child (Panel A), and to a couple with an infant and a three-
year-old (Panel B).  Families receiving the benefit would be required to
make a co-payment at a rate equal to some percentage of their income
above the poverty line.  A family at or below the poverty line makes no
co-payment and receives a benefit equal to the full cost of care.  The
table shows benefits under four different co-payment rates, ranging
from 50 percent down to zero.13 In Panel A, subsidies and parents’ co-
payments add up to $6,707, our estimate of what center care of average
quality would cost for a three-year-old in the year 2000.  In Panel B the
cost of care for the two children would be $13,460.
What is our ideal co-payment rate? The answer depends on the
extent to which we think taxpayers should help parents—particularly
54Table 3 Annual Child Care Benefits and Co-Payments for Parents Choosing Center Care, under Four Rates
of Co-Payment
A. Benefits for a couple with one 4-year old ($)
Rate of 


















10,000 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 
15,000 6,150 558 6,373 335 6,484 223 6,707 0 
20,000 3,650 3,058 4,873 1,835 5,484 1,223 6,707 0 
25,000 1,150 5,558 3,373 3,335 4,484 2,223 6,707 0 
30,000 0 6,707 1,873 4,835 3,484 3,223 6,707 0 
35,000 0 6,707 373 6,335 2,484 4,223 6,707 0 
40,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 1,484 5,223 6,707 0 
45,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 484 6,223 6,707 0 
50,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
55,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
60,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
65,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
70,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
75,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
80,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
85,000 0 6,707 0 6,707 0 6,707 6,707 0 
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B. Benefits for a couple with a 1-year old and a 3-year old ($)
10,000 13,460 0 13,460 0 13,460 0 13,460 0 
15,000 13,460 0 13,460 0 13,460 0 13,460 0 
20,000 12,207 1,254 12,708 752 12,959 501 13,460 0 
25,000 9,707 3,754 11,208 2,252 11,959 1,501 13,460 0 
30,000 7,207 6,254 9,708 3,752 10,959 2,501 13,460 0 
35,000 4,707 8,754 8,208 5,252 9,959 3,501 13,460 0 
40,000 2,207 11,254 6,708 6,752 8,959 4,501 13,460 0 
45,000 0 13,460 5,208 8,252 7,959 5,501 13,460 0 
50,000 0 13,460 3,708 9,752 6,959 6,501 13,460 0 
55,000 0 13,460 2,208 11,252 5,959 7,501 13,460 0 
60,000 0 13,460 708 12,752 4,959 8,501 13,460 0 
65,000 0 13,460 0 13,460 3,959 9,501 13,460 0 
70,000 0 13,460 0 13,460 2,959 10,501 13,460 0 
75,000 0 13,460 0 13,460 1,959 11,501 13,460 0 
80,000 0 13,460 0 13,460 959 12,501 13,460 0 
85,000 0 13,460 0 13,460 0 13,460 13,460 0 
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middle-class parents—with the burden of child care costs. The co-pay-
ment rate determines how high the parents’ incomes will be when  the
aid for child care goes down to zero.  In Panel B of Table 2, a 50 per-
cent co-payment rate cuts off aid to couples earning $45,000 or more,
while a 20 percent rate extends aid to couples making almost $80,000. 
The zero co-payment rate provides free care to all children, regard-
less of family income.  This is the same provision that is made when
children enter public school a few years later.  Some countries subsi-
dize considerable amounts of child care to the same extent they subsi-
dize elementary and secondary schooling.  For example, France
provides free preschools for all children between two and six, run by
the public school system.  Care for the hours before and after school is
available for modest fees (Bergmann 1996).  The Canadian province of
Quebec has a publicly subsidized child care system that provides care
for $5 a day, regardless of the parents’ income (Peritz 2000). 
While there is no scientific answer to the question of which co-
payment rate is best, there are some considerations pointing to a rate
toward the low end of the spectrum.  If the co-payment rate is higher,
parents will receive less help and be more likely to ignore the subsi-
dized programs and instead seek bargain-basement care from unli-
censed providers.  So a higher rate will on average result in lower-
quality care for children.  It would be good public policy to give par-
ents an adequate incentive to use licensed care.  Subsidies which pay
part of the cost of care that is of better-than-minimally-acceptable qual-
ity do provide an incentive, especially if their use is restricted to pro-
viders that meet such quality standards.  But subsidies that pay only a
low share of the cost give only a weak incentive, especially for parents
with low-to-middle incomes.
The co-payment can be thought of as a special tax the family pays,
and it must be paid on top of the other taxes the family owes.  Under a
50 percent co-payment rate, the family would retain a relatively minor
share of its above-poverty spending power to use for its other living
expenses; for that reason, and because of its harshness, we consider it
much too high.  The phaseout of benefits used in some state child care
subsidy plans under the Child Care and Development Fund program
(CCDF) is equivalent to a co-payment rate of about 30 percent.  The
phaseout of the EITC is equivalent to a rate of 16–20 percent.  Couples
with pre-tax income up to about $50,000 are taxed at 15 percent.
Thinking about Child Care Policy 57
If co-payments are charged, the best case can be made for a rate no
higher than 20 percent of income over the poverty line.  Another rea-
sonable configuration would be a modest flat fee of perhaps $5 a day
per child, with rebates for families close to the poverty line.  Obvi-
ously, there are other, more complicated designs that might serve.
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT PAY?
Any adequate national child care program would involve a consid-
erable increase in government spending for child care, on the order of
tens of billions of dollars annually.  Is this the only way it could be
financed? Are there other sources of financing that might make major
contributions? The attacks by conservatives on “big government” and
on policies of “tax and spend” that have gone on since the 1970s have
been very successful in conveying the idea that new high-cost public
programs should never be considered, and that some of the ones we
already have (particularly Social Security and the public schools,
although not defense) are ripe for dismantlement.  Furthermore, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton’s statement that “The era of big government is over,”
appeared to put beyond the pale any ambitions for a public program of
the type and magnitude we are advocating. 
Those who believe that large new programs are unthinkable, or at
least politically infeasible, have thus tended to look elsewhere (such as
employers or charitable organizations) for aid in supplying affordable
high-quality child care.  It is unrealistic to think that charitable contri-
butions to child care could suffice to make up a major share of the tens
of billions of dollars needed—even if those contributions expanded
tenfold, they would not begin to solve the financial problems. 
Those despairing of a significant increase in government provision
or subsidy of child care are also attracted to the idea that employers
might take a prominent role in providing resources and organizing pro-
grams.  There are several reasons why employers are thought of in this
connection.  There is the American tradition of providing for social
needs like health insurance, sick leave, and vacations through
employer-provided “fringe benefits,” rather than through government
programs, as is done in Europe.  Child care centers located in work-
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places offer important advantages such as convenience and contact
during the work day between parents and children.
We need to ask whether it is realistic to expect employers to con-
tribute much to solving the country’s child care problems.  There is no
reason to believe that employers will voluntarily provide an apprecia-
ble share of the additional billions of dollars needed every year to
finance good-quality child care, or that they could be forced to do it by
legislation or cajoled into it by tax incentives.  On the contrary, many
employers are currently making big efforts to reduce their fringe bene-
fits, largely by keeping some of their employees in a part-time status
and making part-timers ineligible for benefits.  Additionally, they are
reducing the amounts they pay for the health insurance of full-time
workers. 
Even in the unlikely event that employer help with child care
expenses were to become as common as employer help with health
insurance, a lot of people would still be without coverage.  We would
be left with the same spotty picture we have today in health insurance,
where the concept of transitioning from employer-coverage to univer-
sal coverage is increasingly more difficult and more complicated.  In
regard to child care, it is perhaps fortunate that employers provide as
little help as they do. 
TAX BREAKS VERSUS PROVIDER PAYMENTS 
AS A MODE OF FINANCE
A rationalized system of child care finance, especially for children
under four, would concentrate on just one of the two modes of help we
now have for parents with child care expenses—either the block grants
to the states which finance payments to child care providers or the tax
breaks which reimburse parent expenses—and eliminate the other.  A
one-mode system would be more efficient to operate and would make
clearer the extent of the system’s generosity and equity.
If one of the existing systems is to be expanded, which should it
be? One possibility would be to expand the tax break mode we now use
to finance child care help for the middle class and use it as the basis of
a larger and more inclusive system of help to parents with child care
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expenses.  That would mean increasing considerably the tax benefits
available to lower-income families, and making the tax credits refund-
able.
It seems politically easier in the United States to provide social
programs in the form of tax breaks than it is to get Congress to finance
them by appropriations.  Conservatives say that expenditures “spend
the people’s money,” while tax breaks “give the money back to the
people who earned it.” However, this distinction is misleading.  Tax
breaks take money out of the treasury just as expenditures do; for this
reason economists call them “tax expenditures.” A dollar given to a
provider to help a parent with child care fees benefits the parent and
costs the government treasury no more or less than a dollar rebated to
the parent by the tax authority, provided the restrictions on the parent’s
use of the dollar is the same in both cases.
Tax breaks are not limited by yearly appropriations.  As a result, no
one is turned away or put on a waiting list (as happens frequently to
applicants for child care subsidies financed by the child care block
grants or to applicants for housing benefits), because the amount that
has been appropriated is insufficient to pay for the benefit for all those
entitled to it.  The entitlement aspect to benefits distributed through the
tax system is certainly an advantage from the point of view of those
who would like to see more expenditures on behalf of child care, and
more equity in the distribution of those expenditures. 
There are some important disadvantages to using the tax system to
fund child care subsidies.  First, the size of the subsidies that are
needed for low-income families are large.  A low-income family with
three preschool children might require $20,000 a year or more in child
care subsidies, and subsidies of this magnitude, so out of proportion to
any taxes owed, would be awkward to distribute as a refundable tax
break.  Child care subsidies, especially those that cover a high propor-
tion of the cost, need to be paid or reimbursed at least on a monthly
basis, something the tax authorities are not in a good position to do.
The administration of the EITC by the IRS has been troubled by a con-
siderable number of fraudulent claims; the much larger amounts to be
handed out in child care subsidies would make an even more tempting
target for false claims.
Perhaps the most telling argument against depending on tax breaks
as a financing mode relates to quality assurance.  The IRS, as it is cur-
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rently set up, is not equipped to pay attention to such things.  A major
purpose of a national child care program that would fund the consider-
able fees that licensed caregivers charge is that our children would be
provided with good-quality care.  That purpose would be nullified in a
system that reimbursed fees to anybody with a Social Security number. 
UNEARMARKED CASH BENEFITS
Conservatives who wish to encourage maternal care and discour-
age nonmaternal care tend to resist providing subsidies to paid care.
They advocate instead cash benefits “for child care” that are not condi-
tional on or earmarked for child care expenses.14 The standard argu-
ment for them is that they give parents freedom to choose how they
wish to care for their children.  These unearmarked benefits are helpful
to family budgets and are therefore useful in providing a better living
standard for children.  However, if they are set up as a total replace-
ment for subsidies earmarked for nonmaternal child care, they are
harmful because they lack a major characteristic of earmarked subsi-
dies: encouraging parents to upgrade the quality of the care their chil-
dren get.  A family receiving an extra cash payment worth several
thousand dollars labeled “for child care” but which they can spend any
way they want, may spend some of it to improve their child’s care.  But
they are unlikely to spend all of it, or even most of it, in this way.  This
is particularly true if the family has a low income and is lacking many
of the goods and services commonly thought necessary to maintain a
decent lifestyle.  By contrast, a voucher worth several thousand dollars
that can only be used to purchase licensed care may succeed in shifting
a child from unlicensed care to licensed care.15
To drive the point home, we can draw the analogy to methods of
giving health care benefits.  The only way for children to be covered by
health insurance is to have them signed up for health insurance, with
the government payment going to the providers.  Nobody would imag-
ine that a $3,000 unearmarked payment “to help families buy their chil-
dren health insurance” would have as much impact on the number of
children covered, or on the quality of the coverage, as would the pre-
sentation to the family of a noncashable voucher for the health insur-
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ance itself.  Similarly, a $3,000 cash benefit that was sent in an
envelope marked “to help the family pay its child care bills” would
have much less impact on the quality or type of care that was bought by
the family for the child than a voucher worth $3,000 which could only
be used to pay part of child care bills.
THE COST OF  MAKING CHILD CARE AFFORDABLE
A new national plan is needed that would build upon and go
beyond our present system in terms of number of families helped and
the degree of help.  We present here three plans so that their virtues,
defects, coverage, and costs can be compared.  The plans differ in
terms of how many families would receive help, the extent of the help
they would receive, the quality of the care that each plan would offer,
and, of course, what each plan would cost.
Plan 1—Fully Fund the Current Programs 
A relatively modest interim plan would provide the resources to
subsidize all families who are currently eligible for help under the pro-
grams that already exist in each state.  These programs, largely
financed by the federally funded Child Care and Development Fund
(CCDF), now give benefits to only 10–15 percent of those who are eli-
gible.  Providing benefits to all income-eligible families nationally who
currently have their children in paid care, and allotting child care sub-
sidies as well to 60 percent of welfare recipients, is estimated to cost
$19 billion a year.16
Reimbursements to providers would total $22 billion, of which $3
billion or 12 percent would be covered by parents’ co-payments.  The
states might bear some of this cost, as they do under the present pro-
gram, but presumably the federal government would continue to pay
the lion’s share.  This program would give benefits to an estimated 9
million children, as compared with the 1–2 million currently estimated
to be getting benefits under the federal block grants and associated
state funds.17
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The child care subsidy programs operating under the CCDF have
major weaknesses in addition to the insufficient funding: 1) help is cut
off abruptly as a family’s income rises, leaving many families with
moderate incomes without access to affordable care, as we have
defined it, and 2) the reimbursement rates to providers that the pro-
grams allow are not based on quality considerations.  The interim plan
does not cure these two latter weaknesses.  That is done by the second
plan presented below.
Plan 2—Affordable Care of Improved Quality
A national plan that would be a worthy longer-term goal would
allow all families, not just those with the lowest incomes, access to
affordable care, as we have defined it.  It would offer reimbursement
rates to providers that would pay the cost of providing all children with
care at a level of quality equal to the current national average.  It would
also incorporate a system of giving providers a bonus payment if they
achieved higher quality.  And as a family’s income rises, the subsidies
would be phased out gradually.  The subsidy to which a family is enti-
tled would not decrease by more than its increase in income, leaving
the family worse off.18
What quality of care would this program finance? This would be
determined by the amount providers would be allowed to charge, and
by the licensing and inspection system that would oversee the eligible
providers.  Data from the study of Cost, Quality, and Child Outcomes
in Child Care Centers (CQO) (Cost, Quality, and Child Outcomes
Study Team 1995) allow us to relate the quality of the service provided
to its cost.  Using standard techniques, the study rated the quality of
centers, giving scores from 1 to 7.  Centers scoring 3 are designated in
this system as “minimally adequate”; centers that use what child care
professionals call “developmentally appropriate practices” are rated 5
and are given the designation “good.” The average grade given centers
in the study was 4.  Average annual cost per child for centers rated 4,
updated to prices charged in the year 2000, would be $7,380, and for
those rated 5, $8,527.19
If we sent all child care providers a fee typical of providers giving
care rated as “good,” we would be paying for a standard that only a dis-
tinct minority of the nation’s child care providers currently meet.  Only
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24 percent of the care provided to preschoolers by centers observed by
the CQO study were given a rating of “good” or better.  Centers pro-
viding care of that quality for infants and toddlers were even rarer: only
8 percent of the care they received in centers observed was rated
“good” or better (Cost, Quality, and Child Outcomes Study Team
1995, pp. 26–27).  The care in family day care homes and that given by
friends and relatives is likely to be poorer still on average. 
It would seem sensible to pay for the quality standard that the aver-
age provider currently meets (a grade of 4, which, of course, about half
do not meet), which would entail paying centers $6,339 for preschool
children and $10,865 for the care of infants.  We have set the reim-
bursement for family child care at $5,300 and $8,550, respectively.  In
estimating the cost of the program, we have included funds to allow
extra payments ($1,150 annually per child) to providers whose quality
reaches the “good” level.20 These extra funds would provide an incen-
tive to improve care, and be available to finance better pay for child
care workers. 
Table 4 gives examples of the benefits this program would pay.
For single parents with one infant using center care, subsidies would be
available for those with incomes below $65,560.  A single parent with
an infant and a preschooler would be partially subsidized for incomes
up to $99,153.  The final example given is the married couple with a
single child in elementary school, needing after-school and summer
care.  In this case, parents would not receive subsidies above an income
of $22,020, because above that income the fee is less than 20 percent of
their over-the-poverty-line income.
To serve children currently needing care, plus those children of
mothers expected to transit from welfare to work under this plan
would, I estimate, cost $37 billion per year.  If one-third of the children
not currently in paid care had to be taken care of in addition, the cost of
this plan would rise to $49 billion per year; the entry of two-thirds into
paid care would require $61 billion.  These figures include the cost of
the quality bonus.  Under current conditions, that would amount to 3
percent of expenditures under the program.  However, if providers
responded by upgrading their program quality, as would be hoped, that
cost would grow.  
64Table 4 Illustrative Plan to Provide “Affordable Care of Improved Quality” at a 20% Co-Payment Rate
Parent(s)/child’s age Single/1 Single/1,4 Married/1 Married/10
Cost of care ($) 10,865 17,204 10,865 1,780 


















10,000 10,865 0 17,204 0 10,865 0 1,780 0 
12,000 10,712 153 17,204 0 10,865 0 1,780 0 
14,000 10,312 553 17,031 173 10,689 176 1,604 176 
16,000 9,912 953 16,631 573 10,289 576 1,204 576 
18,000 9,512 1,353 16,231 973 9,889 976 804 976 
20,000 9,112 1,753 15,831 1,373 9,489 1,376 404 1,376 
22,000 8,712 2,153 15,431 1,773 9,089 1,776 4 1,776 
24,000 8,312 2,553 15,031 2,173 8,689 2,176 0 1,780 
26,000 7,912 2,953 14,631 2,573 8,289 2,576 0 1,780 
28,000 7,512 3,353 14,231 2,973 7,889 2,976 0 1,780 
30,000 7,112 3,753 13,831 3,373 7,489 3,376 0 1,780 
32,000 6,712 4,153 13,431 3,773 7,089 3,776 0 1,780 
34,000 6,312 4,553 13,031 4,173 6,689 4,176 0 1,780 
36,000 5,912 4,953 12,631 4,573 6,289 4,576 0 1,780 
38,000 5,512 5,353 12,231 4,973 5,889 4,976 0 1,780 
40,000 5,112 5,753 11,831 5,373 5,489 5,376 0 1,780 
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42,000 4,712 6,153 11,431 5,773 5,089 5,776 0 1,780 
44,000 4,312 6,553 11,031 6,173 4,689 6,176 0 1,780 
46,000 3,912 6,953 10,631 6,573 4,289 6,576 0 1,780 
48,000 3,512 7,353 10,231 6,973 3,889 6,976 0 1,780 
50,000 3,112 7,753 9,831 7,373 3,489 7,376 0 1,780 
52,000 2,712 8,153 9,431 7,773 3,089 7,776 0 1,780 
54,000 2,312 8,553 9,031 8,173 2,689 8,176 0 1,780 
56,000 1,912 8,953 8,631 8,573 2,289 8,576 0 1,780 
58,000 1,512 9,353 8,231 8,973 1,889 8,976 0 1,780 
60,000 1,112 9,753 7,831 9,373 1,489 9,376 0 1,780 
62,000 712 10,153 7,431 9,773 1,089 9,776 0 1,780 
64,000 312 10,553 7,031 10,173 689 10,176 0 1,780 
66,000 0 10,865 6,631 10,573 289 10,576 0 1,780 
68,000 0 10,865 6,231 10,973 0 10,865 0 1,780 
70,000 0 10,865 5,831 11,373 0 10,865 0 1,780 
72,000 0 10,865 5,431 11,773 0 10,865 0 1,780 
74,000 0 10,865 5,031 12,173 0 10,865 0 1,780 
76,000 0 10,865 4,631 12,573 0 10,865 0 1,780 
78,000 0 10,865 4,231 12,973 0 10,865 0 1,780 
80,000 0 10,865 3,831 13,373 0 10,865 0 1,780 




Parent(s)/child’s age Single/1 Single/1,4 Married/1 Married/10
Cost of care ($) 10,865 17,204 10,865 1,780 


















84,000 0 10,865 3,031 14,173 0 10,865 0 1,780 
86,000 0 10,865 2,631 14,573 0 10,865 0 1,780 
88,000 0 10,865 2,231 14,973 0 10,865 0 1,780 
90,000 0 10,865 1,831 15,373 0 10,865 0 1,780 
92,000 0 10,865 1,431 15,773 0 10,865 0 1,780 
94,000 0 10,865 1,031 16,173 0 10,865 0 1,780 
96,000 0 10,865 631 16,573 0 10,865 0 1,780 
98,000 0 10,865 231 16,973 0 10,865 0 1,780 
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Plan 3—Free Universal Care 
Finally, a plan that would provide free care to all families, regard-
less of income, on the basis of the same fee structure as the plan to pro-
vide affordable care of improved quality, but with zero co-payments,
would cost $79–$129 billion per year.  Were such a plan to be insti-
tuted, costs would quickly reach the top of that range and soon exceed
it, as most parents would use it.
Child Care Versus Other National Needs
An adequate child care program is certainly not the only desirable
public program lacking in the United States.  The country lacks univer-
sal access to health care, including care for mental health; adequate
funding for public schools, especially in low-income areas; access to
higher education for anyone who can profit from it; immediate help for
those addicted to drugs or alcohol; affordable housing; adequate public
transportation; and adequate social services to counter child abuse,
homelessness, and other social pathologies.  To create such programs
or to bring the ones we have to adequacy would require major expendi-
tures of public money.  The program we have outlined to provide the
United States with affordable child care of improved quality would
also, as we have seen, entail major new public expenditures, year after
year.  How high is the priority of such a child care program? Does it
belong in the list of major national needs? 
The strongest case for programs of child care subsidies such as
those proposed above rests on the fact that they will prevent consider-
able misery to children and their families.  Making child care of decent
quality affordable to all families would result in safer, more educa-
tional, and more enjoyable care for children, and it would give a finan-
cial boost to severly low-income families in a nonstigmatizing way.  If
it had no other benefits, a program providing affordable child care
would be amply justified by the fact that it is an indispensable part of
the cure for child poverty, which afflicts almost one in five children in
the United States.  It would reduce enrollment in welfare-type pro-
grams, and it would give parents a chance to participate in the world of
work and achieve the gains in resources and status that such a partici-
pation allows.
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We do not really have to decide whether the benefits of the child
care program are greater or less than the benefits from universal access
to health care or the other desirable programs that are missing in the
United States.  Other countries can afford all these programs by requir-
ing higher taxes and running a lower defense budget.  The simple truth
is that, like them, we can afford them all.
Notes
Financial support for this study was received from the Foundation for Child Develop-
ment.
1. A U.S. Census survey in 1993 (Casper 1995) reported that those families with
monthly incomes less than $1,200 spent on average 25 percent of their incomes
on child care while the mother worked.
2. The other causes cited by Representative Tom DeLay, Republican Whip, were the
teaching of evolution and the smallness of families due to working women’s use
of contraceptives (Noonan 1999, p. 16).
3. The U.S. Census Bureau reports payments for 1993 (Casper 1995), and these fig-
ures have been annualized for full-time service and adjusted to the year 2000 by
use of the child care component of the Consumer Price Index.
4. See http://www.bls.gov
5. Single mothers paid for 46.6 percent of child care arrangements (Casper 1995).
However, many families had more than one arrangement.  A mother of two might
have one paid arrangement and one unpaid one.
6. The National Academy of Science method of explicit budgeting also allows one
to take account of regional differences in housing costs (Citro and Michael 1995).
See also Renwick and Bergmann (1993).
7. The National Academy of Science experts did not propose a standard child care
cost, as was done for other types of family expenditures.  In deciding whether to
count a family as poor, they subtracted a family’s actual child care costs from its
disposable income before comparing its resources to the basic budget.  This deci-
sion can be criticized on the ground that some of the free or low-cost care arrange-
ments that families make because they have no alternative are seriously
substandard. 
8. The data collected by the “Cost, Quality, and Outcomes” study permits an esti-
mate of the costs associated on average with each level of quality.  These reported
costs were updated to the year 2000 using the child care component of the Con-
sumer Price Index.  The average quality of care currently given in centers is better
than “minimally adequate,” but it does not reach the standard the experts have
rated “good” or “developmentally appropriate.”
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9. We are assuming she receives health insurance  from her employer.  If she doesn’t
she would need a still higher wage income, because the poverty line includes
nothing for health care. 
10. At that wage she would no longer be eligible to benefit from the EITC or food
stamps, and she would have to pay $2,598 in Social Security taxes.  She would
benefit from the recently enacted $500 per child federal tax credit and the tax for
dependent care expenses.  She would end up paying $1,103 in federal income tax.
In most states, she would have to pay a state income tax; in Colorado, the state we
are using as an example, it would amount to $364.
11. Computed by the author from wages reported by single mothers in the 1999 Cur-
rent Population Survey, which refers to incomes for the year 1998.  The wages
quoted were converted into dollars of the year 2000. 
12. This condition is violated by current state plans.  Under the federal rules which
govern it, an increase of income of a few dollars can reduce the subsidy by thou-
sands of dollars.
13. In theory, a phaseout rate of 100 percent would be possible.  However, losing a
dollar in child care benefit for every dollar gained in pre-tax income would leave
the family worse off the more income it earned.  It would have to pay tax on each
dollar of new income, so it would lose $1 of benefit but gain less than a dollar in
spending power.  In practice, 50 percent is close to the fastest rate of phaseout of
the child care benefit for the lower income groups that would allow them, when
their wage income rises, to have more income left over after paying for child care
rather than less.  The reason is that as their income rises, their benefits from the
EITC and food stamps are being reduced and the Social Security tax has to be
paid.
14. This kind of counterproposal was made, for example, by President George Bush
who, when the Congress then controlled by the Democratic party, made child care
subsidy proposals during his administration. 
15. Undoubtedly, some unlicensed care is of high quality.  If some forms of care, such
as relative care, cannot be licensed or are unlikely to be licensed, then there will
be cases where giving a subsidy causes a child to be shifted from higher- to lower-
quality care.  However, most studies suggest that licensed care is on average supe-
rior to unlicensed care, relative care included. 
16. These estimates do not take into account large differences in child care costs from
one area to another within the United States.  Some are due to differences in aver-
age quality and in the cost of living.  Such differences would considerably com-
plicate the design of a national program.
17. Estimated by the author on the basis of Congressional estimates that about 1 mil-
lion families are covered by various child care programs, as of 1997 (U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means 1999).
18. This condition is violated by current state plans under the CCDF.  Under the fed-
eral rules which govern it, an increase of income of a few dollars can reduce the
subsidy by thousands of dollars.
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19. These figures were derived from the data generated by the CQO study, increased
by the change in child care prices, as measured by the child care index of the Con-
sumer Price Index, between mid 1992 and February 2000.
20. This amount is the estimated difference in costs between centers graded 4 and 5
by the “Cost, Quality, and Outcomes Study,” taking into account 1998 child care
prices.
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Parents’ Work Time 
and the Family
Thirty Years of Change
Cordelia W. Reimers
Hunter College and the Graduate School
of the City University of New York
The last three decades of the twentieth century have been a time of
enormous change for U.S. families—change in family size and struc-
ture, in time parents worked for pay, in income and who earned it, and
in how child rearing and other household tasks are managed.  More
children are living with only one parent, and their mothers are working
a greater number of hours outside the home.  Median family income
has stagnated, but inequality has increased.  At the same time, families
are having fewer children.  Some of these changes have contributed to
lower incomes and limited parental time available to children; others
have done the opposite. 
This chapter will discuss five broad trends since 1969 that have
affected families with children: 1) changes in family structure with the
rise of single-parent families, 2) changes in parents’ paid work time as
mothers worked more outside the home, 3) change (or rather, lack
thereof) in median family income, 4) changes in the distribution of
income among families as inequality grew, and 5) changes in the num-
ber of children per family as families became smaller.  The chapter will
survey these trends, discuss some of the underlying reasons behind
them, and examine how families with children are faring in the face of
all these changes.  It concludes with a description of the challenges fac-
ing policymakers at the turn of the century. 
The data are drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
microdata files for March 1970, 1980, 1990, 1997, and 2000.1  These
surveys contain information about annual income from various sources
in the previous year, as well as weeks and usual hours worked and a
variety of demographic characteristics.2  They include a random sam-
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ple of about 50,000 households representing the noninstitutionalized
population in the United States.  Hispanic-headed households are over-
sampled.  When families are selected that have children under age 18
and whose head is a civilian at least 18 years old, 21,287 families are in
our sample in 1970 and 18,619  in 2000.3  We tabulate labor force par-
ticipation, hours and weeks worked, earnings, and income from other
sources for families classified by a few demographic variables: gender,
marital status, education, and race or Hispanic ethnicity of the family
head; and age of the youngest child.  All incomes are expressed in con-
stant 1999 dollars.4  We also draw on published tabulations from the
CPS describing the labor force participation of mothers of infants
under one year old (Bachu and O’Connell 2000). 
INCREASE IN SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES
One of the most important changes in the last 30 years has been the
tremendous expansion of the share of families with children that have
only one parent in the home.  Due to more divorce and out-of-wedlock
childbearing, this share climbed from 13 percent in 1969 to 30 percent
in 1999.5  Half of this increase occurred in the 1970s alone, and the
expansion of the share of families with single parents has been deceler-
ating since.  Still, the number of one-parent families has continued to
grow faster than the number with two parents, so the fraction of fami-
lies that have only one parent present continues to rise.  Single parents
have only half as much total time as two parents, and typically have
less than half as much earning power.  The rising number of single par-
ents has therefore increased the fraction of families that are strapped
for both cash and time for child care.  
INCREASED PAID WORK TIME BY MOTHERS
Another dramatic change in the past 30 years has been the huge
shift of mothers out of the household and into the labor market.  The
total hours parents work at paid jobs have increased enormously since
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1969, by 540 hours per year, or 19 percent, for married couples (Figure
1), and by 441 hours, or 42 percent, for single parents.  This is entirely
because of the increasing amount of time mothers are devoting to earn-
ing money.  Single parents are mostly (but not all) women.  Married
fathers’ paid work time has declined slightly, as they worked the equiv-
alent of one week less in 1999 than in 1969, on average.  The drop
occurred in the 1970s, as married fathers’ annual hours of work
dropped by 100 hours in that decade.  They remained constant in the
1980s and then rose by 46 hours in the 1990s.  In contrast, married
mothers’ paid work time nearly doubled between 1969 and 1999, as
they worked almost 600 hours, or 96 percent more.
All dimensions of mothers’ paid work time have risen: more moth-
ers have paid jobs, they are employed more weeks in a year, and they
are working more hours each week.  As married mothers entered the
workforce in unprecedented numbers, their employment rate rose from
36 percent during the survey week in 1970 to 65 percent in 2000 (Fig-
ure 2).  They caught up with single parents in 1990, but then single par-
ents pulled ahead again as they moved into the workforce in large
numbers in the 1990s.  Overall, the single parents’ employment rate
rose from 53 percent in 1970 to 71 percent in 2000.  Moreover, married
mothers who were in the labor force worked an average of 45 weeks in
1999, the same as single parents.  This is an increase of six weeks since
1969 for the married women, and almost two weeks for the single par-
ents.  Average weekly hours also increased, by two and one-quarter
hours for married mothers and by half as much for single parents.  Nev-
ertheless, in 2000 married mothers still spent fewer hours per week at
paid jobs (35.2) than single parents did (38.8).
These increases occurred at different times for married and single
mothers.  The big increases for married mothers were in the 1970s and
1980s.  Their annual hours of paid employment rose only half as much
in the 1990s as in the previous decade (see Figure 1).  In contrast, time
worked by single parents surged between 1996 and 1999, after the
enactment of welfare reform.  As a result, their annual hours increased
more in the 1990s than in the previous two decades combined.  The
labor force participation rate of never-married mothers aged 15–44
rose from 57 percent to 60 percent between 1990 and 1995, and then
jumped to 68 percent in 1998 (Figure 3).  In contrast, the labor force













































Figure 1 Total Annual Hours of Paid Work, Married Couples with 
Children under 18
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
Figure 2 Employment Rates for Parents with Children under 18
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
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Figure 3 LFPR of Never-Married Women Age 15–44
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
children slipped from 72 percent to 70 percent between 1990 and 1998.
This suggests that welfare reform, not simply the tightening labor mar-
ket, was behind the surge of single parents into the workforce in the
1990s.
The increase in mothers’ work for pay has not been uniform;
rather, it differs between more- and less-educated women, by race/eth-
nicity, and between those with and without young children in the
home.  The greatest increases have been for the married women with
the most education.  College-educated married mothers doubled their
annual hours of paid work in the last 30 years of the twentieth century,
from 677 to 1,362 for those with a BA or more, and from 606 to 1,274
for those without a BA (Figure 4).  Married mothers who did not go
beyond high school increased their annual hours of paid work by 75
percent, from 618 to 1,083.  Among single parents, on the other hand,
paid work time rose less for those with college degrees than for the less
educated, who worked fewer annual hours to start with.  Single parents
with a BA or more went from working 1,604 hours in 1969 to 1,871 in
1999, an increase of 17 percent.  Those with some college went from
1,266 hours to 1,686, an increase of 33 percent, and those with no more
than high school went from 1,004 hours to 1,319, an increase of 31 per-
cent.  The time patterns of these increases reflect the effects of welfare



































tions, as for married mothers at all education levels, were in the 1970s
and 1980s; whereas the biggest increases for single parents with no
more than high school were in the late 1990s. 
Black and white non-Hispanic married mothers’ paid work time
increased by about 400 hours, almost twice as much as Hispanics’,
between 1979 and 1999 (Figure 5).6  Because the white women started
from a lower base, their percentage increase was greater than the
blacks’: 50 percent versus 37 percent.  The Hispanic wives’ increase of
222 hours per year was a rise of 28 percent.  Among single parents,
however, the race/ethnic pattern is just the reverse.  Hispanics had the
largest, and white non-Hispanics the smallest, increases in annual
hours of paid work, in both numerical and percentage terms.  Hispanic
single parents’ paid employment climbed by 423 hours, or 48 percent;
blacks’ climbed by 412 hours, or 43 percent; and white non-Hispanics’
rose by 284 hours, or 21 percent.
The largest increases have been among mothers of very young
children, who had the lowest rates of market work to begin with.  Both
Figure 4 Annual Hours Worked, by Education
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
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Figure 5 Annual Hours Worked, by Race/Ethnicity
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
Figure 6 Annual Hours Worked, by Age of Youngest Child
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
78 Reimers
single parents and married mothers with children below age three
increased their paid work time by 600 hours, on average, between 1969
and 1999 (Figure 6).  For the single parents, this represented an
increase of 82 percent.  For the married mothers it was an increase of
two and a half times.  By 1999 married mothers with children under
three years old were working outside the home 1,000 hours a year,
which is equivalent to a half-time job.  (A full-time job—40 hours a
week for 50 weeks a year—would be 2,000 hours.)  Their husbands’
annual hours did not change.  As a result, total parental work time out-
side the home increased by 23 percent for two-parent families with
children under three years of age. 
Even mothers of infants under one year old have surged into the
labor force.  Their labor force participation rate climbed from 31 per-
cent in 1976 to 59 percent in 1998 (Bachu and O’Connell 2000).   The
rate of increase slowed somewhat after 1986, when their labor force
participation rate reached 50 percent; but it jumped again by 3.7 per-
centage points from 1995 to 1998.
The effects of welfare reform are evident in the greater increases in
labor force participation after 1995 by never-married and minority
mothers and those with less education.  The labor force participation
rate of never-married women with infants climbed from 40 to 47 per-
cent in the first half of the 1990s, and then to 54 percent in the next
three years (Figure 7).  Married mothers of infants are still more likely
to be in the paid workforce, however.  In 1998 their participation rate
was 60 percent. 
For black women with infants, married or not, participation in the
workforce rose from 47 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 1995, and then
jumped by 11 points to 63 percent in 1998, putting them well ahead of
whites as well as Hispanics (Figure 8).  For Hispanic mothers of infants,
labor force participation had dropped from 44 percent to 39 percent in
the first half of the 1990s; then it bounced back to 46 percent in the next
three years.   The increases were larger at the lower education levels;
but still, in 1998 mothers of infants who had a BA degree or more were
much more likely to be in the workforce than those with no more than a
high school diploma: 68 percent versus 38 percent (Figure 9).
The increases in annual hours of paid work for mothers whose chil-
dren were all of school age were somewhat less dramatic than for those
with younger children, but were nonetheless quite large: 374 hours (31





















Figure 7 LFPR of Mothers Aged 15–44 Who Had a Child in the Last 
Year, by Marital Status
SOURCE: Bachu and O’Connell 2000.
Figure 8 LFPR of Mothers Aged 15–44 Who Had a Child in the Last 
Year, by Race/Ethnicity












































percent) for single parents and 577 hours (77 percent) for the married
women (see Figure 6).  The fathers’ annual hours declined very slightly
(82 hours, or 4 percent), so total parental time in the labor market
increased by 17 percent for two-parent families with only school-aged
children. 
What is behind this dramatic shift of mothers from the home to the
workplace?  A fundamental force has been rising wages for women.
Women’s median full-time year-round real earnings (in 1999 dollars)
climbed from $21,045 in 1969 to $26,324 in 1999, a rise of 25 percent
(U.S. Census Bureau 2001a).  This has made time spent in unpaid activ-
ities at home and elsewhere increasingly costly to the family, in terms
of foregone income.  A mother who stays home today is making a big-
ger sacrifice of income than ever before.  
The stagnation of men’s median wages during much of this period,
with declining wages for low-skilled male workers, has reinforced this
pressure. In 1969 the median man who worked full time all year earned
$35,751 in 1999 dollars; in 1999 he earned $36,476, just 2 percent more
(U.S. Census Bureau 2001a).  In the interim, men’s median full-time
year-round real earnings had fluctuated with the business cycle but with
a downward trend, peaking in 1973 at $39,483, in 1978 at $38,824, and
Figure 9 LFPR of Mothers Aged 15–44 Who Had a Child in the Last 
Year, by Education
SOURCE: Bachu and O’Connell 2000.
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in 1986 at $38,391.  With fathers already working full time for the most
part, the only way for most families to increase their income—and for
many simply to maintain it in the face of falling male wages—has been
for the woman to take a job or work more hours.  The narrowing gender
wage gap, as women’s full-time earnings rose from 58.9 to 72.2 percent
of men’s, has created powerful pressure toward a more equal division of
labor within the family, with mothers and fathers sharing both financial
responsibilities and household tasks, rather than specializing with a
male breadwinner and female full-time homemaker.
However, the magnitudes of the changes in women’s paid work
time are still not completely understood, and they are not easily
explained by changes in key economic variables  (Blau 1998; Danziger
and Reed 1997).  The increases in paid work among women seem to be
more closely related to increases in their own wages than to the changes
in their husband’s wages over this period (Juhn and Murphy 1997).
Diminished discrimination against women in the workplace and
removal of barriers that had kept them out of nontraditional occupations
have also encouraged women to expand their work outside the home.
Highly educated women have benefited more from diminished discrim-
ination than have women with less education, as higher-level profes-
sional and management jobs have opened up to them. 
Finally, attitudes toward working mothers have changed, making it
the norm rather than the exception for a woman to have a paid job, even
while her children are toddlers.  This change in attitudes is, of course,
not unrelated to the pressures from rising wages for women and the nar-
rowing gender wage gap discussed above.  A self-reinforcing set of
reciprocal influences is operating here, in which rising wages induce
more mothers to go to work, which in turn makes it a more “normal”
pattern, which in turn reduces the social pressure to stay at home while
children are young.  Furthermore, as women have more continuous
careers with less time out for childrearing, their accumulated work
experience increases and with it, their rate of wage growth over time.
This in turn encourages more women to train for and pursue highly paid
careers.
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NO GROWTH IN MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME—UNTIL THE 
LAST FEW YEARS
Putting the trends in wages and hours together, to what extent have
increases in hours of paid work within families translated into
increases in family income? When all families are lumped together, the
median family’s pre-tax cash income rose just 12 percent (from
$42,039 to $47,100) in the last three decades of the twentieth century,
after adjusting for inflation.  Virtually all of this gain occurred in the
last three years, as median income had risen only 1.5 percent between
1969 and 1996.  It then jumped 10 percent in the next three years.
Because families in the upper tail gained the most (and gained much
more than those in the lower tail lost), average real family income rose
27 percent (from $46,447 to $58,888 in 1999 dollars) over the 30-year
period—14 percent in the 27 years from 1969 to 1996 and another 11
percent in the three years from 1996 to 1999.7 
The modest overall rise in family income is the outcome of four
offsetting trends: rising earnings for women, stagnating male wages,
declining real value of transfer payments, and the shift toward single
parenthood.  Largely because of women’s increasing work time and
wages, average family incomes for both married-couple and single-
parent families rose (by 44 percent and 26 percent, respectively), even
though fathers’ earnings stagnated during most of the period, and real
transfer income for single parents fell.  But at the same time an increas-
ing share of families were headed by single parents, whose incomes are
much lower than those of families with two earners.  This shift can-
celled the extra gains for married-couple families taken separately,
leaving overall average family income only 27 percent higher—and
median family income only 12 percent higher—after thirty years.8
Figures 10 and 11 present estimates of average family incomes, by
income component.  Similar to the median family incomes discussed
above, they measure pre-tax cash income only, including cash benefits
such as welfare and unemployment insurance benefits, but they do not
include other family resources, such as fringe benefits, food stamps,
and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  While these other
resources and taxes are important, they are difficult to measure accu-
rately or consistently for individual families.  Because food stamp use











































Figure 10 Average Family Income of Married Couples with Children 
under 18, by Source
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
Figure 11 Average Family Income of Single Parents with Children under 
18, by Source
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
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grew rapidly in the 1970s and the EITC expanded greatly in the 1990s,
the pre-tax cash income measure omits more of the resources available
to low-income families today than in the 1960s.  The family income
data therefore understate the gains made by low-income families since
1969.9
An analysis of the components of married parents’ total family
income shows that the wives’ rising earnings were the main source of
income growth.  After rising only 6 percent in real terms between 1969
and 1996, fathers’ wages rose by 10 percent in the next three years
alone, resulting in an increase of 17 percent over the period 1969–
1999.  Meanwhile, their annual hours of paid work declined slightly,
by 2.5 percent, between 1969 and 1999.  The combination resulted in
an 18 percent increase in fathers’ annual earnings, more than half of it
coming in 1996–1999 alone (see Figure 10).10  In contrast, married
mothers’ wages increased by 57 percent and their annual hours of work
for pay nearly doubled; therefore, their annual earnings more than tri-
pled.  Government transfers for two-parent families—such as Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income for the disabled, unem-
ployment insurance, veterans’ benefits, and workers’ compensation—
rose by 22 percent, but they represent less than 2 percent of these fami-
lies’ income.  Other sources of income—earnings of other family
members and unearned income—rose by 67 percent for two-parent
families, but these represent less than 10 percent of family income.
Largely because of women’s rising wages, the average annual income
of couples rose by more than their annual work time.  In 1999 married
parents spent 19 percent more total hours working for pay than in 1969,
but their income was 44 percent higher. 
The picture was quite different for single parents (mostly, but not
all, female).  Their wages increased by 33 percent from 1969 to 1999.
Their work time rose by 42 percent, far exceeding the increase for cou-
ples, and their earnings rose by 70 percent (see Figure 11).  But their
income rose by only 26 percent, much less than their increase in paid
work time.  This was because the inflation-adjusted transfer income of
single-parent families dropped by 50 percent over the 30-year period,
and their income from other sources rose by only 4 percent.  Because
nominal AFDC benefits were not increased to keep up with inflation,
their real value declined throughout the period.  Then in the 1990s wel-
fare reform led to a steep decline in welfare caseloads, further reducing
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the transfer income of single parents.  On average, their 42 percent
greater paid-work effort more than offset the loss of welfare, but it
increased their total income by only a quarter.
MORE INEQUALITY
Another outcome of the trends of the past 30 years is greater ine-
quality among families.  Not only has income inequality risen within
each type of family, but single parents have less time and less money
than two parents—and many more families are in this situation.
Because the average income of two-parent families increased by 44
percent while that of one-parent families increased by only 26 percent,
the gap between them expanded.  In 1969, married couples with chil-
dren had 2.2 times the income of single parents, on average.   By 1999,
the ratio was 2.5.  
Income Gaps by Education
Inequality of family incomes increased on other dimensions as
well.  Less-educated fathers lost earning power, and they worked less
and had lower annual earnings in 1999 than 30 years before.  This situ-
ation just began to improve in the last few years.  Less-educated single
parents lost transfer income from welfare benefits, which more than
offset the improvement in their earnings relative to single parents with
college educations.
Fathers without a bachelor’s degree earned less, on average, in
1999 than in 1969 (Figure 12).  Those with no more than a high school
diploma earned 10 percent less in real terms; those with some college
education earned 3 percent less.  That the drop was not greater is due to
a turnaround between 1996 and 1999.  In 1996 average earnings of
fathers with no college were 14 percent lower than in 1969; then they
grew by 5 percent in the next three years.  Even this improvement,
however, did not quite get them back to where they had been in 1989,
much less 1969.  Fathers with some college suffered an 8 percent
decline in annual earnings from 1969 to 1996, followed by a 6 percent

























had been in 1989.   In contrast, fathers with a BA or more earned 16
percent more than they had in 1969.  Their earnings rose just 5 percent
from 1969 to 1996, but then climbed 10 percent in the next three years.
The wives did better.  By dint of working many more hours and the
rise in women’s wages, married mothers at each education level earned
two to three times as much in 1999 as 30 years earlier.  Those with no
more than a high school education earned 2.1 times as much, and those
with college education earned 2.7–2.8 times as much (see Figure 12). 
The faster earnings growth of more-educated fathers and mothers,
combined with the tendency of more-educated men to marry more-
educated women, caused the gap in total income between two-parent
families with more- and less-educated heads to increase.  Overall, the
total income of married-couple families where the husband did not go
beyond high school improved by just 15 percent in three decades, after
adjusting for inflation (Figure 13).  For families where the father had
some college, total real income increased by 26 percent, and for those
where he had at least a BA, the increase was 42 percent.  As a result,
the income gap between families with more- and less-educated heads
expanded.  In 1969, families whose head finished college had 1.7 times
the income of families whose head did not go beyond high school.  By
1999 this ratio was 2.1.
Figure 12 Average Annual Earnings of Married Parents, by Education
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.






























Among single parents, on the other hand, the earnings gap between
the more- and less-educated narrowed, while the family income gap
widened.  Those with a high school education or less experienced a 39
percent rise in earnings from 1969 to 1999—17 percent in the 1970s, 3
percent in the 1980s, 1 percent from 1989 to 1996, and then a jump of
15 percent in the next three years.  This no doubt reflects the effect of
welfare reform, combined with the tight labor market for low-skilled
labor so that parents leaving (or not going on) welfare could find jobs.
In the early 1990s, the early welfare reforms under federal waivers
apparently offset the recession for this lowest-skilled group of single
parents.  For single parents with some college (but not four years),
earnings grew by 36 percent over the period 1969–1999.  Again, the
growth was concentrated in the 1970s and late 1990s:  23 percent in the
1970s, 1 percent in the 1980s, a drop of 7 percent in the early 1990s
(no doubt reflecting the recession and slow recovery), and then a 17
percent rise in the late 1990s as the labor market tightened.
Single parents with a BA or higher gained 26 percent in earnings
over 30 years.  This was a smaller gain than for single parents with less
education, but the college graduates had earned much more to begin
Figure 13 Average Family Income, by Marital Status and Education 
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
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with: more than three times as much as those with no more than a high
school diploma, and almost twice as much as those with some college.
The timing of the earnings growth for single parents with four or more
years of college was different, too: a drop of 7 percent in the 1970s, a
26 percent gain in the 1980s, a 3 percent drop from 1989 to 1996, and
an 11 percent increase during 1996–1999.
The outcome of the slower earnings growth for more educated sin-
gle parents was to narrow the earnings advantage of those with at least
four years of college over those with no more than a high school
diploma, from a ratio of 3.3 in 1969 to 3.0 in 1999.  However, their
total income advantage increased from a ratio of 2.1 to 2.5 (see Figure
13), because transfer payments were a larger share of the income of the
less-skilled, and their value was cut in half.  
Income Gaps by Race/Ethnicity
Looking at married-couple and single-parent families separately,
the family income gaps between blacks, Hispanics, and white non-His-
panics failed to narrow during the last three decades of the twentieth
century.  Indeed, among two-parent families, Hispanics fell further
behind the other groups.  The gaps between black and white non-His-
panic family incomes did not change for either type of family, nor did
the gaps between Hispanic and other single-parent families.
Among married couples with children, white and black non-His-
panics’ average family income both grew by 31 percent between 1979
and 1999, while Hispanics’ family income grew by a mere 4 percent
(see Figure 14).11  All of the Hispanics’ gain occurred in the last three
years.  Their real family income had deteriorated by 4 percent between
1979 and 1996, then gained 8 percent from 1996 to 1999.  Among sin-
gle parents, white and black non-Hispanics’ average family income
rose by 19 percent during the 20-year period, while that of Hispanics
rose by 23 percent. 
Therefore, the black/white gaps remained constant for each type of
family, with black non-Hispanic two-parent families having 77 percent
as much income as white non-Hispanics, and black non-Hispanic sin-
gle-parent families having 68 percent as much income as their white
counterparts.  When both types of families are combined, however,
blacks’ average family income grew less than that of whites because of
































the larger share of single parents among blacks.  Therefore, the overall
black/white family income gap expanded.
Among one-parent families, the Hispanic/white gap was also virtu-
ally constant: Hispanics had 67 percent as much as white non-Hispan-
ics in 1979, and 69 percent in 1999.  There was little difference
between Hispanic and black single parents’ average family income in
either year.  But Hispanic two-parent families fell further behind blacks
and whites over these two decades, slipping from 74 percent of white
non-Hispanics’ family incomes to only 58 percent.  One reason was
that Hispanic couples increased their combined paid work time much
less than black and white non-Hispanic parents: 272 hours per year
versus 479 and 475, respectively (see Figure 5).  Another was that His-
panics’ wages deteriorated relative to blacks’ and whites’ as the wage
gap between more and less-skilled workers expanded, due to the His-
panics’ lower average educational attainment (U.S. Census Bureau
2001b, 2001c, 2001d; McKinnon and Humes 2000; Therrien and
Ramirez 2001).  The increased immigration of Hispanics with very lit-
Figure 14 Average Family Income, by Marital Status and Race/Ethnicity
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
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tle education also contributed to the decline of their median wages
(Schmidley and Gibson 1999).
Interquartile Income Gap
Putting together the various trends toward greater inequality, it is
no surprise to find that families at the upper end of the income distribu-
tion gained while those in the lower tail lost out over the past 30 years.
Families at the 75th percentile of all families with children experienced
a 32 percent rise in real income, while those at the 25th percentile
experienced an 11 percent decline.  After 1996 the long-term decline
for the lower income group reversed itself:  from 1969 to 1996, total
family income at the 25th percentile had dropped by 21 percent.  It then
rose by 12 percent in the next three years.  The 75th percentile had
risen by 19 percent from 1969 to 1996; then it rose another 11 percent
in the next three years.  As a result, between 1969 and 1996 families at
the 75th percentile went from twice to more than triple the income of
families at the 25th percentile, and the size of the gap did not change
after that.
FEWER CHILDREN
At the same time that parents were working more outside the home
and family incomes were increasing during the last three decades, the
average number of children per family was decreasing, from 2.4 to 1.9.
Declining fertility rates and later childbearing meant that, on average,
there were 0.5 fewer children per family with children under 18 in
1989 than 1969.  The number remained constant in the 1990s.  The
decline was somewhat greater in one-parent than two-parent families.
In 1969 the average family with children under 18 had 2.4 children,
regardless of whether there were two parents or one.  Thirty years later
the married couples had 1.9 children under 18 at home, whereas the
single parents had only 1.7.
The same fundamental pressure—rising wages for women—
underlies both the fertility decline and the dramatic shift of mothers’
time into the labor market.  The opportunity cost of child rearing, in
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terms of foregone income, has risen.  And since the growth of female
wages means that the cost of purchased child care rises about as fast as
mothers’ wages do, children simply have become much more expen-
sive compared with other goods.  Hence, parents are having fewer chil-
dren. 
NET OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN
Family Per Capita Income
The combination of these dramatic trends since 1969—toward
more parental time in the labor market and, consequently, more family
income, but fewer children—means that there is more money per per-
son for purchasing goods and services in many families, especially in
those with two parents.  But not all children have benefited.  The
increasing share of single-parent families, whose incomes are lower
and grew much less than the incomes of married-couple families, needs
to be taken into account.  Moreover, less-skilled parents had slower
income growth than highly skilled parents.  It is therefore important to
examine the trends in per capita income for lower-income and higher-
income families, not just the average.
Figure 15 shows changes for the combined family income distribu-
tion of single-parent and two-parent families.  As a crude adjustment
for the differences in family size between two-parent and one-parent
families and for the decreases in family size over time, family incomes
are presented in per capita terms.  (This adjustment overstates the gains
from shrinking family size because it costs more than half as much to
support one person as two.)  The figure shows the change in average
income per person for the lowest quarter, the highest quarter, and the
middle half of the distribution of all families’ per capita incomes, after
adjusting for inflation.
These estimates indicate that while there has been substantial
growth in real income per person for families with high per capita
income, income per person was either stable or decreasing for other
families when 1996 is compared with 1969.  During the economic

























incomes also experienced rising income per person, though not as
much as the high-income group.  Between 1969 and 1999, the top
quarter of families gained 42 percent ($9,877 in 1999 dollars), while
families in the bottom quarter of the per capita income distribution had
declines of three percent ($122), after adjusting for inflation.  For fam-
ilies in the middle half of the per capita income distribution, average
real income per person gained 20 percent ($2,098). 
Potential Time for Children
The flip side of the increases in parents’ paid work time and
incomes is that parents have less time for other activities, thus less time
potentially available for children.  The information about what people
actually do with the time they do not spend at paid jobs is limited, and
comes mainly from time-use diary studies.  These studies include only
small samples of people.  We begin with the CPS data regarding basic
trends and then discuss the more detailed time-use diary data.
The CPS data indicate that families have less total time to devote to
unpaid activities, including maintaining a household and caring for
children, because they are spending more time in the labor market and
Figure 15 Average Income per Person, by Quartile, Families with 
Children under 18
SOURCE: March CPS microdata files.
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because the share of families with a single parent is growing.  From
1969 to 1999, both married-couple and single-parent families experi-
enced a decrease in time not spent in paid work, of 1.4 hours and 1.2
hours, respectively.  The overall decrease of 2.6 hours is greater than
the decreases within either family type because the proportion of sin-
gle-parent families increased over this period.  It should be emphasized
that this is a decrease only in time potentially available in the home.
There is no information in the CPS about how parents actually spend
their time outside paid work.
Despite increases in paid work hours for each type of family,
reductions in family size mean that the amount of parental non-market
time potentially available per child has increased for both married-cou-
ple and single-parent families since 1969.  When single-parent and
married-couple families are added together, however, the amount of
parental time per child has remained relatively constant.  This is
because the shift toward more single parents tends to decrease total
parental time available to children, as it reduces the number of custo-
dial parents available to spend time with them.  In any case, this mea-
sure is obviously misleading, because it assumes that an only child who
spends an hour with a parent gets twice as much parental attention as
each of two children who spend that same hour with the parent.  This
ignores the obvious “economies of scale” when a parent reads a story
to, plays a game with, or eats a meal with more than one child at a time.
Time Use in the Home: Diary Evidence
The trends in hours of paid work time and non-market time
described above are based on data that report individuals’ estimates of
their weeks worked and usual hours worked per week in the previous
year.  Such estimates may not accurately portray the actual hours
worked for pay because the hours question is somewhat ambiguous
and respondents may not be able to report accurately on a “usual” week
in the few minutes allowed during the CPS interview.  Fortunately,
time-use diary surveys, which ask respondents to keep a detailed diary
record of how they spend their time during a specific day, provide an
alternative, more accurate method of measuring paid work time as well
as time spent in various kinds of unpaid activities, such as commuting,
housework, child care, shopping, recreation, and personal care.  Time-
94 Reimers
use diary measures tend to show shorter paid work hours and some-
times even different trends than the CPS (Robinson and Godbey 1997,
Chapter 5).
Unfortunately, such time-use diary surveys are conducted much
less frequently and with much smaller samples than the CPS.  The lat-
est available data for adults were collected in 1985; results on parents’
time use from a survey done in 1992–1994 are not yet available.  More
recent time-use diary data are available for children, however, as sur-
veys were done in 1981 and 1997.  Because of the small samples, time-
use diary surveys cannot be used to examine trends for subgroups of
the adult population, such as single parents or blacks.  Moreover, the
individuals who complete the diaries may not represent the U.S. popu-
lation as well as the CPS sample does.  These surveys do, however,
provide otherwise unavailable information about how much time is
spent by adults in different types of unpaid work at home, such as child
care and housework, in leisure pursuits, and sleep.  And the children’s
time-use diaries show recent trends in time children spend with their
parents, in both married-couple and single-parent families.  We first
discuss the time-use diary evidence for parents, and then for children.
Time-use diaries for adults indicate that the entry of many mothers
into the workforce has put them in a “time crunch.” While both
employed and non-employed women have managed to keep the
amount of time spent with children relatively constant, a great many
women with children have moved from the “non-employed” to
“employed” category.  The “time crunch” is best illustrated by the fact
that in 1985, employed women spent more than one-third less time on
child care and household tasks than women without paid jobs, but they
still had 27 percent less free time (Robinson and Godbey 1997, Tables
3 and 6).
Figures 16 and 17 show the time devoted to various activities by all
women and all men, including those without children, based on time-
use surveys conducted in the United States in 1965 and 1985 (Robin-
son and Godbey 1997).  The decreases in child care time for men and
non-employed women reflect the fact that fewer of them are parents.
The increase in child care time for employed women is mainly due to
the shift of mothers into paid employment, which increased the share
of the female workforce that had children at home.  These same time-
use surveys show that employed mothers spent almost the same
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Figure 16 Women’s Division of Time outside Paid Work and Sleep
SOURCE: Robinson and Godbey 1997.
Figure 17 Men’s Division of Time outside Paid Work and Sleep
SOURCE: Robinson and Godbey 1997.
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amount of time taking care of children in 1985 (6.7 hours per week) as
in 1965 (6.3 hours per week).12  Mothers without paid jobs also main-
tained a consistent amount of time with children, spending about 12
hours a week on child care in both years.  When the shift of women
into employment is taken into account, however, mothers’ time in child
care declined by 10 percent overall, from 10 to 9 hours per week.
Fathers did not make up the difference.  Their child care time remained
about 2.6 hours per week from 1965 to 1985.   This suggests that the
increase in market work among women has reduced parents’ total child
care time.  But mothers have reduced their child care time by much less
than they have increased their time in paid work because they have cut
back on other activities.  Women have markedly reduced the time they
spend on household chores.  Men have somewhat increased the time
they spend on housework, but it does not make up for all of the reduc-
tion by women.
The effect of women’s increased hours in the labor market on fam-
ilies is likely to vary between college-educated parents whose incomes
have been rising faster than their work hours because their wages
increased, and less-educated parents whose incomes have risen less
than their work hours due to falling wages and transfer payments.  The
effect of women’s increased paid work time on families is also likely to
vary between married couples, who can shift some housework and
child care from working wife to husband, and single parents, who can-
not.  Within married-couple families, moreover, there are likely to be
differences across education levels in this shifting of tasks, as child
care time by fathers rises with their education.  Unfortunately, the
time-use diary survey samples are too small to be broken down into
these subsamples.  Thus, the above-quoted estimates are based on aver-
age trends and may miss important distinctions between high- and low-
income groups, or between single-parent and two-parent families. 
Children’s Time with Parents
The evidence we have from studies of time use in the home sug-
gests that most of the extra paid work time by women has come out of
household chores, not child care. The estimated reduction of time spent
in child care is much less than the reduction in available time at home.
When we also take into account the decrease in number of children per
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family, it is not at all clear that the average child today actually gets
less time from a parent than 30 years ago.
Direct evidence from time-use diaries for children shows that in
1997 the average child spent more time with his or her parents than in
1981 (Sandberg and Hofferth 2001).  This was true whether or not the
mother was married, whether or not she worked, and whether or not
she was a college graduate.  This shift in parents’ behavior far out-
weighed the negative effects of the increase in single parenthood and in
mothers’ paid employment.  The net outcome was an increase of 4.3
hours per week (18 percent) spent with mothers and 3.0 hours per week
(19 percent) spent with fathers.   Because college-educated parents
spend more time with a child than less-educated parents do, the rise in
educational attainment helped, but it explains only a small part of the
increase in children’s time with their mothers. 
Unfortunately, there are no data on children’s time use before
1981, so we do not know what happened in the 1970s.  It is possible
that parental behavior adjusted with a lag, and that children’s time with
their parents declined in the 1970s as single parenthood and mothers’
labor force participation grew.  Therefore, we cannot say that children
today spend more time with their parents than children did 30 years
ago.  However, several other considerations are relevant here.  First,
much of mothers’ additional paid work time is at part-time jobs, often
during school hours.  In addition, couples often work different shifts so
one of them can be at home with the children.  This may not be good
for their own relationship, but the children do have a parent around
more often. 
Moreover, in the past, even “stay-at-home” middle- and upper-
class mothers, who didn’t work for pay, were not at home with their
children all the time.  They went shopping, participated in church or
synagogue groups, attended PTA and other organization meetings, did
volunteer work in the community, played golf or bridge, and social-
ized.  And even when their mothers were at home, school-aged chil-
dren were often somewhere else—at school, at lessons, playing at
friends’ homes, or with baby-sitters.
As couples have shifted to a more equal division of labor from the
traditional one where the father specialized in earning money and the
mother in unpaid work in the household, the increase in mothers’ earn-
ings and the narrowing of the earnings gap between them and their hus-
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bands has given women more power within the family.  This has both a
down side and an up side for children.  It may result in more divorced
parents, because women today have more alternatives to staying in an
unhappy marriage.  But children may not be worse off living with only
one parent than with an unhappy, perhaps violent, mother and father.
And if parents do divorce or the father dies, the average mother today
is better able to support the children alone than when she had no mar-
ketable skills.  There is also some evidence that when the mother has
more power within the family, the children benefit directly, as mothers
are more likely than fathers to spend extra money on goods and ser-
vices for children rather than on themselves.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has documented the large-scale shift of women’s time
from the home to the labor market over the last generation.  For most
families, this change has led to an increase in family income.  It has
also changed how child care and household tasks are done, with more
purchased goods and fathers’ time, but less total parental time because
of less mothers’ time.  Take-out and pre-prepared convenience food,
commercial laundries, landscapers, and housecleaning services con-
sume much of the extra income parents earn.  Child care is increasingly
purchased from day care centers, nursery schools, baby-sitters, or nan-
nies, depending on the parents’ income level. 
This chapter has also documented the very large shift from mar-
ried-couple to single-parent families over the last 30 years, reducing
both the income and parental time available for many children. While
smaller family sizes have helped cushion the decrease in “home” time,
many parents find it difficult to balance jobs and children.  Single par-
ents face the most difficulties.  They have only half as much total time
available as two parents, and a single mother typically has less than
half as much earning power as a married couple because women’s
wages are lower than men’s.  Lack of income limits most single par-
ents’ ability to purchase time-saving goods and services and high-qual-
ity child care.  Thus, they face a severe “time crunch” as well as a
“money bind.”
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Among married parents, men without college educations have
faced declining wages.  While increased work by their wives has
helped maintain their families’ income, it is still difficult for these fam-
ilies to afford child care.  Moreover, less-educated workers are less
likely to have jobs that permit parents to arrange their hours to accom-
modate family needs.
Better-educated parents, whose increased time in the labor market
has been rewarded with considerably higher incomes than in 1969, can
more easily afford high-quality child care, household help, and other
time-saving goods and services.  Married-couple families, particularly
those where the husband has a college degree, have seen substantial
improvements in their economic situation over the last three decades.
Even these couples, however, face the stress involved in balancing
increased work and family.
If children and their families are going to withstand the stresses
created by the trends of the last three decades, employers and public
policy makers need to do more to help parents balance work and fam-
ily.  To an important extent, the effect of parents’ market work time on
children depends on when and where it is performed.  By shifting from
work in the home to work in the market, many women find themselves
with far less flexibility in responding to family needs.  Workplaces and
work hours must become more flexible.  Compensatory time instead of
“time-and-a-half” pay for overtime work is one increasingly popular
arrangement; “flextime” (that is, allowing employees some discretion
in when they work their allotted hours) is another.  In 1997, 28 percent
of full-time wage and salary workers had flexible work schedules.
This was up sharply from 15 percent in 1991, the most recent prior year
when data were collected.13  The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 enables workers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for
a new baby or ailing family member without jeopardizing their jobs.
Flexibility in shift work enables parents to share child care more
easily by working different shifts.  In order for shift work to make com-
bining paid work and child care easier, however, the choice of shifts
must be voluntary.  Nonstandard working hours may make it difficult
both to find time to spend with children when they are awake and not
in school and to arrange for child care while working.  For those work-
ers who cannot determine their own schedules, the combination of shift
work and children is a potential source of stress and expense.  In 1997,
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83 percent of full-time wage and salary workers were on regular day-
time schedules, 4.6 percent were on evening shifts, 3.9 percent were on
employer-arranged irregular schedules, 3.5 percent were on night
shifts, and 2.9 percent were on rotating shifts (Council of Economic
Advisers 1999, p. 15). 
Working at home for pay can also increase parents’ flexibility.  In
1997, 3.3 percent of all wage and salary workers were doing work at
home for pay, up from 1.9 percent in 1991.  An additional 10 percent of
all wage and salary workers in 1997 were doing work at home without
receiving extra pay for it.  Nearly 9 out of 10 workers who were paid
for work at home were in white-collar occupations (Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 1999, p. 15).
While incomes have been rising for most people, families at the
bottom of the income distribution, whose inflation-adjusted incomes
were lower in 1999 than in 1969, still face serious economic hardship.
Many low-income parents are forced to work harder and spend less
time with their families just to make ends meet.  Policies that would
help these families cope include expansions in the EITC; children’s
allowances or tax credits to help offset the expense of raising children;
increases in the minimum wage; expanded child support enforcement;
employer tax credits to help create jobs for welfare recipients; support
for skill development among persons in lower-income families; and
policies to encourage steady economic growth, which creates jobs,
reduces unemployment, and raises wages for all workers—especially
the less-skilled, who are most affected when jobs are scarce.
Since most parents adjust to an increase in their paid work time by
increasing their use of child care providers, policies are also needed to
help make child care more available and affordable and to improve its
quality.  The primary child care arrangements for preschool-aged chil-
dren of employed mothers in the fall of 1994 were divided roughly
equally among care in the child’s home (by a relative or nonrelative),
care in another home (by a relative or nonrelative), and care in an orga-
nized child care facility.  Since comparable data were first collected in
1986, the trend shows a slight increase in the proportion of children
receiving care in their own homes, relatively fewer children receiving
care in another home, and relatively more children receiving care in an
organized facility.  In addition, the share of monthly income spent on
child care by those purchasing this service rose from 6.3 percent to 7.3
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percent between 1986 and 1993 (Council of Economic Advisers 1999,
p. 16).  More and higher-quality child care must be made available and
affordable, with longer hours to accommodate parents who work irreg-
ular hours, and with after-school care for older children.  The availabil-
ity, cost, and quality of child care are crucial to the ability of parents to
balance the needs of work and family and the well-being of their chil-
dren.
Finally, policies that encourage economic expansion are extremely
important, especially for less-skilled parents.  It is not clear whether the
earnings and income gains made by families with less-educated parents
in 1996–1999 will persist in the long run, or whether they were a short-
term phenomenon due to the extremely tight labor market during those
years, combined with welfare reform.
Notes
I wish to thank the directors of the Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar Series, Professor
Emily P. Hoffman and Dr. Jean Kimmel, for their extraordinary hospitality.  My lec-
ture was based on the report Families and the Labor Market, 1969–1999: Analyzing
the “Time Crunch” (Council of Economic Advisers, May 1999), which was written
while I was a senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers.  I wish to thank
Rebecca Blank, Maria Hanratty, Nora Gordon, Andrew Feldman, and others who also
worked on that report.  New data have been added to this chapter to update and expand
the findings.  All interpretations are my own.
1. Because the annual employment and income data collected each March refer to
the previous calendar year, our data are for 1969, 1979, 1989, 1996, and 1999.
Those years (with the exception of 1996) represent business-cycle peaks and thus
trace out long-term trends. The year 1996 is included because the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or “welfare reform,”
was enacted in that year.  This legislation had a profound effect on the labor sup-
ply of low-skilled single parents. 
2. Annual hours of work in 1979, 1989, 1996, and 1999 were calculated by multiply-
ing the answers to two questions which ask how many weeks each individual
worked in the previous year and how many hours they “usually worked” in the
weeks they worked.  The 1969 data are not strictly comparable to later years due
to differences in data reporting.  An imputation procedure was used to make these
data more comparable to information in later years. 
3. The Census Bureau’s definition of a family is used throughout this chapter; that is,
all related individuals living together in the same household.   The analysis is
restricted to families whose head is a civilian at least 18 years old and where there
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is a child under age 18.  A mother (or couple) and her (their) children living in a
household headed by another family member are part of the head’s family, and an
unmarried parent cohabiting with a domestic partner is classified as a single par-
ent.  Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise specified, the terms wives and
married women refer only to those with children. 
4. The CPI-U-X1 price index is used to adjust for changes in prices over time.  The
CPI-U-X1 is an alternative to the CPI-U (Consumer Price Index for Urban Con-
sumers) that uses the rental equivalence approach to improve the treatment of
home ownership costs before 1983.  The CPI-U adopted this method in 1983, and
the two series are identical after that date. 
5. Unless otherwise noted, the numbers in this chapter are based on the author’s tab-
ulations of the March CPS microdata files.  Tables are available from the author.  
6. Hispanics are not identified separately in the 1970 CPS; hence we cannot compare
them with other ethnic groups in 1969. 
7. Overall average family income in each year is the weighted average of mean total
family incomes for married couples and single parents (Figures 10 and 11),
weighted by their respective shares of all families.  Disproportionate growth in the
upper tail of the income distribution pulls up the mean more than the median.  
8. Top-coded values of income components were multiplied by 1.45 so that the
means would not be underestimated.  
9. For estimates of changes in family incomes using a broader definition of income,
see Levy (1996).  
10. How could earnings increase more than wages, while hours declined?  This
reflects the correlation between changes in hours and wages in the population, and
the fact that earnings are the product of the wage rate times hours worked.  Math-
ematically, the average of a product is not equal to the product of the averages.
11. Hispanics are not identified separately in the 1970 CPS; hence we cannot compare
them with other ethnic groups in 1969. 
12. Robinson and Godbey (1997), Table 3.  The child care category in the time diaries
only includes time spent on direct caregiving.  Any changes in time parents spend
with children while they are primarily engaged in another activity, such as cook-
ing, cleaning, or shopping, are not reflected in the time-use data. 
13. Data on alternative work arrangements come from the 1991 and 1997 May sup-
plements to the CPS, as reported in Council of Economic Advisers (1999), p. 14.
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Fertility, Public Policy, 
and Mothers 




Few policy debates draw more attention or more heated discussion
than those concerning population policy.  Many countries have strug-
gled to influence their birth rates.  Countries such as Germany, France,
and Sweden have instigated a variety of policies to deal with low birth
rates, while other countries such as India, Singapore, and China have
had varying degrees of success with policies to reduce their birth rates.
The United States has also experienced below-replacement fertility in
recent decades, but it has not implemented explicit pronatalist policies
as many other industrialized countries have done.  Most U.S. popula-
tion policy is centered on controlling immigration.  Nevertheless,
recent research on the economics of fertility has demonstrated that the
United States does indeed have policies that have an impact, whether
intended or not, on the birth rate.  For example, recent research has
determined that tax exemptions for children, welfare benefits, family
planning funded by Medicaid benefits, and company-provided mater-
nity leave all exert statistically significant effects on fertility.  Interest-
ingly, the policies that lower the cost of raising a child (such as taxes
and maternity leave), were not specifically designed to affect fertility,
whereas the polices that have an antinatalist effect (such as certain pro-
visions related to welfare reform and Medicaid-funded family plan-
ning) were in fact designed to lower birth rates among specific













At the same time that some of these policies have been enacted,
expanded, and/or modified, the U.S. total fertility rate has remained
remarkably constant and hovers just below replacement (Figure 1).1
The constant overall total fertility rate does mask the fact that the teen-
age birth rate in the United States is quite high and has only recently
shown signs of declining (Figure 2).2 Although the overall birth rate in
the United States has remained fairly constant over the past two
decades, during this time period there has been tremendous growth in
the labor force participation of women, particularly women with young
children (Figure 3).  As of 1994, the labor force participation rate of
married women with preschool-aged children was virtually identical to
that of married women with older children (Hotz, Klerman, and Willis,
1997).  This increase in the labor force participation rate of married
women with children has generated much discussion as to how govern-
ment and business can and/or should ease the dual burden of work and
family that falls primarily on women. 
In this chapter I explore two related areas of research.  The first is
the effect of public policies on the birth rate in the United States.  I
focus on the fertility effects of taxes, welfare, Medicaid, and maternity
leave.  Because these policies have the potential to influence birth
rates, and because economists view fertility and labor force participa-
Figure 1 Total Fertility Rate

































Figure 2 Teen Birth Rate per 1,000 Women in Specified Group
Figure 3 Female Labor Force Participation Rates
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tion as simultaneous, I also examine the labor force participation of
mothers.  In particular, I focus on two issues related to mothers in the
labor force.  The first revolves around continued reports in the popular
press that professional women are fleeing the workforce due to con-
flicting work and family roles.  Although most of the evidence on this
topic is anecdotal, it has the potential to lead employers to believe that
women with children are not committed to the workforce, perhaps
leading employers to be less willing to invest in women.  To address
this issue, I report on some of my own research that examines whether
or not professional women are leaving the labor force and returning to
the home to care for their children.  The second issue I explore is the
family pay gap—the earnings differential between women with and
without children.  While the gender pay differential has received much
attention and has narrowed recently, the family pay gap has received
scant attention and has grown in recent decades. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, I outline
the basic economic theory behind the economics of fertility.  Following
that I discuss the effects of various public policies on the fertility of
U.S. women.  In the next section I discuss both the issue of women
returning from the workforce to care for children and the family pay
gap that exists between women with and without children.  In the final
section I offer some concluding remarks. 
THE ECONOMICS OF FERTILITY
To understand how public policies such as income taxes, welfare
reform, and maternity leave can affect fertility, it is useful to begin
with some economic theory.  My discussion is short and nontechnical.3
The economic model of fertility is essentially an extension of neoclas-
sical demand theory.  Parents are assumed to receive utility from chil-
dren (or child quality) as well as from other goods.  Parents are also
assumed to behave rationally and to be perfect contraceptors; that is,
they are effective users of contraception.  Children (or child quality)
can be either produced primarily at home (home-cooked meals, paren-
tal child care) or with goods bought from the market (restaurant meals,
prepared foods, and purchased child care).  Parents maximize their util-
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ity subject to a full-income budget constraint where full income is
defined as that amount of income the household would have if it
devoted all available time to working.  The full-income budget con-
straint thus explicitly includes the hourly wage rate as the opportunity
cost of time.  Therefore, the model recognizes that not only are there
explicit costs of raising a child (diapers, food, etc.), there is a signifi-
cant time cost or opportunity cost associated with raising a child. This
time cost is traditionally borne by the mother.
The model leads to the prediction that the demand for children is a
function of income, prices, tastes, and preferences.  Theoretically, there
is some ambiguity surrounding the potential impact of women’s wages
on fertility due to competing income and price effects.  The general
expectation, however, is that fertility will be negatively associated with
a woman’s wage rate because traditionally women have borne the time
cost of children.  In fact, Schultz (1994) has noted that virtually all eco-
nomic studies of fertility have found a negative relationship between
women’s earnings or women’s education (a good proxy for earnings)
and fertility. 
In the following section I review and discuss research that exam-
ines several specific policies and their effects on fertility in the United
States.   All of these policies change the budget constraint facing the
family because they change the price of a child.  Thus, as parents
weigh the costs and benefits of an additional child, they are assumed to
take into account the change in costs and/or benefits imposed by the
policy under consideration. 
PUBLIC POLICY AND FERTILITY
Taxes and Fertility
As noted above, the economic model of fertility suggests that cou-
ples weigh the financial costs of raising a child together with the time
inputs of parents against the utility gains from having children.  Tax
and transfer payments that vary with family size alter these costs and
benefits and thus are expected to have an effect on the demand for chil-
dren.  Politicians have often stated that increasing the personal exemp-
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tion in the U.S. income tax would decrease the cost of a child.  In the
late 1980s, several economists began noting that tax variables, by
changing the “cost” of a child, could have an impact on fertility.  In one
of the first papers in this vein, Whittington, Alm, and Peters (1990)
examined the possibility of a causal relationship between the value of
the personal exemption in the U.S. income tax and the U.S. total fertil-
ity rate. 
The personal exemption, a feature of the income tax system since
1913, was instituted to provide relief for low-income families from the
burden of taxation.  Thus, the original intent of the personal exemption
was not to subsidize births  (Pechman 1983).  Unlike other policies that
might affect fertility, the personal exemption is an ongoing subsidy that
families receive each year they claim the child as a dependent on their
income tax form.  For most families, this subsidy lasts for at least 18
years.  In 1994, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that the
out-of-pocket expenditures required to raise a child to age 18 amounted
to $136,320.  Whittington, Alm, and Peters report that the personal
exemption actually covers between 4 and 9 percent of the out-of-
pocket costs of a child.  Clearly this is not an inconsequential subsidy. 
Using aggregate time-series data for the United States from the
period 1913–1984, Whittington, Alm, and Peters model the general
fertility rate (the birth rate per thousand women between the ages of 15
and 44) as a function of the tax value of the personal exemption,
women’s average wages, and a variety of other regressors.  They con-
firm that the dependent exemption has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on the total fertility rate.  In related work, Whittington
(1992) demonstrates that the time series finding of a statistically signif-
icant and positive link between fertility and the personal exemption
also holds in the cross section.
This subsidy to fertility does have some distributional effects, as it
is primarily geared to middle-income families.  Low-income families
often are outside of the tax system due to the zero bracket amounts and
the fact that high-income families typically do not qualify for the per-
sonal exemption. 
Another feature of the U.S. income tax code that has the potential
to increase fertility is the earned income tax credit (EITC).  Unlike the
personal exemption, the EITC is targeted to low-income women.
There is ample evidence that this credit increases labor supply, but no
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one has yet examined its possible fertility incentive.  However, because
it is a refundable tax credit for individuals who have dependent chil-
dren in the household, it has the potential to alter fertility.  It is a more
complicated subsidy than the personal exemption because although it
provides a subsidy to families with dependent children, it also
increases wage rates.  Given the regular empirical observation that
higher wages reduce fertility, the EITC may also work to reduce fertil-
ity to the extent that it increases the time cost of having children.  Thus,
any empirical study that looks at the relationship between earned
income taxes and fertility must take account of these two offsetting
effects and sort out their impact on fertility.  It is worth noting that the
potential distributional impact of this policy is quite different from the
dependent exemption because the EITC is targeted specifically to low-
income families.  It is possible, though unconfirmed empirically, that
this subsidy could provide a birth incentive to low-income families.
There are other features of the tax code that may also have an
effect on fertility.  The child and dependent care tax provides a tax
credit worth up to 30 percent of a family’s child care costs in a given
year.  The impact of this subsidy on births is indirect because in order
to be eligible for this subsidy, the family must be using some mode of
paid child care.  Also, because this subsidy lowers the cost of child
care, thus increasing wage rates and thereby labor supply, it may in
fact, like EITC, have the effect of dampening the birth rate.  To date,
there has been no research that examines this issue, though there is a
body of work that has examined the link between child care costs and
fertility.  Connelly (1991) surmises that the actual effect of the child
and dependent care tax credit on fertility is small.
Welfare and Fertility
Although some people are skeptical about whether or not eco-
nomic variables play a role in the complex decision to have a child, one
need look no further than those involved in the welfare reform move-
ment to find policymakers and voters who believe that economic
incentives can and do affect fertility.  Welfare reform has received
much recent attention since 1996, when President Clinton signed into
law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA).  This represented a large change in welfare programs.
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Prior to this time, welfare benefits were available to women with
dependent children, allowing low-income women to stay home with
their children.  But increasing out-of-wedlock births and a changing
political climate have changed society’s—and policymakers’—views
of women on welfare.  Perceptions that married women not on welfare
are increasingly opting to work full time and utilize day care services
has also contributed to the idea that poor women should not have the
option to raise their children at home while collecting welfare benefits
(Cohen and Bianchi 1999). 
When PRWORA passed, the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program (AFDC) was renamed Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF).  The TANF program was designed to deal specifi-
cally with several perceived shortcomings of the old AFDC system.
Women receiving TANF are now subject to time limits and work
requirements.  In addition, teen mothers must live with a parent or
other responsible adult to receive benefits.  Child support enforcement
was also increased.  Furthermore, states are now allowed to implement
family caps, i.e., deny an increase in monthly welfare benefits to
women who have more children while on welfare.  It is this latter pro-
vision that is the focus of my discussion. 
Under the old welfare system, in most states the monthly AFDC
payment increased with the number of children in the family.  Many
policymakers and researchers expressed concern that this encouraged
women on welfare to have more children in order to collect more
money each month.  Under TANF, states may now implement a family
cap that denies increased benefits to children born to a recipient parent.
Mandated family caps at the federal level were not instituted under
TANF primarily because abortion foes raised concerns that family caps
would encourage more abortions (Klerman 1998).  Prior to TANF,
states could apply for a federal waiver if they wanted to implement a
family cap.  New Jersey was the first to do so in 1992, and Arkansas
followed quickly.  As of July 2000, 23 states had family caps.
There have been numerous studies of the effects of AFDC on fer-
tility.  These are summarized in Moffitt (1992, 1998).  The early litera-
ture suggests only a weak link between AFDC and fertility (Moffitt
1992; Schultz 1994).  Later work, reviewed in Moffitt (1998), does
find evidence of a link between welfare payments and fertility,
although the magnitude varies widely.  Because these studies examine
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first births and do not distinguish between welfare recipients and non-
recipients, they cannot be used to assess the consequences of a family
cap.  Economists have only recently examined the potential effect of
family caps on the birth rate. 
Researchers who study family caps and fertility rely on statewide
variation in the monthly level of incremental AFDC benefits (rather
than the total benefit) to determine if there is an effect on fertility.
Because family caps only apply to women currently on welfare, it is
typical to limit the sample for analysis to those women receiving wel-
fare benefits.  One important issue that must be addressed by all
researchers looking into the effects of welfare payments on fertility is
the issue of how states choose their policies.  If policies were randomly
assigned, it would be appropriate simply to regress fertility on the
incremental benefit levels in each state, controlling for other demo-
graphic and personal characteristics of the woman.  However, policies
are not randomly assigned; they are generated by the democratic pro-
cess.  For example, states with particularly high abortion rates may
adopt policies to curb these rates.  Similarly, states with many welfare
recipients may have generous welfare benefits primarily because vot-
ers in those states believe in supporting single parents, i.e., it is not the
policy that is causing the behavior but the behavior is causing the pol-
icy.  Of course, policymakers are interested in how exogenous changes
in policy affect behavior.  Such exogenous variation in policy can be
difficult to isolate.  As Klerman (1998) states: “A crucial methodologi-
cal issue is thus how to estimate the true effect of the law while con-
trolling for persistent differences in the states adopting policies and
other social changes”  (p. 118).  The approach most often used, state
fixed effects (Moffitt 1992),  is to include a dummy variable for each
state in the model.  Often, adding state fixed effects to the model
deletes any statistically significant effect of incremental welfare pay-
ments on fertility. 
Although there is some evidence to suggest that births to recipients
may be reduced with the imposition of a family cap, many policymak-
ers are concerned about whether or not lower incremental benefits
reduce births by reducing pregnancies or by increasing abortions.
Most proponents of family caps contend that any reduction in births to
recipient mothers will be accomplished through a decrease in pregnan-
cies.  However, a reduction in births may instead result from an
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increase in abortions.  This possibility has prompted concern by the
public, the popular press, and policymakers, and as mentioned earlier,
it was one of the reasons family caps were not mandated at the federal
level (Klerman 1998).  Clearly, given the controversy surrounding
abortion in the United States, this is an important issue to research.
Klerman (1998) presents evidence from the sociology and social psy-
chology literature indicating that many teenage women will resort to
abortion when faced with the realities of PRWORA.  In other words,
rather than becoming better contraceptors, teenagers are more likely to
react to a family cap by increasing abortions.  However, researchers at
the Alan Guttmacher Institute argue that teenagers are better contra-
ceptors than many believe—their figures indicate that nearly 60 per-
cent of poor and low-income teenage women and about 75 percent of
higher-income adolescent women use some method of contraception
the first time they have sexual intercourse and that an even higher pro-
portions use it on an ongoing basis (Alan Guttmacher Institute 1998).
By exploiting state differences in payments under AFDC, Argys,
Averett, and Rees (2000) examine the link between incremental wel-
fare benefits, pregnancy, and pregnancy resolution among welfare
recipients.  We use a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) of unmarried women who received AFDC income for
at least one year between 1979 and 1991.  We estimate a bivariate pro-
bit model of the determinants of pregnancy while on AFDC and, condi-
tional on becoming pregnant, the probability of obtaining an abortion.
Estimates from our model indicate that there is no evidence that family
caps will increase abortions.  We do find some effect of family caps on
pregnancy.  The pregnancy effect is most pronounced for women with
three or more children.  Contrary to what other studies have found, we
found no difference in the responses of white, black, and Hispanic
recipients to incremental benefit levels.
However, one problem confronting any research that uses
microlevel data to examine abortions is that the incidence of abortion is
severely underreported in most survey data sets.  Several researchers
have expressed concern about underreporting of abortions in survey
data.  Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) state that white premarital teens in
the youth cohort of the NLSY report 33 percent fewer abortions than
medical records would lead one to expect.  Black teenaged women
were even less likely to report their abortions, with nearly 80 percent
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unreported.  These findings are similar to those of Jones and Forrest
(1992), who suggest that the underreporting may be related to marital
status as well as race.  Argys, Averett, and Rees (2000)  also note the
severe underreporting of abortions in the NLSY data set but note that
as long as the underreporting is not systematically related to the
explanatory variables in the model, the estimates will be unbiased.
Klerman (1998) argues that such severe underreporting makes the esti-
mation of policy effects from survey data impossible.  His review of
the available evidence of the effect of welfare reform on abortion also
indicates that there is no effect of AFDC payments on abortion.  It
should be noted that the studies he reviewed did not focus specifically
on a welfare population and so did not examine the effects of incre-
mental AFDC benefits; i.e., family caps.
Family caps are an antinatalist policy directed at low-income
women.  Although family caps apply to only a small fraction of women
in their childbearing ages, they bring up many social and political ques-
tions.  Donovan (1995) notes that despite considerable debate about
family caps, there is almost nothing known about the consequences for
the families who have another child and are denied benefits.  Will they
be able to pay their rent? Will their children go hungry?  These are also
concerns voiced by the Catholic Church (Pear 1995).  These issues
have not yet been dealt with, but welfare reform speeds ahead with
states reporting dramatic declines in their welfare caseloads (Council
of Economic Advisers, 1999).  There is considerable debate over
whether or not the declines in welfare caseloads are due entirely to
welfare reform or to the strong economy that has prevailed during the
late 1990s.  At least one study reports that an economic downturn could
increase welfare roles substantially (Black, McKinnish, and Sanders
2000). 
Another policy in the United States that affects the fertility of low-
income women in a potentially antinatalist way is the money that is
allocated to family planning efforts.  In particular, the Medicaid pro-
gram subsidizes family planning for low-income women.  Surpris-
ingly, there is not much recent work on the link between Medicaid-
funded family planning efforts and fertility.  A study by Mellor (1998)
is a notable exception.  She uses data from Medicaid claims for the
state of Maryland.  Although her results are specific to Medicaid recip-
ients in Maryland, they provide some of the best evidence we have of
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the effect of federally funded family planning on the fertility of low-
income women.  Women who are on Medicaid receive family planning
services, and by federal law they pay no co-payments on prescription
family planning services or supplies (unlike women who use private
health insurance, which often does not cover items such as birth control
pills).  Mellor’s results indicate that women who are exposed to feder-
ally funded family planning through the Medicaid program have a
lower probability of having a birth.  The magnitude of the effect is
larger than that found by earlier researchers.  She argues that this is
because her method takes into account the potential correlation
between the unobservable determinants of family planning use and fer-
tility. 
It is interesting to note that policymakers have zeroed in on family
caps as an effective way to reduce the fertility of welfare recipients
despite the fact that the evidence is unclear as to whether or not family
caps are effective.  Mellor’s work suggests that an effective way to
reduce births among this population is to provide family planning ser-
vices.  Family planning programs, unlike family caps, are not discussed
as much among policymakers.
Maternity Leave and Fertility
Given the dramatic increase in the labor force participation rate of
mothers documented earlier, there has been increased policy attention
on how firms and/or government can accommodate the needs of
women for both leave time after childbirth and stable job status.  In the
United States, the debate over maternity leave largely centered around
the role of government in family decisions, and this public debate ulti-
mately led to the adoption of the federal Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) in 1993.  The FMLA guarantees 12 weeks of unpaid
parental (meaning both women and men are eligible) leave to most
employees of relatively large firms.  This offers substantial job protec-
tion to some parents following the birth of their children.  It is, how-
ever, estimated that this legislation will only pertain to about half of
U.S. workers due to coverage limitations, primarily because only firms
employing more than 50 persons are required to comply (Joesch 1995).
Further, no firms are required by law to offer paid parental leave.
Some firms did offer maternity leave (largely unpaid) prior to the pas-
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sage of the FMLA, but it has generally been a benefit offered only to
employees at large firms that pay relatively high wages (Kamerman
and Kahn 1997; Phillips 2001). 
The expansion of parental leave laws to provide coverage for all
workers, and the requirement that such leaves be compensated, remain
issues of national debate.  Advocates emphasize that the United States
is the only industrialized country that does not guarantee paid mater-
nity leave (Kamerman and Kahn 1991).   Critics argue that expanded
leave will result in higher costs for employers, as they must hire
replacement workers and/or deal with greater employee absenteeism,
and that these costs will be particularly devastating to small firms
(Trzcinski and Finn-Stevenson 1991; Kamerman and Kahn 1997).
Another cost concern is that women will be induced to have more
births because maternity leave lowers the cost of a child, and that this
increased fertility will exacerbate the financial burden on firms.  Oppo-
nents also argue that actual costs combined with employers’ fears of
increasing fertility will harm the position of women in the labor force
because employers will steer away from hiring women in their repro-
ductive years.  This could stigmatize working mothers.  To deal ratio-
nally with these concerns, it is crucial to understand whether women
increase births in response to employer-provided maternity leave.
There is a growing literature exploring the impact of maternity leave
on labor supply patterns and earnings in the United States (Phillips
2001; Waldfogel 1997a; Klerman and Leibowitz 1997, 1998).  To date,
only two papers examine the impact of maternity leave on births
among U.S. women.  The paucity of empirical work on this issue is
surprising given that the fertility concerns are an often-cited reason for
not offering such leave.
In a cross-national study on maternity leave and demographic out-
comes, Winegarden and Bracy (1995) estimate a model relating paid
maternity leave to three demographic outcomes: infant mortality rate,
labor force participation rates of women of childbearing age, and fertil-
ity.  They find that paid maternity leave decreases infant mortality rates
and raises female labor force participation.  Interestingly, despite the
fact that paid maternity leave in  many of the countries in his data set
was actually instituted as a policy to increase fertility rates, it has not
had that effect because the increase in female labor force participation
subsequently reduces fertility.  Their research underscores the impor-
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tance of considering the simultaneous nature of many demographic and
labor force decisions. 
In Averett and Whittington (2001), we model the effect of
employer-provided maternity leave on the probability of a birth for
U.S. women and find that firm-provided maternity leave can in fact
have a rather large influence on births, particularly second and higher-
order births.  We hypothesize that the temporal ordering of events
among working women is as follows.   A woman first selects her job
with or without maternity leave as a benefit.  Then, she either has a
birth or not.  Because of the waiting period often required of benefits
packages, a woman may be in a position for a year or more before hav-
ing access to maternity benefits.  It therefore seems unlikely, though
not impossible, that a woman would move into a position with mater-
nity leave because she is already pregnant.  Because maternity leave is
not a benefit explicitly available with every job or firm, women may
seek it out as a particular characteristic of their desired job just as peo-
ple may search for other job benefits such as flexible schedules, tuition
remission, or health insurance.  Determining the impact of maternity
leave on fertility therefore requires explicit recognition of this potential
sorting into jobs with maternity leave based on anticipated fertility, and
it is not as straightforward as the dependent exemption or the family
caps discussed earlier.
In order to determine the effect of maternity leave on births, we
estimate two equations: 1) the probability of a woman selecting a job
with maternity leave, and 2) the probability of having a birth.  The
probability of choosing a maternity leave job is a function of her
desired fertility, economic and social conditions in the area in which
she resides, and personal characteristics that affect her tastes, prices,
and income.  The probability of a birth is posited to be a function of her
wages, nonearned income, maternity leave, and tastes and preferences
for children.  Thus, the effect of maternity leave on fertility is actually
the sum of two effects: the indirect effect of desired fertility on the
probability of being in a maternity leave job, and the direct effect of
maternity leave on the probability of a birth. 
Maternity leave lowers the cost of a birth whether it is paid or
unpaid leave, and lowering the cost of childbirth creates a fertility
incentive.  Hoem (1990) and Walker (1991), in analyses of maternity
leave in Sweden, note that this positive incentive may be dampened if
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there is any sort of minimum work period required in order to accrue
full benefits.  If workers are required to meet a minimum term of
employment before becoming fully vested in maternity benefits, the
existence of maternity leave might actually increase the time to birth,
thereby decreasing the probability of a birth in early years.  Further, a
woman with maternity leave benefits may be a more highly valued
employee of the firm, and may have a stronger, unobserved attachment
to the labor force, making a birth less probable than for a woman with a
lower labor force attachment (and no maternity leave).  Thus, the direct
effect of maternity leave on fertility can not be determined a priori.
We estimate our model using data from the NLSY and find no evi-
dence that working women who desire children self-select into firms
offering maternity leave.  Once in a firm, however, maternity leave
does appear to directly increase the probability of a birth for working
women, at least for women with at least one child already, and the
effect is actually quite substantial.  The following calculation provides
an estimate of the potential magnitude of the effect we found.  In 1995,
the Census Bureau reported that 2,034,000 working women aged 15–
44 had births, a rate of about 5.65 percent among the roughly 36 mil-
lion working women in that age group.  If all working women were
given access to guaranteed maternity leave, the birth probability would
presumably rise only among the 23.5 percent (based on our sample)
who previously had not benefited from such a policy, and, again, likely
only for higher-order births.  Thus, increased coverage might result in
an additional 118,000 births.  This would increase the overall rough
birth probability among working women aged 15–44 to just under 6
percent, an increase of 0.4 percentage points.  Any change in the fertil-
ity or labor market behavior of women not in the labor market resulting
from expanded maternity leave policy is not included in this estimated
birth increase and, of course, as Winegarden and Bracy note, the labor
market effects have the potential to dampen the fertility effects.  In
other words, if maternity leave encourages more women to work, it
may end up decreasing births.  Because the NLSY does not collect data
on maternity leave coverage for women who are not in the labor force,
we cannot empirically test at the individual level whether or not
women who are offered maternity leave are more likely to work. 
The evidence reviewed above suggests that several public policies
in the United States influence the birth rate.  The personal exemption in
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the U.S. tax system provides a subsidy to children, and it is confirmed
that it has a positive impact on births, both in time-series and cross-sec-
tion models.  The effects of welfare payments on fertility, and specifi-
cally family caps, provide more modest evidence on the impact of
these payments on fertility.  To date there is no evidence that family
caps will increase abortions, though further study on this issue is war-
ranted.  Employer-provided maternity leave is also found to influence
the birth rate, particularly for higher-order births.  Clearly, the govern-
ment has intervened in the family.  The distributional effect of these
policies is worth noting.  The pronatalist subsidies are for the most part
geared to middle- and high-income women, while the antinatalist pro-
grams clearly target low-income women. 
The focus on fertility in welfare reform and the push to get welfare
mothers into the paid labor force, as well as continued debate about
whether the United States should mandate paid maternity leave, brings
up an often-debated issue.  Is there more that the government should do
to help women balance family and career?  In the next section, I focus
on how mothers fare in the labor force.
BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
The research reviewed above demonstrates that government policy
has the potential to impact personal decisions such as fertility.  Fertility
rates in the United States have remained fairly constant over the past
20 years, as shown earlier in Figure 1.  During this same time frame,
female labor force participation, particularly among women with
infants, has grown dramatically.  For example, in 1975, the labor force
participation rate of married women with children under one year old
was 30.8 percent.  By 1998 this number had climbed to 61.8 percent, a
growth rate of just over 100 percent.  We can expect even bigger
growth in the labor force participation of low-income women with pre-
school-aged children, as welfare reforms continue to push this group of
mothers into the labor force.  The balance between family and job
responsibilities is increasingly the focus of many researchers and poli-
cymakers. In 1989, the late Felice Schwartz wrote an article for the
Harvard Business Review where she argued that employers should put
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family-focused women on a slower career track and keep women who
viewed their careers as coming first on the fast track (Schwartz 1989).
Though she didn’t use the term “mommy track,” it quickly became a
popular buzzword.  Now, over a decade after she suggested this, there
is still debate over the merits of mommy tracking.
In recent years, the popular press in the United States has repeat-
edly profiled professional women who have elected to leave the labor
force to devote their full-time energies to child rearing.  This is an
extreme version of the mommy track, as these women supposedly elect
to leave the labor force entirely rather than to simply cut back on hours
and attempt to balance job and family responsibilities.  The conclusion
in mainstream media is often that mothers have tired of trying to be
“superwomen” and have decided that high achievement in the labor
force is not compatible with a successful home life (Deogun 1997;
Jacobs 1994; Morin 1991; Tailor 1991).  Goldin (1998) notes that for
young women with college degrees, the difficulty in balancing work
and family remains a major concern.  Others have suggested that the
relative prosperity of the 1990s has afforded women the choice to stay
home and that many career-minded professional women are exercising
their freedom to choose, i.e., they are not necessarily tired of trying to
juggle family and home life, they just want to stay home  (Quinn 2000;
Jeffrey 2000).  It is not, of course, just professional women who strug-
gle with finding a balance between work and family.  Sicherman
(1996), for example, found that a higher proportion of women than
men leave their jobs for nonmarket reasons, such as household duties
and family illness.  Culpan, Akdag, and Cindogvlu (1996), Wentling
(1996), and Gordon and Whelan (1998), among others, also present
evidence indicating that family concerns play a large role in women’s
career satisfaction, retention, and achievement.  
The effect of repeated mass media articles in this vein has been to
leave the impression that women currently entering professions are less
committed to a long-term career than were women in previous decades.
This anecdotal impression can be used in some dangerous inferences
about the validity of investing in women.  Of further concern, policy-
makers could conclude that aggressive pursuit of policy options pro-
tecting women’s positions in the labor market is unnecessary.
Statistical discrimination with respect to women based on their poten-
tial labor force attachment may flourish if employers fear that a
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woman’s odds of returning to the home are greater than they were in
the past.
Interestingly, this set of articles appears at a time when the major-
ity of the empirical evidence suggests that women with children have a
heightened attachment to the labor force.  The growth in the labor force
participation rate of women has slowed in the 1990s, but there is no
reason to believe that these rates will fall.4  Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier, the labor force participation rate of mothers of preschool-aged
children has climbed more rapidly than the overall female labor force
participation rate.  Women are not only working more, they are making
inroads into traditionally male-dominated occupations.  For example,
data from the Current Population Survey indicate that in 1999, 46.7
percent of full-time wage and salary workers in executive, administra-
tive, and managerial occupations were women, up from 34.2 percent in
1983 (U.S. Department of Labor 2000).  Women are also working later
into pregnancy, and they return to work more quickly after childbirth
(Wentling 1996).  In fact, Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) report that
about half of all women return to work by the time their child is four
months old.  They also note that women returning to work closely after
the birth of a child account for nearly all of the women who will return
to work that first year.  Hayghe and Bianchi (1994) report that married
mothers are twice as likely to work full time all year than their prede-
cessors of 20 years ago.  Thus, the commitment to the workforce on the
part of mothers appears stronger than ever.
Despite the considerable anecdotal evidence surrounding this
issue, there is little empirical evidence that professional women are
leaving the workplace.  Whittington, Averett, and Anderson (2000)
examine this issue more closely, and the results of that research are
summarized here.  To determine whether or not professional women
are leaving the workforce more frequently than in years past, we use a
sample of managerial and professional women from the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics, and we estimate the probability of withdrawing
from the labor force at one-, two- and five-year intervals after the birth
of a child.  Our sample consists of married women who report that they
are working in a professional, managerial, or technical position in the
year preceding a birth during the years 1968–1992.  Because previous
research by Shapiro and Mott (1994) and Klerman and Leibowitz
(1994) highlights the importance of making the distinction between
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being employed and working, we use several definitions of withdrawal
from the labor force.   For example, many women do not withdraw
completely from the labor force after giving birth but are still
employed by their firms even though they may be out on leave.  Like-
wise, a woman might be currently out of work but still consider herself
attached to the labor market and plan to return.  The distinction
between work and employment is therefore important in understanding
women’s employment behavior following childbirth. 
It is also important to control for other factors that may affect labor
force attachment, such as earnings, work experience, and husband’s
earnings, since others have found that these factors influence whether
or not women will return to work after the birth of a child (Desai and
Waite 1991; Klerman and Leibowitz 1994).  Therefore, we regress
each measure of labor force withdrawal on the set of covariates,
described above, and control for the time period when the woman gave
birth.  Our results indicate that women who gave birth in recent years
are more likely to report zero hours of work two years after the birth of
a child when compared with women who gave birth earlier in the sam-
ple period.  Thus, we find some support for the supposition that more
professional women are opting to stay home and raise children in lieu
of aggressively pursuing their careers.  We do not find any differences
by cohort, indicating that this phenomenon cuts across women of all
childbearing ages.  However, our results are not robust across different
measures of labor force withdrawal, nor are they consistent across
postpartum time intervals.  One possible explanation for our findings is
that women of later childbirth periods may now face a more flexible
workplace that permits them to cut back on their hours or take an
extended leave, perhaps without pay, while still maintaining their
attachment to the workforce.  There is some anecdotal evidence that
this is the case and that the strong economy of the late 1990s has given
women more flexibility in the labor market (Wylie 2000). 
There is some support, albeit weak, for the conjecture that profes-
sional women are opting to leave the workforce.  Why? Several factors
have been put forth to explain this exodus.  Perhaps the most salient is
the existence of the glass ceiling.  Although women have made great
inroads in the labor market, there is still a considerable gap at the top.
Myerson and Fletcher (2000) report that women still comprise only 10
percent of senior management positions at Fortune 500 companies.
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The data are not broken down by child status, but it is safe to say that
considerably few of the women who are senior corporate managers
have children, or at least young children. 
Another explanation for this phenomenon may be the pay differen-
tial that still exists between men and women.  Currently women earn
76 percent of what men earn.  Although women are better represented
in the top-paying occupations, within those broad occupational catego-
ries women are much less likely to be employed in the higher-paying
occupations.  For example, in the professional specialty occupations,
where women earn the most, they are much less likely to be employed
as engineers and mathematical and computer scientists and more likely
to work as teachers (except college and university) and registered
nurses (U.S. Department of Labor 2000).  The median weekly earnings
of teachers is $671 and the median earnings of registered nurses is
$739 while the median weekly earnings for engineers and mathemati-
cal and computer scientists is between $900 and $1,000 (Bowler 1999). 
What may be a more compelling reason for women with children
to opt out of the labor force may not be the gender pay gap but the fam-
ily pay gap.  The family pay gap is defined as the difference in pay
between women with and without children.  Economists have docu-
mented for many years that women with children earn less than women
without children, while this is typically not found for men.  In fact,
there is some evidence that marriage (though not necessarily children)
raises men’s earnings (Korenman and Neumark 1991).  Waldfogel
(1998) examines this issue more closely and finds that the family gap
for women has been widening at the same time the gender pay gap has
been decreasing.  For example, she notes that women without children
earned 68.4 percent of what a man earned in 1978, but that by 1994
that figure had risen to 81.3 percent.  The same figures for a woman
with children were 62.5 percent and 73.4 percent, respectively.  How-
ever, a married woman with children under the age of six earned only
67 percent of what a married man with children under the age of six
earned, while women with no children under age 18 earned 83 percent
of what a man with no children under age 18 earned.  These figures are
unadjusted for differences in human capital investment and occupation.
Thus, they may be misleading if men and women have different pro-
ductivity characteristics; i.e., it may be that women with children have
less education or less work experience on average.  However, the fam-
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ily penalty remains even when other important wage determining vari-
ables such as education, ability, previous work experience, and other
factors have been controlled. 
To provide an estimate of the magnitude of the effect of children
on men’s and women’s wages, I use data from the 1993 wave of the
NLSY.5  I use separate samples of men and women, as is typical when
estimating human capital wage functions.  Limiting my sample to high
school graduates,  I estimate a human capital earnings function, con-
trolling for the usual set of human capital, demographic, and location
variables.  One advantage of using the NLSY is that it provides infor-
mation on weekly work experience and has an ability indicator; all
respondents were administered the Armed Forces Qualifications Test
in 1980 (AFQT), which is a test of academic ability.  The dependent
variable in the analysis is the natural log of hourly earnings.  As shown
in Table 1, it is clear that the presence of a child lowers earnings by
nearly 8 percent for women and that the effect is statistically signifi-
cant.  For men, children increase their earnings by 6 percent, and the
effect is statistically significant.  These figures are even more dramatic
when I limit my analysis sample to those women and men who are in
managerial and professional occupations.  Having a child lowers a
female manager’s earnings by 15 percent while having a child has vir-
tually no impact on the earnings of a male manager.  Like Korenman
and Neumark (1991), I find married men to have higher earnings than
nonmarried men.6
Waldfogel (1998) notes that there are several theories put forth to
explain the lower earnings of mothers.  The most obvious, and the one
for which we have virtually no empirical evidence, is discrimination.
It is possible that women with children face statistical discrimination—
employers believe they are less likely to be attached to the labor force
and are thus reluctant to invest in them.  Another theory put forth by
Becker (1985) states that the earnings penalty faced by mothers is due
to lower effort.  Women with children and families exert less effort on
the job and thus earn lower wages.  If such effort is unmeasured when
estimating a human capital earnings function, the resulting wage pen-
alty may not reflect the effect of the child per se but may simply be a
difference in effort.  However, recent research that carefully accounts
for effort has generally not confirmed that this is the case (McLennan
2000). 
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Table 1 Log Wage Regressions for Men and Women from 1993 NLSY 
Waldfogel (1998), in her study of the family gap, notes that job-
protected maternity leave has the potential to close the family wage
gap.  She finds that women who have job protected maternity leave
experience less of a wage penalty to having children.  Waldfogel
argues that this is because maternity leave coverage raises the probabil-
ity that women return to their previous employers after childbirth.





































































































Adjusted R2 0.257 0.237 0.151 0.149
N 2,997 3,416 782 713
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  All models include controls for region of
residence (3 dummy variables) and a control for center city residence.  *** = Statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = sta-
tistically significant at the 10% level.  
Fertility, Public Policy, and Mothers in the Labor Force 127
Having women return to their previous employers is advantageous, she
argues, because this job continuity provides women the opportunity to
receive general and firm-specific training and work experience that
will boost their pay.  This opportunity is typically lost when a woman
has to return to a completely new employer or position following child-
birth.  She also notes that child care and other family friendly policies
also have the potential to close the family pay gap. 
CONCLUSIONS
The study of the economics of fertility has consistently found that
economic variables play an important role in determining fertility rates.
Despite experiencing below replacement level fertility, the United
States does not have any explicit policies designed to influence fertility
rates.  However, there are several public policies that affect the fertility
decisions of families.  Most of these policies are antinatalist at the low
end of the income distribution and are more pronatalist to women at the
upper end of the income distribution.  Some of these policies grew out
of concern over the high fertility rates of certain groups of the popula-
tion, such as welfare recipients.  Other policies, such as maternity
leave, were not designed to influence fertility but rather to help women
combine family and work responsibilities. 
The growing involvement of women in work outside the home has
focused attention on the status of women, particularly mothers, in the
labor force.  It is clear that working women are an entrenched feature
of the labor market.  There is evidence that family-friendly policies,
such as job-protected maternity leave, will help put them on more
equal ground economically.  Although women have made sizable
progress in the labor force, there are still barriers.  Women still earn
only 76 percent of what men earn.  They still work in female-domi-
nated jobs, and they are still underrepresented in upper management.
Women with children earn less than comparably qualified women
without children.  With many former welfare recipients poised to enter
the labor market, it is of increasing importance to examine the delicate
balance between work and family that many women must maintain.  If
professional women find the dual task of family and career daunting, it
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must seem impossible to a low-skilled woman facing the prospect of a
low-wage job and childcare costs.  For former welfare recipients,
childcare issues will be at the forefront as these women scramble to
find affordable, quality child care for their children. 
Notes
1. The total fertility rate is defined as the number of births that 1,000 women would
have in their lifetime if at each year they experienced the birth rates occurring in
the specified year.  A total fertility rate of 2.11 represents replacement level fertil-
ity at current mortality rates.
2. High teenage birth rates have been a concern of policymakers for some time in the
United States.  I do not discuss them specifically, except in the context of welfare
reform.  Readers interested in examining some of the issues should see Levine
(2000).
3. For an excellent and more technical and detailed presentation of the models, see
Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997).  For those interested in reading some of the
seminal work, see Schultz (1974).
4. Hayghe (1994) notes that although there was a break in the data between 1989 and
1991, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the labor force participa-
tion rate of women has leveled off or is going to fall.
5. Economists emphasize the simultaneous nature of the labor supply and fertility
decisions.  In these models I make no attempt to control for the endogeneity of
children.  Failure to control for this likely biases the coefficient on children
upward.  See Angrist and Evans (1998) for a model that does account for the
endogeneity of children.  See Waldfogel (1997b) for a comprehensive examina-
tion of the effect of children on women’s earnings.
6. I do not control for occupation in these models, although controlling for occupa-
tion (in models not presented here) does not reduce the child penalty.  This sug-
gests that women with children are not necessarily in lower-paying occupations.
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The chapter title appears self-evident—of course family structure
matters!  Surely the quirks and turns of one’s personal life—which for
almost everyone is inextricably commingled with their family’s
lives—would have measurable effects on almost everything that you
do, including whether or not you work, how much you earn, and a host
of other facts about your work experience.  It would have seemed
unreasonable to have instead titled this essay: How family structure
doesn’t affect labor market outcomes.
But it turns out that uncovering exactly how family structure mat-
ters is not a trivial undertaking.  Because economics is not in general an
experimental science, it is difficult to make a convincing argument that
family structure matters, holding all other factors constant that are
potentially correlated with family structure.  We can’t just randomly
assign people to different family structures in which to spend their
lives and see what happens.  Untangling the actual “family assign-
ment” mechanism from the outcome is a difficult problem that
researchers have tackled using a number of methodological
approaches.  We will gauge how convincing their solutions are, and the
degree to which taking this problem seriously modifies the raw num-
bers that we see in the unmassaged data.
In this chapter I will first define family structure and labor market
outcomes, and show you examples of the kinds of patterns that lead
people to believe that family structure influences labor market out-
comes.  I will briefly outline the theoretical reasoning that leads one to
believe that family structure would matter, as well as the reasoning that
can lead one to believe that it matters less than most people might
think.  In the next section I consider the evidence from a number of
studies that attempt to measure carefully the effects of family struc-
ture—particularly marital status and presence or absence of children in
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the household—on labor force participation and earnings measures.  I
conclude by looking at a few studies that consider aspects of family
structure more broadly defined, and by discussing whether the results
shown have relevance for any particular policy initiatives.
WHAT IS FAMILY STRUCTURE?
Family structure can refer to anything about a person’s past and
present living conditions and relational structure.  But we need a nar-
row definition of a family to understand the way data are commonly
collected by statistical agencies.  Let’s look at the U.S. Census Bureau/
Department of Labor definition, which relies on both relation and co-
residence: “A family is a group of two persons or more (one of whom
is the householder) residing together and related by birth, marriage, or
adoption. All such persons (including related subfamily members) are
considered as members of one family.”  Hence, while a household
“consists of all the persons who occupy a house, an apartment, or other
group of rooms, or a room, which constitutes a housing unit,” a family
household “is a household maintained by a family (as defined above),
and may include among the household members any unrelated persons
(unrelated subfamily members and/or unrelated individuals) who may
be residing there” (U.S. Department of Labor 1995).
Using these definitions, in order to see how families might vary
and how they overlap with households, consider the concrete case of
the United States population as of March 1999 (most of the results I
present in this paper are based on U.S. data, and the remaining results
come from other developed countries; I do not argue that the results are
necessarily more widely applicable).  Let us consider three widespread
phenomena (and their absence): people living more than one to a
household, people living with someone they are married to, and people
living with their own children (under 18) in a household.
Figure 1 displays the proportions of households that fall into these
types of categories and shows how these numbers vary by sex.  The
convention is to define either an individual or a married couple as the
householder(s), i.e., the person(s) in whose name(s) the housing unit is
owned or rented.  We see that out of the 100 million U.S. households in
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Figure 1 The Proportional Distribution of U.S. Households, by Various 
Characteristics, 1999
103,874,000 households (all percentages are out of this total)
NOTE: “Child” refers to own child under 18.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (2000, Tables 60, 62,
65).
1999, slightly more than half were headed by a married couple and
more than one-quarter were female-headed; the remaining 18 percent
were male-headed households.  Female- and male-headed households
can be further subdivided into family and nonfamily households, of
which a majority are nonfamily households (i.e., do not contain related
persons).  Nonfamily households can consist of one or more nonrelated
persons; 5.5 percent of all households consisted of unrelated persons,
while over a quarter of all households (25.7 percent) contained only
one person.  Hence, about two-thirds of all households are family
households.  Only 1.9 percent of married couples do not have their own
household, so being married is highly related to maintaining a family
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household (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
2000, Table 60).  Neither households nor families are particularly large
in general: the average household size is 2.61 persons and the average
family size is 3.18 persons (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census 2000, Table 60).  Notably, the idealized view of the
“nuclear family” as consisting of a married couple with two or more
children is found in less than 15 percent of households—about one of
every seven—although potentially many more of us are in such house-
holds for at least some percentage of our lives.
Even while maintaining the U.S. statistical agencies’ narrow defi-
nition of a family, one might further refine one’s view of living condi-
tions that might matter in a number of ways.  For instance, one might
examine more closely the different types of “nonmarriage”: cohabita-
tion; previously married, but now widowed, divorced, or separated; liv-
ing alone; or living with other persons in a nonsexual relationship.  One
might also want to know if previous structure has lasting effects; for
example, does a divorced person appear quite different from a wid-
owed person, and do both of those appear different from someone who
has never married?
One might also want to know more about the type of marriage that
one is in.  Do the spouses largely conform to traditional roles within the
marriage?  Do both spouses work?  Which spouse earns more?  One
might also want to know more about the age structure of the family,
including the ages of the children and, potentially, also of the spouses.
One might also be interested in how one relates to other family
members who may reside in other households.  One might be in a care-
giver relationship with an elderly and/or disabled family member who
lives elsewhere.  One might have a dependent who does not live in the
household but who still represents some level of financial (and emo-
tional) obligation.
In addition, one might wonder how family structure in the past
affects one today.  Perhaps one’s siblings continue to exert an influence
even after one no longer interacts with them daily.  Children, grand-
children, parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, and in-laws all
potentially affect your current life in measurable ways, whether or not
you currently interact with them regularly.
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WHAT ARE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES?
What sorts of outcomes might we measure?  As an economist, my
mind naturally turns to observable, independently verifiable outcomes
such as earnings and hours worked.  For the purposes of this chapter,
we will consider three outcome measures: two measures of labor sup-
ply, labor force participation (work/not work), and hours worked; and
hourly earnings.  This by no means exhausts the range of outcomes.
Netz and Haveman (1999) make a good case for including family
structure variables as potential controls/predictors for studying a wide
range of labor market outcomes—such as unemployment duration—
where researchers have not normally thought to include such variables.
However, much of the extant empirical work has in fact considered one
or more of these three outcomes.
First let’s see what the raw numbers can show us.  Table 1 shows
some calculations for prime-age adults (ages 25 to 54) for the United
States in March 1999.  For this group, consider first their labor force
participation rate (i.e., the proportion that is either currently employed
or actively looking for paid work).  Women are less likely to be partic-
ipating in the labor force if married, while the opposite holds for men.
The hours effect for those who are working goes in a similar direction.
Women in larger families, measured by either number of persons or
number of children, have reduced participation and hours.  Men in
larger families have higher participation but little variation in hours,
and men in very large families have reduced values for both measures.
Married persons earn more per hour worked than do unmarried per-
sons, but the effect appears to be much stronger for men than for
women.  Women in larger families have substantially reduced hourly
earnings, while for men in very large families hourly earnings first rise
and then fall, with little difference in the midrange (two to five people;
one to three children).
Before taking these hourly earnings rates as given, we might first
want to consider how aggregation affects these patterns.  For instance,
maybe married and unmarried persons have very different demo-
graphic characteristics, like their age distribution (which could relate
both to generic lifecycle differences and differences by birth cohort).
By showing results only for persons between 25 and 54 in Table 1, I
























All persons 77 38 11.53 43,000 29,573 92 44 15.38 46,000 27,360
Currently married 74 37 11.54 56,000 19,339 94 45 16.83 56,000 18,126
Currently 
unmarried 82 40 11.11 23,000 10,234 87 43 12.82 30,000 9,234
Number of 
persons in family
1 85 41 12.82 24,000 4,319 89 44 13.75 27,000 5,955
2 81 39 12.02 44,000 6,925 90 44 15.38 50,000 5,423
3 79 38 11.43 47,000 6,280 92 44 15.38 53,000 5,178
4 74 36 11.11 54,000 6,762 95 45 16.53 58,000 6,066
5 68 35 10.00 52,000 3,360 94 45 16.35 56,000 3,042
≥6 62 35 8.65 44,000 1,927 90 44 13.00 48,000 1,696
Number of 
children in family
0 81 40 12.02 40,000 13,912 89 44 14.42 40,000 14,552
1 79 38 11.54 47,000 5,980 94 45 16.48 55,000 4,741
139
2 74 36 10.99 48,000 6,050 96 45 16.83 55,000 5,110
3 66 34 9.62 42,000 2,610 95 45 16.73 51,000 2,164
≥4 55 33 7.92 32,000 1,021 92 46 14.42 41,000 793
NOTE: Hours and hourly earnings are calculated only for those persons reporting nonzero values.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1999).
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have already controlled for age to some degree, but it could be done
more carefully.  It turns out that the same patterns appear if I look
within narrower age ranges, say 10-year age ranges (25–34, 35–44, 45–
54).  I might also want to consider different types of non-marriedness,
such as widowed, divorced, separated, or never married.  For these
middle-aged persons, the differences in outcomes between these cate-
gories is quite small; current marital status (rather than past marital his-
tory) becomes the important distinction.
We might also want to control simultaneously for marital status
and family size using a multiple regression framework to see the
effects of each factor while holding constant the other factor.  Let’s
consider the family structure effects on earnings using this idea.
Applying a simple model to the hourly earnings data described in
Table 1 (using the natural log of hourly earnings as the dependent vari-
able, and with no other controls except for age and age-squared), for
men, being married is associated with a 22 percent higher earnings
rate, while the number of children has no effect; for women, being
married is associated with 5 percent higher hourly earnings, while each
child is associated with a 6 percent drop in hourly earnings.
WHY ARE FAMILY STRUCTURE AND LABOR MARKET 
OUTCOMES RELATED?
For both men and women, but particularly for men, marriage is
associated with higher hourly earnings.  For women, each additional
child is associated with lower hourly earnings.  Why do we see these
patterns?
I derived these percentages from a very sparse regression specifi-
cation, in which many of the usual variables that we would associate
with earnings rates, like one’s education and work experience, were
missing.  So one obvious answer is that marriage and number of chil-
dren are serving as proxies for a number of omitted variables that are
directly related to productivity as rewarded in the labor market.
Indeed, these variables are often included in regressions, particularly
for data sets where not many other variables are available, in order to
serve as proxy for these other measures (Hill 1979).  These might
How Family Structure Affects Labor Market Outcomes 141
include labor force attachment, pre- and postschool human capital
investments, stability, restrictions on work location and hours, absen-
teeism, and turnover.  Hence, studies that include a longer list of con-
trol variables should drive these family effects toward zero.
One problem with this approach is that not all variables that are
related to labor market productivity are available in the kind of data
sets that are generally available.  For instance, many measures of abil-
ity or effort might be important to employers but are not collected in
surveys.  The person surveyed might not even know how other people
view his or her actions and abilities.  And these unobservable differ-
ences across persons are potentially correlated with whether or not they
marry and how many children they have.
We could get away from the omitted variable problem completely
if we could randomly assign people to marry or not marry (and whom
to marry!), and randomly assign people to have different numbers of
children.  Indeed, if you think that marriage markets are like a lottery in
the sense that love strikes almost randomly, this would not be a prob-
lem.  But as we will see shortly, there is evidence that people do not
randomly marry with respect to economic factors.  Indeed, exactly the
opposite occurs: currently, potential high earners are likely to marry
other high earners.  Similarly, if you think that the number of children a
family has is basically an act of God, then we have a natural experi-
ment as to how children affect labor market outcomes.
Another problem is that even if you find that persons with certain
features are both more likely to marry and to make more money, this
could still be due to either effort or discrimination.  How could this be?
Let’s consider the theoretical arguments for the two main phenomena
we have observed with respect to earnings: 1) women with children
earn less than women without children, and 2) married men earn more
than unmarried men.  This will also help us understand why labor force
participation and hours might vary in the ways shown in Table 1.
One of the main arguments economists will give for why people
marry (or at least for why they live together) is that marriage allows for
gains in household output due to increasing the spouses’ ability to spe-
cialize.  Hence, a couple’s total household output would likely be
greater than the sum of what they were able to produce separately, par-
ticularly if they can increasingly specialize over the course of the mar-
riage.  If women have comparative advantage (i.e., are relatively
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better) at home production, they will be less likely to work for pay after
marriage.  Children raise the value of time spent in home production,
so children can amplify this effect considerably.  Meanwhile, married
men can specialize in market-related human capital investments,
thereby increasing their productivity over time.  In some cases, the
woman may choose to devote her time to forwarding the man’s career,
again in cases where this time investment has a higher payoff than
either her working in the market herself, or spending the time in other
forms of nonmarket production.
But what about cases where we observe both spouses working for
pay?  The argument must then be extended to say that women with
children are less productive than both childless women and all men per
hour worked in the market.  This could happen for a number of rea-
sons.  They may be directly less productive because they have invested
less in the past in market-related human capital.  Many women take
time off to raise children before reentering the labor market; hence,
women on average have less total work experience than do men, as
well as less time with their current employer.  Even if they had the
same amount of total work experience or total job tenure, leaving the
labor force for more than six months in order to raise children is in and
of itself associated with lower hourly earnings (Jacobsen and Levin
1995), possibly because their human capital has depreciated during
their absence from the labor market.  Also, anticipating discontinuous
employment, they may have invested in forms of human capital that
were less likely to depreciate, or that might be more useful in a variety
of geographic locations if they will be moving to further their spouse’s
career.
Another possibility is that rather than less human capital being
applied per hour of work, women with children are applying less effort
per hour of work.  If at-home production requires a certain amount of
one’s fixed daily stock of energy, the person doing more at-home pro-
duction may exert less effort per hour of market production.  Note that
the opposite effect potentially occurs for men who are freed from
responsibilities for at-home production, and for men whose wives are
actively supporting their career (throwing parties for their colleagues
and customers, accompanying them on trips), the employer may really
be receiving twice the effort per hour of work.
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Alternatively, women may be applying equal amounts of both
effort and human capital per hour but may be constrained in their selec-
tion of jobs to those that have flexible and/or part-time hours.  It is well
documented that such jobs generally have lower earnings rates, poten-
tially because these are desirable features, or because such jobs are less
valuable to employers.  Hence women’s desire to reduce hours of paid
work so as to spend more time in nonmarket production leads to their
lower earnings per hour.  Meanwhile, married men may select jobs that
have fewer amenities (including but not limited to flexibility) but
higher wages (Reed and Harford 1989).  In other words, there exist
jobs with higher pay but fewer amenities and jobs with lower pay but
greater amenities, and people sort systematically between them based
on gender and family structure.
That outlines the basic neoclassical economic argument for why
marital status and number of children would have effects on labor force
participation, hours, and earnings: marriage and children alter one’s
relative productivity between home and work and potentially one’s
choice of pecuniary and nonpecuniary amenities related to work.  Note,
however, that for any point made above, it is possible to make an alter-
native argument that marital status and number of children either won’t
or will matter in the opposite direction.  For example, the potential
endogeneity of the human capital investment decision will make it hard
to measure the full effects of marriage and children on current earn-
ings; there may be no current effect, but past anticipation of becoming
married with children will have led women to invest in less human cap-
ital than they would have otherwise.  However, if most women plan to
(or assume that they will) become married and have children, this will
depress women’s earnings relative to men but will have little effect on
the differential earnings between married and unmarried women.
It is also possible to derive alternative explanations for why these
phenomena occur.  In particular, marriage and children might alter not
only one’s choice set but also one’s preferences.  For example, married
men might work harder because now there are other people—people
whom they care about—whose well-being is affected by their level of
income.
Another alternative explanation is that society (broadly defined,
but also narrowly defined as employers) prefers certain familial config-
urations to others, potentially for economic reasons, and attempts to
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reward persons who conform to these norms while penalizing those
who do not.  So married men, particularly those with stay-at-home
wives, receive higher pay raises and more frequent promotions.  Mean-
while, women find it difficult to combine work with home duties, and
employers make it no easier for them.  Employers may favor the tradi-
tional style of marriage out of simple prejudice and a desire to replicate
the male-dominated management structure that they have become
accustomed to.  An alternative, statistical, discrimination theory would
be that employers use family structure as a proxy for the unobservable
factors of effort, emotional stability, and turnover (i.e., marriage and
children are good for men but bad for women).
To sum up, we see that there are four main categories of explana-
tions for why there might be differences in earnings and labor market
work associated with changes in family structure: both absolute and
relative productivity in market work may be affected; preferences are
altered; trade-offs between higher pay and higher job amenities are in
part based on family structure; and discrimination—either prejudicial
or statistical—occurs.  It is not necessary to pick one of these explana-
tions over the others; rather, they might all be operating simulta-
neously, each accounting for some proportion of the wage and
employment differences.
In addition, we see that there are a number of reasons why it would
be hard to observe these effects cleanly using nonexperimental data:
selection into marriage and into child raising must be taken account of
to the degree that both observable and nonobservable factors affecting
selection are correlated with either productivity or preferences regard-
ing market versus nonmarket work.  Various studies have taken these
different theoretical and empirical considerations seriously.  We will
see how they have reduced—or strengthened—the marital wage pre-
mium for men and the family wage penalty for women.  I will briefly
summarize the range of results and sum up my views in each of these
two cases.
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THE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE
Many studies have considered the puzzle of why married men earn
more.  This premium varies across studies from zero to 30 percent,
depending on the particular data set and time period studied and on the
nature of the empirical methodology.  The premium clearly persists if
standard, observable controls for productivity are added, such as edu-
cational attainment and actual or estimated work experience (Hill
1979), and is larger for persons in professional and managerial occupa-
tions (Pfeffer and Ross 1982).  Following people over time, which is a
way of controlling for unobservable variables, indicates that wages rise
after marriage, and that the managerial and professional effect appears
to be related to receiving higher performance ratings and therefore
being more likely to be promoted to higher, better-paying jobs (Koren-
man and Neumark 1991).  These results are all consistent with both the
higher productivity and the discrimination arguments.
However, in controlling for unobservables that affect both wages
and marital status, a number of studies have found that the marital sta-
tus premium is greatly reduced or eradicated (Cohen and Haberfeld
1991; Cornwell and Rupert 1995; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987, 1997;
Loh 1996).  There is also some reason to believe that the marital pre-
mium is declining over time.  This may be related not only to reduced
differences in human capital investment between married and unmar-
ried men (Blackburn and Korenman 1994), but also to reduced special-
ization in market work during marriage, possibly related to rising
divorce probabilities (Gray 1997; Gray and Vanderhart 2000).  On the
other hand, a recent study using the 1999 March CPS finds that even
after controlling for endogeneity of marital status, married men have a
13 percent wage premium (Chun and Lee 2001).
A number of studies (Chalmers 1996; Jacobsen and Rayack 1996;
Blackaby, Carlin, and Murphy 1998; Hotchkiss and Moore 1999; Chun
and Lee 2001) have considered differences among married men in the
marital wage premium, specifically how their spouse’s work hours
might affect the wage premium.  These studies generally find differ-
ences, after controlling for observable productivity-related characteris-
tics, of approximately 15 percent between married men whose wives
do not work and married men whose wives work full time.  By the
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effort argument put forth above, we should observe that a man who has
a nonworking wife will have higher wages because his wife is free to
dedicate relatively more time to furthering his career, either directly
through career-related activities, or indirectly by freeing him from
almost all home production obligations.  However, this effect could
also be due to one or both of two alternative explanations: the assorta-
tive mating effect, in this case leading to matches between men who
have high market productivity and women who have high nonmarket
productivity; and the endogeneity of spousal work hours.  In other
words, if a man is a high earner, his wife reduces her paid work time,
even potentially increasing leisure time rather than home production.
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) find that the effect disappears in U.S. data
(the Panel Study of Income Dynamics) when either of these two alter-
native explanations is controlled for and Chalmers (1996) finds that
controlling for endogeneity alone is enough to eradicate the phenome-
non in five different data sets (data from the Luxembourg Income
Study for Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
States).  However, Hotchkiss and Moore (1999) find that the effect per-
sists in U.S. data for managerial occupations, as do Blackaby, Carlin,
and Murphy (1998) for a United Kingdom data set; and Chun and Lee
(2001) find that the effect persists in a broader sample of men in the
United States even when controlling simultaneously for marital endo-
geneity and hours endogeneity.
The effects of marriage on women have received less attention, but
the slight positive wage premium related to marriage appears to persist
even when heterogeneity and endogeneity bias are accounted for.  Neu-
mark and Korenman (1994), using data on sisters to control for these
factors, find a positive marriage premium for white women.  Using a
different data set, however, they previously found no direct effect on
women’s wages (Korenman and Neumark 1992).  Jacobsen and Levin
(1995) find no statistically significant effect of current marital status
once fairly detailed controls for work experience, including intermit-
tency spells, are included.
The difficulty of considering all explanations simultaneously,
using a data set that has good controls for human capital variables (par-
ticularly work experience and intermittency measures) and controlling
for heterogeneity and endogeneity, shows up in these differing results.
Based on the current studies, I am not completely willing to concede
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that there is currently in the United States any marital wage premium
for men or women.  This is clearly an area of active research, and one
where more research, including more replicative and summarizing
studies, is needed.
THE EFFECTS OF CHILDREN
A topic that has received even more ink and has been equally con-
troversial has been the effects of childbearing and child raising on
female labor supply and earnings.  The reduced earnings effect oper-
ates largely through the reduced labor supply effect and is more rele-
vant for total family earnings than on hourly earnings.  However, there
does appear to be an effect even on the hourly earnings rate, as we saw
in Table 1.  Waldfogel (1998) argues that there is still an effect in U.S.
data, and that the penalty is in the 10 to 15 percent range in comparing
women with children to women with no children.  Again, as with the
men, we might first want to know how adding traditional observable
controls for productivity affects this finding.  Indeed, studies that have
added such controls, particularly for work experience and job tenure,
have reduced considerably the effect of children on wage, adding cre-
dence to the idea that the presence of children in the household is to a
large degree a proxy for these direct productivity effects (Hill 1979;
Jacobsen and Levin 1995; Lundberg and Rose 2000).  But how to treat
the endogeneity of work experience and job tenure is contentious.
Korenman and Neumark (1992) argue that if this endogeneity is not
controlled for (i.e., the effects of children in reducing these measures is
taken into account), the negative effect of children on wages is under-
stated. 
One study that considered the family gap across seven developed
countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States,
Germany, Finland, and Sweden) finds much variation in the effects of
children on both employment and wages, with the largest wage penalty
for children in the United Kingdom (Harkness and Waldfogel 1999).
In the United Kingdom, the presence of children still strongly inhibits
full-time employment, and the low pay in part-time work appears to be
an important explanation of the “family gap” in wages (Joshi, Macran,
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and Dex 1996; Joshi et al. 1999).  These findings raise the question of
how institutional differences across countries can affect this gap,
potentially through the indirect link of children to wages through
reducing labor force attachment.
A method that avoids the endogeneity and heterogeneity problems
is to use natural experiments involving multiple births and the gender
mix of children.  In other words, to the extent that multiple births are
not planned and that people aim to have children of specific genders
and therefore might have additional children if the first one or two are
not of the desired sex, these outcomes cause increases in the number of
children in a family over what the family might have desired.  These
studies generally find rather small additional child effects on both labor
supply and earnings (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000).  Another study in
this vein (Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom 1999) finds small effects
of total fertility on married women’s labor supply and earnings,
depressing labor supply by 2.5 percent and hours worked by two per
week per additional child, and essentially no effect on hourly earnings,
which is consistent with the raw numbers in Table 1.
Another method that attempts to measure directly whether time
and effort spent on household production affects labor market out-
comes is to measure the effects of household production directly.
Studies using a variety of econometric specifications (Hersch 1991a,b;
Hersch and Stratton 1997, 2002) have indeed found a significant nega-
tive effect on women’s wages of time spent on housework; approxi-
mately 10 weekly hours of housework reduces hourly earnings by
about 2 percent (Stratton 2001).  Housework hours variations by mari-
tal status are fairly large for women and may even be relevant in
explaining the negative wage differentials related to the presence of
children (although this particular specification was not tested by the
mentioned studies).  In contrast, results have been inconclusive for
men, with the possibility of a smaller negative impact or no effect
(Hersch 1991b; Hersch and Stratton 1997, 2002), while the other study
(Hersch 1991a) actually found a slight positive effect of time spent on
housework on men’s wages.  Notably, Hersch and Stratton (2000) find
that married and single men spend virtually the same amount of time
on home production, “albeit on different types of housework”; not sur-
prisingly, they also find no effect of housework on the marital wage
premium for men.
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Note that while one interpretation of these results is that time spent
on housework reduces one’s ability to do well in the labor market,
another interpretation is that time spent on housework is a proxy nega-
tively correlated with drive or ambition in the labor market.  In addi-
tion, the negative effect can operate through creation of a constraint
(i.e., picking part-time positions with lower wage rate) rather than
through effort or flextime (Stratton 2001).
Another line of research has attempted to measure attitudes toward
family life directly and use these attitudinal measures as control vari-
ables.  Interestingly, while Rose and Winkler (2000) find that women’s
inclinations toward traditional roles in the family are correlated with
lower labor force attachment and earnings, Cappelli, Constantine, and
Chadwick (2000) find that persons placing a high priority on family
before entering the labor market earn more; women who place a high
priority on family do not suffer in terms of subsequent earnings.
Fewer studies have bothered to consider the effects of children on
men, given the apparent absence of a strong effect in the raw data on
either hours or earnings (although Hersch [1991b] finds a positive
effect of presence of children on both male and female wages).  How-
ever, Carlin and Flood (1997) consider this question in the context of
the contemporary Swedish experience and find a small reduction in
male labor supply (2.6 to 3.4 hours per week) related to the presence of
one or more young children in the household.  Lundberg and Rose
(2000) find that in U.S. households where the mother continues to
work, the father reduces hours worked substantially.  Preston (2000)
presents an interesting statistical discrimination model in which
employers are unable initially to observe long-term career prospects,
but once parenthood occurs, true child care responsibilities are
observed and both women and men are tracked correctly into high- or
low-career orientation paths.  In her data, earnings differentials
between men and women fall to zero once the share of child care
responsibility is included in the analysis.
To sum up, again there is difficulty in considering all explanations
simultaneously, using a data set that has good controls for human capi-
tal variables (particularly work experience and intermittency measures)
and controlling for heterogeneity and endogeneity.  In addition, the
philosophical question arises of whether children’s indirect effects in
reducing labor force attachment should be credited to the children per
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se.  However, without crediting these indirect effects, the effects of
children on female labor market behavior appear to be relatively small.
OTHER FAMILY STRUCTURE EFFECTS
Now that we have considered the two main veins of the research
literature on family structure effects, we turn briefly to outlining other
topics that are of interest but have received less focus by researchers.
A number of persons have been interested in the recent rise in cohabi-
tation, particularly in this country and in Western Europe, particularly
in Sweden (Waite and Gallagher 2000).  Cohabitation appears to have
some of the productivity advantages of married life, such as the possi-
bility of day-to-day specialization.  But it lacks the ones that rely on a
long-term relationship, as such couples are not willing to specialize
more completely, given the uncertainty inherent in a nonformal rela-
tionship.
Another phenomenon of some interest is the increased number and
proportion of dual-earner couples, mainly in the United States, in
which the wife earns more than the husband (Winkler 1998).  While
this is an outcomes measure, it also has implications for how bargain-
ing in the home is affected, an area of increased research in general by
theoreticians.  Another phenomenon of interest concurrent with the
increase in dual-earner couples is the apparent rise in correlation
between husbands’ and wives’ earnings.  This is in contrast to the ear-
lier argument that high-earner husbands might well pick wives who
had relatively high nonmarket production capabilities, a feature that
was assumed to be generally negatively correlated with high market
production capability (Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001).  This has been of
particular interest for its implications regarding income inequality
between families, although so far changes in wives’ earnings do not
explain a substantial portion of the rise in family income inequality that
has occurred since the 1980s (Cancian and Reed 1999). 
Another topic that has been barely studied yet in a systematic
empirical way is the implications of the rising number of elderly and
how they may be cared for in both resident and nonresident settings by
their close relatives.  A related topic is how families deal with disabled
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members of any age.  It is known that a majority of caregivers for both
household members and persons outside the household are women
(Schmittroth 1991, Tables 111, 113).  It appears that the existence of a
dependent elder in a family household is negatively correlated with
earnings of adults in their immediate family (Tilly and Albelda 1994);
linkages with nonresident dependent elders, where effects may operate
through the need to provide both time and money toward their care,
have yet to be clearly measured in terms of their effects on labor mar-
ket outcomes for caregivers.  For instance, one study finds no evidence
of reduced employment among married women caregivers (Wolf and
Soldo 1994), while other studies find that caregivers have significantly
reduced employment (Ettner 1995; White-Means 1992).
Finally, a number of studies have considered labor market effects
related to the situation of one’s birth family rather than one’s current
family.  While some studies (Neumark and Korenman 1994) have
exploited sibling and parental relationships in an attempt to control for
unobservables that are correlated across family members, others have
considered directly the effects of family size, birth order, and/or sibling
gender mix on one’s own outcomes.  These effects have in large part
been modeled as affecting one’s human capital investments, such as
educational attainment, prior to entering the labor market.  Regarding
family size, Kessler (1991) finds no effect on wages but finds some
relation to labor supply for women—women from small families work
less when young, more when older.  Regarding birth order effects,
Behrman and Taubman (1986) find favorable labor market outcomes
for first-born children, Kessler finds no effect on wages of birth order,
and Oettinger (2000) finds that older sibling educational achievement
positively affects younger sibling educational achievement.  Regarding
sibling gender mix, Butcher and Case (1994) find that women raised
only with brothers received more education than women raised with
any sisters.  In contrast, Kaestner (1997) finds no such effect among
whites, and finds that among blacks, sisters are positively related to
educational attainment, while Hauser and Kuo (1998) find no effect of
sibling gender composition on educational attainment.
While the aforementioned studies all use contemporary U.S. data,
these topics have also been considered using historical data (Sassler
1995) and data from developing countries—indeed, birth family struc-
ture effects appear to be of increasing interest now that more data are
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available from these countries that allow for empirical research.  In the
developing country context, interest has centered on health indicators
as well as educational indicators, and effects appear larger.  For exam-
ple, Garg and Morduch (1998), using Ghanaian data, find that children
with sisters but no brothers score 25 to 40 percent better on measured
health indicators than if they have only brothers.  A final topic, con-
tinuing linkages to one’s birth family (without necessarily implying
any type of direct income or hours transfers), has barely been consid-
ered, although Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find that relative
income comparisons to one’s sisters and sisters-in-law are significant
in explaining the increase in female labor supply.
POLICY-RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, let us briefly consider two questions.  Does family
structure matter enough for labor market outcomes that we should do
anything about it?  If so, what should we do?  From my preceding dis-
cussion, it is clear that I think it is far from obvious that these effects
are large enough to cause concern.  But even if they were large, the
issue of whether there is anything amiss here is not obvious.
If the premia and penalties we observe were clearly the result of
prejudicial discrimination, as opposed to being based on productivity
differences, compensating differentials, or marriage market matching,
then we would want to eradicate it.  This is the argument given for
making sex and race discrimination illegal, and indeed, we also make
questions regarding one’s family status illegal for employers to ask.
However, unlike sex and race discrimination, because family status is a
choice variable and is changeable, it is less obvious that anything
should be done.  The usual argument that discrimination is distortion-
ary would hold, but it is apparently discrimination against women as a
whole that is problematic, not necessarily against women who are mar-
ried mothers.  Policy proposals that reduce discrimination against
women in general would have the effect of raising the return to invest-
ments in their human capital, regardless of either their expectations or
outcomes regarding marriage and child rearing.
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One conclusion we can draw from positive marriage premiums for
both working men and women (and potentially positive premiums
achieved by those who specialize in nonmarket production as well) is
that marriage is an efficiency-raising device, which might be encour-
aged therefore on efficiency grounds alone.  Indeed, Waite and Gal-
lagher (2000) argues a strong case for taking societal actions to
strengthen society’s commitment to the institution of marriage, in part
on economic grounds, and in part on a number of other grounds,
including its apparent causal linkage to better mental, physical, and
emotional health.
But most work/family policy initiatives are suggested in order to
reduce the negative outcomes associated with child raising, particularly
with raising children while unmarried.  These include high rates of
poverty and near-poverty for female-headed families, whether created
through out-of-wedlock birth or divorce.  Direct income transfers and
attempts to increase the human capital of such families are two such
policies.  Note that neither of these need be directly associated with the
family structure so much as with the low state of human capital invest-
ment in these persons to begin with.  Another set of policies attempts to
reduce the income penalty associated with taking parental leaves from
one’s career, or stepping down to part-time work.  Paid parental leaves
and child care subsidies can have measurable effects, both directly by
increasing a family’s income, and indirectly by increasing labor force
attachment.  To the extent that these preserve human capital invest-
ments and encourage such investments, they may be viewed as desir-
able.  But prices may also be distorted in a way that reduces the value
of nonmarket labor, including child care performed in the household.
A clearer case would need to be made, either on the grounds of offset-
ting current distortions overvaluing such labor, or on the grounds that
work/family policies internalize positive externalities of family struc-
ture, in order to justify them.
Finally, dependent care assistance, whether for children, the eld-
erly, or the disabled, which could be paid directly to either the depen-
dent or to the caregiver, would reduce the income strain associated
with these situations.  The latter two, particularly to the degree that eld-
erly persons have high disability rates, appear to be a reasonable form
of insurance in cases where various problems causing incomplete
insurance markets have made it difficult for individuals and families to
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self-insure.  The former is less defensible on insurance grounds if one
believes that child raising is a freely chosen option, with many of its
benefits accruing to the family itself.
However, insuring against negative outcomes caused by the cir-
cumstances of one’s birth is a reasonable policy to consider.  Assis-
tance targeted to those children who receive negative outcomes (such
as low educational attainment) because of parental investment deci-
sions (and potentially lack of investment funds due to capital market
constraints) would be defensible as a social insurance program against
being born in a family situation where you do not receive as good an
outcome as those in other, more fortunate family situations.  For
instance, for a society in which there is systematic underinvestment in
girls by their families, societal leaders could make the decision to off-
set this underinvestment.  This is clearly an area that needs consider-
ation in a number of developing countries.
The issue therefore appears to come down to choice: To what
degree is the choice of family situation made freely?  What sorts of con-
straints (in the usual economist terms of relative prices and endow-
ments) operate on that choice?  In all societies, one does not choose
what family to be born into, and we have strong equity grounds for min-
imizing the differences caused by birth family circumstance.  In some
societies, arguably including our own, one does choose what family to
create, and the equity grounds for minimizing differences in labor mar-
ket outcomes related to that choice are therefore much less clear.
In conclusion, while the robustness—and policy relevance—of the
findings presented in this chapter is ambiguous, I have found the effects
of family structure on labor outcomes an intriguing area to explore.
Much remains to be done on this topic, and I look forward to reading, as
well as doing my own research, in this area for years to come.
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Working for All Families? 
Family Leave Policies 
in the United States
Katherin Ross Phillips
The Urban Institute
Over the past 20 years, two demographic trends in the United
States have captured the attention of social scientists and policymakers.
First, the percentage of mothers with young children who are in the
workforce has increased.  Today most children with married parents
see both their mother and father go to work each week, and single par-
ents are more likely to work full time than either part time or not at all
(Ross Phillips 2002).  As parents become increasingly attached to the
labor market, pressures build within employers and across govern-
ments to develop working environments that facilitate the combination
of caregiving and market work responsibilities.  Adding to these pres-
sures is the second major demographic trend of the late twentieth cen-
tury: the aging of the population.  As they age, workers’ need for leave
from work to tend to their own health or to care for their parents or
spouses intensifies.
In 1993, the United States passed legislation aimed at easing the
tension many employees feel as they face the challenge of trying to
care for themselves and their families while maintaining an attachment
to the workforce.  The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) pro-
vides job-protected leave to eligible workers for a variety of caregiving
and medical reasons.  Throughout the 1990s state governments and pri-
vate employers also experimented with different leave policies. 
Policies that allow workers time to take care of their own and their
families’ health needs can improve employment security in the short-
term and, as a result, help raise family earnings and income in the long-
term.  Explicit in the FMLA is a goal to promote economic security for
all families (U.S. Department of Labor 1993).  The ability of family
policies, both public and private, to improve economic security
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depends both on benefit generosity and the number of workers who
have access to the benefits.  If access to family leave is negatively
related to income status, then the economic security derived from fam-
ily leave may not reach low-income working caregivers.  For example,
poor mothers who leave the welfare system for employment may find
they are not protected by the FMLA.
Just three years after passing the FMLA, the United States enacted
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA).  Commonly referred to as “welfare reform,”
a goal of the legislation is to convert welfare into a transitional, work-
focused assistance program.  The law requires most participants to
work after two years of benefit receipt and imposes a five-year lifetime
limit on a family’s receipt of the federal portion of welfare benefits.  As
a result, the PRWORA will move mothers who previously relied on
public support into the workforce.  Given that federal policy is direct-
ing some welfare recipients into employment, it seems reasonable to
ask if federally guaranteed employment supports, such as the FMLA,
are available to these mothers.
This chapter examines whether leave provided under the FMLA,
as well as through private employers and state policies, works for all
families in the United States.  After reviewing the forms of leave that
workers might use to address their family and medical needs, the chap-
ter looks at whether access to these benefits is related to family income
or occupations status.  Research suggests that in the years directly after
leaving welfare for work, most mothers will be employed in blue-collar
or service occupations and will live in families with incomes less than
twice the poverty line.  The analysis highlights these occupation and
income groups.  The chapter concludes with some policy recommenda-
tions aimed at improving access to family leave benefits among low-
income workers.
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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FAMILY LEAVE POLICIES
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
The FMLA was the first major piece of legislation signed into law
by President Clinton.  The act provides eligible employees with up to
12 unpaid work weeks of job-protected leave during any 12-month
period for the birth or adoption of a child, the foster care of a child, to
care for a seriously ill child, spouse, or parent, or for an employee’s
own serious illness. 
Leave mandated by the FMLA is job-protected but unpaid.  After
an FMLA leave the employer must allow a leave-taker to return either
to the same position held before the leave or to a position with equiva-
lent pay, benefits, terms of employment, and seniority.  An employer
may deny reinstatement to an employee who is among the highest paid
10 percent of the employer’s workforce if reinstatement would cause
“substantial and grievous economic injury” to the business.  Further-
more, if the employee would have been laid off, terminated, or down-
graded had she not taken leave, her job will not be protected during her
leave.
The FMLA does not require remuneration during the leave period.
An employer, however, may require its employees to use accrued vaca-
tion and/or sick leave as a portion of FMLA leave.  An employee can
use paid vacation or annual leave for a portion of FMLA leave and will
usually be permitted to use paid, accrued sick leave as well.  The total
amount of FMLA leave, however, cannot exceed 12 weeks within a
12-month period.  For example, if an employee substitutes two paid
vacation weeks for FMLA leave, then she is only entitled to 10 unpaid
weeks.
The use of FMLA leave cannot result in the loss of any employ-
ment benefit earned prior to the leave, although benefits need not
accrue during the leave.  Under the FMLA, an employer must maintain
health insurance coverage during the leave period in the same manner
as if the employee had continued employment.  If the employee fails to
return to work after the specified leave period an employer can stop
paying for health insurance and recover premiums paid to maintain the
health insurance during the leave period.  If the employee cannot return
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to work due to a continued health condition or a reason beyond the
employee’s control, however, the employer cannot recover health
insurance premiums paid during the leave period.
Family and medical leave is available to an employee who 1) has at
least 12 months of tenure with the employer from whom she will take
leave; 2) has worked at least 1,250 hours during the 12 months preced-
ing the leave period for the employer; and 3) works for an employer
who employs at least 50 people within a 75-mile radius of the
employee’s worksite.  The FMLA applies to private establishments,
federal, state, and local governments, and Congress.  The FMLA does
not replace any state legislation that was more generous than the
FMLA’s provisions.
According to a recent Department of Labor survey, of the six pos-
sible reasons for taking family leave, a worker’s own serious health
condition is the most common (Cantor et al. 2001).1  Among workers
who took family leave over an 18-month period ending last year, the
majority (52 percent) of the workers took leave for their own serious
illnesses.  Less than one in five workers took parental leave (19 per-
cent), and 8 percent took leave for maternity disability.2  Similar per-
centages of workers took leave to care for a seriously ill parent (13
percent) or child (12 percent).  Only 6 percent of workers used leave to
care for an ill spouse.
State Family Leave Policies
Some state laws provide family leave that is more expansive than
the FMLA.  For example, a number of states allow longer maternity
and parental leave periods, some states mandate that small employers
also provide maternity leave, and a few states allow parents some time
away from market work to participate in their children’s education.
State Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs in California,
Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island provide partial
wage replacement during maternity disability leaves.  Typically, TDI
leaves are not job-protected, and eligibility criteria for TDI programs
can limit their reach.  Minnesota’s At-Home Infant Child Care program
allows some low-income working families to collect child care subsi-
dies while parents stay at home to care for their own infants under one
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year of age.  Participation in the program and funding have been quite
limited.
Over the past three years, there has been a lot of activity at the state
level to pass a variety of family leave laws.  Most states have focused
on developing ways to provide some remuneration during FMLA
leaves.  To date, however, no state has enacted comprehensive family
leave legislation.3  Some of the recent state proposals are discussed in
the policy options section at the end of this chapter.
Employer Policies
Employer policies have often provided some workers with leave
that they could take for a subset of family leave purposes.  Employers
might offer paid sick leave that an employee can use for her own ill-
ness and, in some cases, to care for her sick child; short-term disability
leave that can often be used for maternity leave purposes; paid vaca-
tions that can generally be used for any purpose provided the employee
gives sufficient notice; and paid personal leave that typically allows
workers to take time off for reasons not covered by other leave poli-
cies.  Increasingly, employers have begun to offer some employees
packages of “unrestricted leave.”  Under this benefit, employees have
access to a specified number of paid days of leave that they can use for
any reason.
In place of formal leave policies, firms may also permit leaves of
absence for some family leave purposes on a case-by-case basis.
Although data on informal family leave policies are not consistently
collected, maternity leave coverage estimates increase when they
include the informal mechanisms for maternity leave provision.  While
36 percent of firms surveyed in a study during the mid 1980s had for-
mal policies, an additional 50 percent had informal policies (Raabe and
Gessner 1988).
Informal policies and the use of sick leave, vacation time, and per-
sonal leave to provide family leave may restrict access to leave.  Sick
leave and vacation time accrue slowly and are often capped at a rela-
tively small number of weeks.  Caregivers who have short job tenures
may not be able to accrue a sufficient number of weeks of leave for
family leave purposes—especially for childbearing and parental
leaves.  Using accrued vacation and sick leave for family leave also
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reduces the opportunities for additional time off in a year during which
a caregiver experiences the stresses of childbirth, new parenthood, or
illness.  Workers who use accrued vacation and sick leave for family
leaves are not guaranteed to have their jobs available when they return
to market work unless the leaves are covered under the FMLA.
Both public and private family leave policies can help covered and
eligible workers combine their family and work responsibilities.  The
following sections examine who is covered and who is eligible for
family leave.  To gauge whether low-income workers, particularly
recent welfare-leavers, have equal access to family leave benefits, the
analyses focuses on the income status and occupations of workers who
have and who do not have access to family leave benefits.
ACCESS TO FAMILY LEAVE: COVERAGE
Family and Medical Leave Act
Family and medical leave is only available to persons who work
for relatively large firms.  At the end of the twentieth century, about 58
percent of workers in private establishments were covered under the
FMLA (Cantor et al. 2001).  Research suggests that women who suc-
cessfully transition from welfare to market work will remain low
income in the short term.  Table 1 compares the firm sizes of workers
Table 1 Percent of Workers in Different Firm Sizes, by Income 
Status, 1999




 above twice the 
poverty line
Number of employees at worksite
Less than 25 43.3 30.4
25–49 13.0 11.3
50–100 12.6 11.8
More than 100 31.1 46.5
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families.
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with family incomes less than twice the poverty line to the firm sizes of
high-income workers.4 More than 56 percent of low-income workers
are employed at worksites with fewer than 50 employees compared to
less than 42 percent of higher income workers.  The data in Table 1
suggest that the majority of low-income workers are probably not cov-
ered by the FMLA.5 
State Policies
A primary way state policies provide more generous leaves than
the FMLA is through expanded coverage.  The District of Columbia,
Oregon, and Vermont all provide some form of family leave to
employees of firms that are smaller than firms covered by the FMLA.
Laws in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, and New Hampshire mandate
that smaller employers than are covered under the FMLA provide
maternity benefits to working women in their states.  States that set
very low firm-size thresholds for leave coverage (e.g., below 10
employees) may increase the share of low-income workers that are
covered by public family leave policies.
Private Establishment Policies
Each year the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) surveys private
establishments to gather information about the types of benefits they
provide to their workers.  In even years the BLS surveys small estab-
lishments, firms with fewer than 100 employees; in odd years, the BLS
surveys medium and large establishments, firms with at least 100
employees.  Tables 2 and 3 summarize some of the data collected in
these surveys for full-time employees in 1996 and 1997.  Patterns are
similar for part-time employees, but coverage rates are substantially
smaller.
The differential impact of the FMLA by firm size is noticeable in
the first two rows of Table 2.  Some proportion of the small firms in
Table 2 are covered by the FMLA either because they employ 50 to
100 employees or because they have a number of worksites within a
small geographical area.  However, fewer than half of workers in small
establishments have access to unpaid family leave, compared to 93 per-
cent of workers in large firms.  Blue-collar and service workers are the
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Large firmsa 93 95 96 91
Small firmsb 48 53 52 43
Paid family leave
Large firms 2 3 3 1
Small firms 2 3 3 1 
Paid sick leave
Large firms 56 73 73 38
Small firms 50 66 64 35
Short-term disability
Large firms 55 54 52 58
Small firms 29 32 33 25
Paid vacations
Large firms 95 96 97 94
Small firms 86 90 95 79
Paid personal leave
Large firms 20 23 33 13
Small firms 14 21 18 8
a Large firms are establishments with at least 100 employees.  The Bureau of Labor
Statistics refers to these as medium and large establishments.  Data for large firms are
from 1997.
b Small firms are establishments with fewer than 100 employees.  Data for small firms
are from 1996.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999a,b).
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least likely to have unpaid family leave.  Only 2 percent of workers in
either small or large firms receive paid family leave.  Across all other
leave types, employees in larger firms are more likely to have access to
leave than employees in small establishments and blue-collar and ser-
vice employees are the least likely occupation group to have access to
all forms of leave.  
Average length of leave available for covered employees varies by
firm size and occupation (Table 3).  In general, full-time employees in
small private firms are covered under leave policies that are shorter in
duration than the policies found in larger private firms.  Within large
firms, blue-collar and service employees are covered by leave policies
that have shorter average durations than policies that apply to the other
occupation groups.  For example, after one year of service, profes-
sional/technical employees in private establishments with more than
100 employees are entitled to an average of 13.3 paid sick days while
blue-collar and service employees in large, private establishments are
entitled to an average of 9.9 days of sick leave.  Blue-collar and service
workers are the least likely to be allowed to carry over their sick leave
from year to year and are the most likely to end up in a “use or lose”
situation at the end of the plan year (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1999a,b). 
Within private establishments, blue-collar and service workers are
less likely to have access to leave that may be used for family leave
purposes.  Some firms allow workers to use their sick leave to care for
a sick child.  The percentage of workers who can use sick leave to care
for a sick child varies by the size of the firm and occupation and ranges
from a low of 43 percent for blue-collar and service workers in large
firms to a high of 63 percent of professional and technical workers in
small establishments (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999a,b).
A few patterns emerge from the BLS data.  Establishments that
employ fewer than 100 people are typically less likely to provide leave
to their workers than larger employers.  Among the small firms that do
provide leave, average available leave length is generally shorter.
Workers in blue-collar and service occupations have less access to pri-
vate family leave policies than workers in other occupations.  Low-
income workers tend to work for smaller firms than higher-income
workers (see Table 1).  Using data from the National Survey of Amer-
ica’s Families (NSAF), Table 4 demonstrates that low-income and
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Unpaid family leave (weeks)
Large firmsa 14.0 14.8 14.3 13.4
Small firmsb 12.5 12.4 12.6 12.4
Paid family leave (weeks)
Large firms NA NA NA NA
Small firms NA NA NA NA
Paid sick leave (days)c,d,e
Large firms 11.2 13.3 10.1 9.9
Small firms 8.0 7.6 7.6 8.8
Short-term disability (weeks)f
Large firms 25 25 24 26
Small firms 25 24 24 26
Paid vacations (days)c
Large firms 9.6 12.4 9.9 7.9
Small firms 8.1 10.0 8.6 6.8
Paid personal leave (days)
Large firms 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.6
Small firms 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.9
NOTE: NA = not available.
a Large firms are establishments with at least 100 employees.  The U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics refers to these as medium and large establishments.  Data for large
firms are from 1997.
b Small firms are establishments with fewer than 100 employees.  Data for small firms
are from 1996.
c Average number of days available after one year of service for covered employees.
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d Paid sick leave durations are calculated only for covered employees whose paid sick
leave policy provides for a specific number of days.  Nine percent of employees in
large firms and 13 percent of employees in small firms are covered under sick leave
policies that provide leave on an “as needed” or other basis.  Most of these employees
work in professional/technical occupations.
e Data for sick leave durations are aggregated by white-collar and blue-collar in U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999a).
f Short-term disability durations are calculated only for covered employees whose
short-term disability policy is for a fixed duration.  Three percent of employees in
small businesses and 5 percent of employees in large firms are covered under policies
that have a variable duration.  Most of these employees work in the clerical or sales
occupations.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999a,b).
poor workers are more likely to work in blue-collar and service occu-
pations.  Nearly 63 percent of low-income workers are employed in
blue-collar and service occupations, compared to just over 36 percent
of higher-income workers.
Summary: Family Leave Coverage
Coverage of both public and private leave policies tends to dispro-
portionately exclude low-income workers and workers in blue-collar
and service occupations.  Low-income workers are more likely to live
Table 4 Percent of Employees in Different Occupations, by Income 
Status, 1999
Family income less 
than twice the 
poverty line
Family income 




Clerical and sales 23.4 25.1
Blue-collar and service 62.5 36.3
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families.
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in families with children than higher-income workers (Acs et al. 2000).
As a result they may have a greater need for family leave than higher-
income workers.  Assuming they look more like low-income than
higher-income workers, former welfare participants who move into the
workforce may not be covered by either private or public family leave
policies that could facilitate their transition from focusing on caregiv-
ing toward combining caregiving with market work.
ACCESS TO FAMILY LEAVE: ELIGIBILITY
Family and Medical Leave Act
Although nearly 58 percent of all U.S. workers in private establish-
ments are covered under the FMLA, not all of these workers meet the
act’s eligibility criteria.  Only workers who have worked for their
employers for at least 12 months and for at least 1,250 hours over the
past year are eligible to take FMLA leave.  Approximately 81 percent
of all workers who report that they work at a worksite that meets the
FMLA coverage restrictions also report that they meet the job tenure
and hours requirements of the legislation (Cantor et al. 2001).  Assum-
ing that the estimated share of workers who meet the eligibility
requirements applies to the subset of workers employed at private
establishments, roughly 47 percent of workers in private industry are
both covered and eligible for FMLA leave.6 
Low-income workers are much less likely to meet the eligibility
requirements than workers living in higher-income families.  Only 54
percent of workers with annual family incomes less than $20,000, who
are covered under the FMLA, meet the eligibility criteria.  In contrast,
nearly 89 percent of workers with annual family incomes above
$50,000, who are covered under the FMLA, meet the eligibility criteria
(author’s calculations from data presented in Cantor et al. 2001). 
State Policies
Eligibility for state family leaves differs from state to state.  Typi-
cally, however, employees must work full time to be eligible.  Many
state laws also include a job tenure requirement.  Both hours and job
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tenure requirements tend to make more low-income workers ineligible
for benefits than higher-income workers.  Job tenure requirements will
prevent recent welfare-leavers from accessing benefits.
Private Establishment Policies 
Although no comparable data exist on employee eligibility for
leave benefits provided through private employer policies in the late
1990s, the BLS does collect information about the length of service
required before workers are eligible for vacation leave and paid sick
leave.  In firms with more than 100 employees, 91 percent of full-time
blue-collar and service workers must meet a service requirement, gen-
erally one year on the job, before they are eligible to take vacation
leave (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999b).  In contrast, only 78 per-
cent of full-time professional and technical employees in large firms
are required to meet a service requirement before they are eligible to
take vacation leave.  The service requirement for professional and tech-
nical occupations is, on average, only six months (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 1999b).  A majority of all workers in large firms must
work at least three months before they are eligible to take sick leave.
The share of blue-collar and service workers in large firms who must
meet a tenure requirement before being eligible for sick leave is 73 per-
cent; only 54 percent of professional and technical workers in large
firms must meet a tenure requirement.
The data presented from the BLS surveys so far is for full-time
employees.  The BLS allows survey respondents to define full time.
For the majority of workers full time is equal to 30 or more hours per
week.  Part-time workers are much less likely to have access to private
leave policies than full-time workers.  For example, only 15 percent of
part-time blue-collar and service workers in large firms are covered
under a paid sick leave policy.  In Table 2 the comparable share among
full-time workers is 35 percent.
Summary: Family Leave Eligibility
As was the case with coverage, low-income workers and workers
in blue-collar and service occupations are less likely to be eligible for
family leave benefits.  The service requirements for both private leave
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policies and the FMLA restrict access to family leave benefits to work-
ers who have some job tenure.  As a result, caregivers who are transi-
tioning off of welfare and other new entrants into the workforce will
not have family leave protections at their new jobs, even if they work
full time.  
Access to Family Leave: Take-up
Among workers who have access to some leave from work, taking
family leave may be impracticable.  For workers who are not covered
under the FMLA, their private employer’s leave policies may not pro-
vide job protection.  While the caregiver is out on family leave, her job
may be eliminated or given to another employee.  Many workers fear
that taking leave from work for family leave purposes, especially for
caregiving reasons, will have a negative effect on how they are viewed
by their supervisors.  Research on workplace culture and parental leave
suggests that these fears are reasonable (Fried 1998). 
Leave guaranteed under the FMLA is unpaid.  Low-income work-
ers and primary earners in higher-income families may not be able to
forego earnings in order to take family leave.  In the Department of
Labor’s Survey of Employees, the most commonly reported reason for
not taking a needed family leave is the inability to afford leave.  Sev-
enty-eight percent of leave-needers felt they could not afford to take
family leave, and 88 percent of leave-needers said they would have
taken leave if they could have received some or additional pay during
the leave (Cantor et al. 2001). 
Among workers who did take leave, more than one-third received
no pay during their longest leave.  Receipt of pay during family leave is
positively related to income status.  Nearly three-quarters of workers
with annual incomes less than $20,000 reported receiving no pay dur-
ing their longest leave.  This large percentage does not include low-
income workers who were deterred from taking leave because they
could not afford it.  Among leave-takers who do not receive pay during
their leave, nearly 9 percent report using public assistance to replace
some of their lost income (Cantor et al. 2001).
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POLICIES TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO FAMILY LEAVE
Public policy can address many of the gaps in access to family
leave.  Given the unequal distribution of family leave access across
income strata and occupations, a case for public policy intervention on
the grounds of equity could be made.  Furthermore, in light of the rhet-
oric of responsibility and opportunity espoused in the PRWORA, it
seems appropriate to provide caregivers transitioning into the work-
force an equal opportunity to fulfill both their caregiving and their mar-
ket work responsibilities.
Since enactment of the FMLA, there have been a number of pro-
posals at the national and state levels to make family leave accessible.
Some of these proposals, along with a few novel ideas, are summarized
below.  In general family leave can be improved to meet the needs of
all working families in four broad ways:  1) expand coverage; 2)
expand eligibility; 3) expand reasons for leave-taking; and, 4) provide
remuneration during the leave.
Expand Coverage
In nearly every session of Congress since 1993, members have
introduced a bill that would lower the FMLA establishment size
threshold to 25.  As stated above, many states provide maternity-leave
coverage to women working in small firms.  Estimates from the 1999
NSAF suggest that reducing the FMLA threshold to 25 could increase
coverage rates by about 12 percentage points distributed fairly evenly
across low-income and higher-income workers (see Table 1).7
Expand Eligibility
Removing or reducing the job tenure and hours requirements in the
FMLA legislation would increase the proportion of covered workers
who are eligible for FMLA.  Expanding eligibility would be particu-
larly beneficial for low-income workers.  Recall that nearly half of cov-
ered low-income workers do not meet the FMLA eligibility
requirements.  New entrants to the workforce, such as recent welfare-
leavers, would benefit from a loosening of the job tenure requirement.
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Expand Benefits
Proposals at both the state and national levels have attempted to
augment the allowable reasons for leave under the FMLA or similar
state legislation.  In particular, permitting parents to take short periods
of time away from market work to attend parent/teacher conferences or
to take children to doctors’ appointments have been popular proposals.
Eight states have successfully enacted leave statutes that allow parents
to participate in their children’s educational activities.  Other proposals
for expanding benefits include allowing workers to take leave to care
for unrelated persons and for in-laws, expanding the length of leave,
and permitting leave for acute, emergency medical conditions.
Because low-income workers and welfare-leavers are more likely to
have children than higher-income workers, benefits that are targeted
toward parents could be particularly beneficial to them.
Provide Remuneration
Proposals to provide some wage replacement during family leaves
have received the most public attention.  Many states have proposed
changes in their Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems or expansions
of their Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs.  In addition
to these two policy options, other public mechanisms for providing
wage replacement during family leaves are discussed below.
Unemployment Insurance
In June 2000, the Department of Labor issued regulations allowing
states to extend UI benefits to workers on parental leave.  With revenue
collected through payroll taxes, the UI system provides partial wage
replacement for unemployed workers.  Each state has its own system
for determining both benefit amounts and program eligibility.  Typi-
cally, workers must meet both job tenure and work hour thresholds
before they are eligible for UI benefits.  Many state legislatures are
debating this option for providing paid leave.  As of February 2001,
only the Massachusetts legislature had passed “Baby UI” legislation;
the governor, however, did not sign the bill.
Using the UI system to provide partial wage replacement during
parental leaves would not benefit workers who are eligible for FMLA
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leave but who do not meet a state’s UI eligibility criteria, nor would it
provide wage replacement for any other form of family leave.  Women
and low-income workers are less likely to be eligible for UI benefits
than men and higher-income workers (Hobbie, Wittenburg, and Fish-
man 1999). 
Temporary Disability Insurance
Five states and Puerto Rico have TDI programs that provide partial
wage replacement to workers with nonwork related, short-term medi-
cal disabilities.  According to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, TDI policies must cover disabilities related to pregnancy and
childbirth.  TDI plans are funded by employee or employer contribu-
tions, or both, and benefit periods range from 26 weeks to 52 weeks.
TDI does not guarantee job protection.
The California and New Jersey legislatures have considered
expanding their state TDI programs to provide coverage during periods
of leave taken for family medical reasons.  In 1999, the New York leg-
islature debated allowing workers to collect TDI benefits during any
FMLA leave, during leaves for parent/teacher meetings, during
bereavement leave, and during leaves to care for household members
in medical situations not covered by the FMLA.  To date, none of these
TDI expansions have become law.
Other Insurance Programs
In Washington State, legislation was recently introduced to
develop family leave insurance.  The program would be funded
through a small payroll tax that employees and employers would split.
The insurance fund would provide a flat-rate, weekly stipend for five
weeks of family or medical leave.
There is growing concern among some policymakers about the
regressive nature of many payroll taxes.  Insurance funds could have a
progressive funding structure with low-income workers paying in less
than higher-income workers.  Some employers currently use a sliding-
fee scale approach to providing health insurance.  This model could be
emulated in a family insurance plan.
Family leave insurance funds could also be experience rated.8 The
Department of Labor Employee Survey provides a lot of data about
leave-takers that actuaries could use to help develop a model of family
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and medical leave-taking.  With experience rating, public policy could
mandate contributions to the family leave insurance fund from all
workers.  Contributions could be based on an employee’s probability
of taking leave and the expected amount of wages foregone during that
leave.  Mandated participation would ensure the largest risk pool and
would help avoid problems associated with adverse selection.  As a
result, family leave insurance funds created through public policy may
be preferable to private insurance plans.  However, as more caregivers
devote an increasing amount of time to the labor force and as the aver-
age age of workers increases, a private market for family leave insur-
ance could develop.
Tax Credits and Tax-Preferred Savings
The United States uses its income tax system not only to generate
revenue, but also as a means to provide income support to low-income
workers and to encourage savings.  A refundable tax credit, like the
Earned Income Tax Credit, could help ease the financial strain of fam-
ily leave for low-income families.  Unless the tax credit has an advance
payment option, the income from the tax credit will probably arrive
months after a leave was taken and the income needed.  The governor
of Massachusetts has proposed a tax credit to employers who provide
paid leave to help offset the costs of providing paid leave and to
encourage more employers to provide the benefit.
Currently many workers use Flexible Spending Accounts (FSA) to
save money for out-of-pocket medical costs and/or child care costs.
Contributions to FSAs are made on a pre-tax basis and workers are not
required to pay taxes on withdrawals.  A tax-preferred savings vehicle
modeled after FSAs could help workers save for family leaves.  With-
out either employer contributions or government assistance, however,
many low-income workers may not be able to save a sufficient amount
to cover wages lost during family leaves.
Welfare Funds
Due to rapidly declining welfare rolls and the relatively fixed
block-grant funding stream provided under PRWORA, most states cur-
rently have surplus welfare funds.  States have considerable discretion
in how they spend their surpluses, and they could use a portion of their
excess welfare funds to provide paid family leave for low-income
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workers.  Low-income workers and workers in low-wage occupations
are the least likely to have access to any paid leave.  Targeting publicly
funded paid leave at this group of workers could help offset gaps in pri-
vately provided leave policies.  Using surplus welfare funds to provide
welfare-leavers and other low-income workers with affordable access
to family leave could help these workers maintain their labor force
attachment and promote long-run economic security. 
State welfare systems may not always have surpluses.  When Con-
gress begins its deliberations over PRWORA reauthorization, the for-
mulas used to determine the size of federal block grants will receive a
lot of scrutiny.  Funding levels may not continue to exceed the cost of
covering core welfare benefits.  Furthermore, the rapid decline in wel-
fare participation over the past five years occurred during a strong
economy.  If the economy weakens, demands on state welfare systems
will likely increase.  Given the uncertainty of welfare surplus funds, it
does not make sense to develop a paid family leave program that relies
solely on the existence of a surplus.  Nevertheless, welfare surpluses
could provide states with a means for testing paid leave programs tar-
geted at low-income populations.
CONCLUSION
Public and private leave policies help many workers combine their
caregiving and market work responsibilities.  Access to leave benefits,
however, is not equal throughout the income distribution and across
occupations.  Coverage limits, eligibility criteria, and benefit levels
combine to limit access to family leave for low-income workers and
workers in blue-collar and service occupations.  As welfare reform
continues to influence the labor market behavior of low-income care-
givers, the need for family leave among the population of low-income
workers will grow.  Public policy can offer these vulnerable workers a
better opportunity for a successful transition into the workforce by




Opinions expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily repre-
sent the position of the Urban Institute or its sponsors.
1. This is not necessarily leave taken under the FMLA.  Many covered and eligible
workers do not know about the FMLA, and very few leave-takers actually ascribe
their leave to the FMLA.
2. Respondents could record reasons for more than one family leave.  A share of the
8 percent of workers who took maternity leave probably took parental leave as
well.
3. See the National Partnership for  Women and Families Web site (http://
www.nationalpartnership.org) for updated news about state legislative activity.
4. Tables 1 and 4 use data from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF).
The NSAF provides nationally representative estimates for the civilian, noninsti-
tutionalized population under age 65 and their families.
5. The NSAF asks about the number of employees that work at the respondent’s
worksite.  Some of these workers may actually be covered under the FMLA if
their employers have additional worksites within a 75-mile radius of the respon-
dent’s worksite.  In a recent Department of Labor report, more than 91 percent of
all FMLA-covered workers were deemed covered because their worksites
employed at least 50 workers; less than 9 percent were covered only after consid-
ering additional worksites close to the employee’s worksite.
6. Data from the 2000 Survey of Employees commissioned by the Department of
Labor provides a significantly higher estimate of the percentage of workers cov-
ered by the FMLA than data from the 2000 Survey of Establishments, also com-
missioned by the Department of Labor.  The estimated share of covered workers
from the Survey of Employees is 77 percent.  Although this estimate includes
workers in the public as well as the private sector, the estimate is substantially
higher than the estimate generated from the Survey of Establishments (58 per-
cent).  The estimate derived from the Survey of Employees, if accurate, would
suggest a significant increase in the proportion of workers employed in firms that
met FMLA coverage criteria from 1995 to 1999.  However, BLS data from a sim-
ilar time period is not suggestive of such an increase.  As a result, estimates of the
percentage of covered and eligible workers derived from the Department of Labor
survey are not reported here.  (See Appendix C in Cantor et al. [2001] for a more
detailed discussion of the inconsistent estimates.)
7. Most people who work for small businesses work for very small firms—those
with fewer than 25 employees.  For example, the data in Table 1 suggest that 77
percent of low-income workers employed in worksites with fewer than 50
employees work in firms with fewer than 25 employees (77 percent = 100 x [43.3/
(43.3 + 13.0)]).  The comparable rate for higher-income workers is 73 percent.
8. The two technical terms in this paragraph—experience rated and adverse selec-
tion—are often found in the field of public economics.  Insurance companies and
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programs use experience ratings to determine how much to charge their clients.
Premiums are based on the probability that the insured will experience the activity
that the insurance covers.  For example, Unemployment Insurance programs
determine the tax rate that a firm pays into the program from the firm’s history
with layoffs.
Adverse selection arises when people who are most likely to receive benefits
from insurance are the people who are most likely to purchase insurance.  For
example, an individual with a chronic health condition that requires treatment
may be more likely to purchase health insurance than a healthy person.  Very high
premium costs can result from adverse selection.  Private insurance companies
often exclude preexisting conditions from coverage to help dampen the effects of
adverse selection.
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